FARYAB: A VIEW FROM MAIMANA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 KABUL 000657 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM, INR/B STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA USFOR-A FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2020 TAGS: KDEM PGOV TU AF SUBJECT: FARYAB: A VIEW FROM MAIMANA Classified By: Interagency Provincial Affairs Deputy Director Hoyt Yee for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Governor Shafaq, local Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) leaders, PRT Maimana military and civilian representatives all regard insurgency as the principal challenge facing Faryab province. They express their strongest concerns about Ghormach district, but see the entire "Pashtun belt," stretching northeast along the Turkmenistan border as a haven for anti-government fighters ) both the ideologically-motivated warriors and the "$10 a day" combatants simply seeking a paycheck. The weak performance of the Afghan Border Police (ABP) and the absence of Turkmenistan forces close to the border facilitate insurgent activity in this corridor. The Governor and the Afghan National Police (ANP) Chief favor the establishment of militias to enhance the counterinsurgency effort. From a governance and development perspective, Faryab presents a fragmented picture: a "Lone Ranger" Governor, a self-styled reformer with little confidence in other government officials; a newly-elected Provincial Council unsure of its role; and line ministry officials with differing approaches to incorporating popular wishes into the province,s development plans. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) During their January 16-18 visit to Maimana, PRT Mazar PolOff and PolAssistant had the opportunity to attend the Faryab Provincial Security Meeting and to meet with the Governor, Chief of Police, NDS Chief, members of the newly-elected Provincial Council, and the provincial directors of two line ministries: Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD),and Economy (MinEcon). They also met with UNAMA political officers based in Maimana; the Norwegian-led Maimana PRT,s military commander and civilian affairs supervisor; and members of the U.S. Army,s Task Force Warrior based in Maimana. SECURITY Security Meeting: Of Ghormach and Militias -------------- ¶3. (C) Mazar Poloffs and RC-North Rule of Law Coordinator met Governor Abdul Haq Shafaq during the January 17 Provincial Security Meeting and, later, at a dinner at the Governor,s Guest House. At the Security Meeting, the Governor was full of praise for U.S. forces operating in the area (both Special Forces and Police Mentors) and critical of the Norwegian-led PRT, depicting the latter as ineffectual and reluctant to engage the enemy. (NOTE: A week following our visit, a Norwegian soldier died in insurgent-prone Ghormach district when his vehicle hit an IED. END NOTE.) In particular, the Governor charged that a Norwegian patrol was only 500 meters away when insurgents kidnapped two Chinese road construction workers and Afghan guards in Ghormach district. He complained that foreign forces and the ANSF so far have not demonstrated that they can effectively counter the insurgents. He called for both an increase in ANSF forces and establishment of militias, echoing a call we had heard in an earlier meeting with Faryab Chief of Police Khalil Andarabi. The Governor added that, if the combined efforts of foreign forces, ANSF and militias failed to crush the insurgency, he would write a letter to President Karzai requesting that the President return Ghormach district to Baghdis Province. (COMMENT: Shafaq did not specify how shifting administrative control of Ghormach to another province would prevent Ghormach from remaining a source of instability for Faryab. END COMMENT.) ¶4. (C) Ongoing instability in Ghormach infused the discussion at the Security Meeting, which featured brief remarks by PRT representatives and the heads of the security services, interspersed with extended remarks by the Governor. The Governor reported that in the wake of the recent kidnapping, the Chinese construction company building the Ring Road through the Qeysar and Ghormach districts had cancelled its contract, leaving uncertain the fate of the "Faryab 500" ) the 500 primarily ethnic Uzbek security forces the Asian Development Bank had funded to provide security for the northwestern Afghan portion of this national road construction project. Not surprisingly, the ANSF leaders attending the Security meeting supported the Governor,s suggestion that he advise the Ministry of Interior that the Faryab Provincial Government wishes to keep the 500-strong contingent in Faryab. ANP, ABP, and NDS: Where,s the Beef? -------------- KABUL 00000657 002 OF 005 ¶5. (C) Like most ANP Chiefs, Police Chief Andarabi maintains that he lacks sufficient personnel to adequately patrol all the other districts of the province, let alone Ghormach. In a meeting with PolOffs, he defended his limited deployment of police to outlying districts, citing competing requirements, including traffic control and protection of government officials and offices in Maimana. With respect to Ghormach, Andarabi argued that the police are saddled with a task more properly assigned to the ANA and foreign forces, and that his ANP are outgunned by the insurgents. U.S. military colleagues cited another obstacle to successful ANP efforts in Ghormach ) glitches in the disbursement of salaries to police serving there, including lags in the Ministry of Interior forwarding conflict zone bonus payments. ¶6. (C) Notwithstanding the focus on Ghormach as a primary source of instability in Faryab, several of our interlocutors cited concerns about insurgent activities in the "Pashtun belt" extending from Ghormach to the northeast, along the Turkmen border, towards Andkhoy. Andarabi complained of the ineffectiveness of widely-spaced Afghan Border Police stationed in or beyond the mountains extending along a line roughly parallel to the border. According to Andarabi, many of the ABP are residents of the areas they patrol and, he suggested, are reluctant to act against some of the insurgents. Moreover, he reported that insurgents can easily evade pursuit by ABP or other ANSF by temporarily crossing the border into Turkmenistan. He and others claimed that Turkmenistan leaves a swath of its territory undefended, deploying its own forces some 20 km away from the border. ¶7. (C) The ABP are widely regarded as the weakest link in Faryab,s security structure. The PRT Maimana Commander and the ANP and NDS Chiefs referenced an ANP-devised plan to pull the ABP forces back to Maimana for a few weeks of training, temporarily replacing them with a contingent of ABP seconded from elsewhere in the region. Then, rather than redeploying the ABP to their former locations close to the border, they would deploy ABP soldiers to positions further east, closer to the Ring Road. In those positions, the ANP personnel could support their ABP colleagues and, together, the two forces could enhance protection of the more populated areas of the province. Whatever the merits of this plan, it is not clear that the ABP itself supports it. ¶8. (C) PRT Maimana contacts share the view that the ANSF needs to provide more and better-trained security forces in the Pashtun belt. But they observe that the predominantly Tajik and Uzbek composition of the ANP in Faryab presents challenges. According to PRT Maimana military and civilian contacts, on some occasions when the ANP has supported ABP operations in the Pashtun belt, ANP personnel have beaten up local residents. ¶9. (C) While ANP Chief Andarabi,s reputation among our foreign Faryab-based contacts is mixed ) one likened Andarabi to Tony Soprano ) the consensus view is that NDS Chief Gen. Abdul Hafiz manages his portfolio effectively. He is cooperative and provides accurate and actionable intelligence to foreign forces operating in the area. "Gateway to the North": Plugging the Gap -------------- ¶10. (C) Foreign and Afghan interlocutors alike noted Faryab,s history as the "gateway to the north," and expressed consternation that, in their view, ANSF and ISAF have not been allocating sufficient financial and human resources and materiel to prevent insurgents from using Ghormach and Faryab,s Pashtun belt to advance further into northern Afghanistan. Both groups discounted the ideological appeal of the insurgents, seeing financial incentives as the key motivating factor for most of the combatants. Military contacts referred to the majority of recruits as "$10 a day soldiers" who would be just as happy to have alternative means of earning a living. GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT Governor Shafaq: The "Lone Ranger" -------------- ¶11. (C) During a dinner at his official guest house for PRT Mazar Poloff, PolAsst and RC-North Rule of Law Coordinator, Governor Abdul Haq Shafaq reiterated his praise of U.S. forces in the area, contrasting their performance with that of the Norwegian and Latvian forces from PRT Maimana. He fondly recalled Ambassador Eikenberry,s October 2009 visit, as well as his visit several years ago to Nebraska, KABUL 00000657 003 OF 005 California, New Mexico and Washington, DC as a participant in an International Visitors program for selected Afghanistan provincial governors. Shafaq gives the impression of being very pro-American. ¶12. (C) Others view Shafaq ) and he views himself ) as an outsider. As a Sar-e-Pol native and a Hazara, he seems somewhat insulated from some of the ethnic rivalries (especially between the predominant Uzbeks and the Pashtuns). To all appearances, President Karzai is his principal power base. Faryab-based UNAMA interlocutors characterize him as a balancer of interests, as being above the fray, and say that local residents seem to appreciate his role. Military and civilian contacts at the PRT are less enthusiastic, noting that the Governor has spent much of the past several months outside of Faryab, most recently spending 2 or 3 weeks in Kabul. (Both UNAMA and PRT contacts speculate that, having served as Governor of three different provinces to date - Sar-e-Pol, Samangan and Faryab ) Shafaq was in Kabul to lobby for an assignment there, perhaps a ministerial appointment.) Afghan interlocutors evinced no strong feelings (pro or con) about the Governor. ¶13. (C) Shafaq said he distrusts the majority of officials of Faryab ) that he can count on one hand the number of people who merit his trust. He portrayed himself as responsive to individual constituents who contact him with their concerns, including regarding alleged corruption among public officials. He purports to conduct his own investigations into malfeasance, and to have secured the demotion of some public officials caught defrauding the public. He even claims to go undercover to monitor the behavior of officials. Shafaq said he believes his anti-corruption moves have sparked significant changes in official behavior; however, he added that such changes will only take hold permanently if others clean up the justice sector. ¶14. (C) The Governor also casts himself as a reformer vis--vis the IDLG. Convinced that other Governors divert much of their monthly representational allowances (from operational budgets received from the IDLG) to their own accounts or in support of their own private interests, Shafaq said he had opted to save most of his monthly allowances in order to fund construction of the reception hall in the Governor,s official guest house. According to Shafaq, IDLG officials long had resisted this use of representational funds, but finally relented. He reported that he again is setting aside a substantial portion of his representational allowance ) this time, in order to fund upgrades to rooms in the building housing the Governor,s Office. ¶15. (C) Although he touched upon counternarcotics efforts only briefly, the Governor considers Faryab to be poppy-free. He ignores contrary evidence from Ghormach, presumably because he considers Ghormach a part of Baghdis, rather than Faryab. (UNODC has taken the same approach; in 2009 it declared Faryab poppy-free and, as a result, Faryab received Good Performers, Initiative funding.) ¶16. (C) Shafaq initially skirted PolOff,s question about his own political future. But he then advised that he understands that President Karzai plans to keep him in his position "for now." Provincial Council: A Slow Start -------------- ¶17. (C) Inaugurated approximately a week before PolOffs, arrival, the Provincial Council had met only once when PolOffs paid an initial call on eight of the members, including the Chairman and one of the female members. The members in attendance seemed puzzled by PolOff,s inquiries regarding the leading concerns of their constituents, their vision of the role of the Council and their near-term agenda. The Chairman, one of many new members of the Council, wondered aloud how members could know anything about Faryab residents, primary concerns, given that the members had just assumed their positions. Similarly, he considered it too early in the new Council,s tenure to speculate about the Council,s near-term or long-term priorities. ¶18. (C) Impatient with the course of the discussion, one member challenged the efforts of the international community, asking "Where,s the development?" This sparked a heated discussion of the international donor community,s and Afghan Government,s perceived neglect of Faryab. PolAsst noted evidence that Faryab had received substantial benefits over the past several years, especially in Maimana; as a result, KABUL 00000657 004 OF 005 the province enjoys many kilometers of well-paved roads and relatively extensive and reliable access to electricity. (NOTE: USAID program funding in Faryab totaled $7.9 million between October 2007 and September 2008. END NOTE.) ¶19. (C) Later in the meeting, one member commented that the building in which the Faryab Provincial Council meets actually belongs to the Ministry of Agriculture. He suggested that one way to support local governance would be for donors to consider providing the Council with its own building. Junbesh Party Officials: Hiring the Capable -------------- ¶20. (C) Junbesh party officials, concerns about Faryab,s security situation paralleled those of government officials. Provincial party leader Mohammad Asef Paiman remained tight-lipped about prospects for appointment of a Junbesh member as Governor, and declined to assess Governor Shafaq,s performance. (COMMENT: Junbesh support undoubtedly played a strong role in delivering 60 percent of the vote to Karzai in the 2009 election; accordingly, Junbesh contacts are hopeful that a Junbesh member will be the next Faryab Governor. END COMMENT.) However, Paiman highlighted the need for improvements in governance, and drew particular attention to the civil service hiring system, which he regards as corrupt. He decried the low capacity of government officials occupying senior positions in line ministries, both at the national and provincial level. He declared that even though he holds a Ph.D. in Economics, he has avoided applying for government positions, not wanting to risk losing out to applicants with less education and thereby becoming a laughingstock among his friends. MRRD and MinEcon: Power to the People? -------------- ¶21. (C) Faryab Director for MRRD Amanullah Salimi provided an overview of his Department,s efforts in support of provincial development and its collaboration with the Afghan National Disaster Management Authority (ANDMA) and other agencies in responding to emergency situations. In his view, the existing process for determining development priorities works as designed; Community Development Councils (CDCs) and District Development Assemblies (DDAs) are operating effectively (and democratically) in assembling and conveying their recommendations upward to provincial and central government decision makers. The Director offered no complaints about GIRoA,s prioritization and allocation of development spending, but did offer criticism of international donors for declining to underwrite his plan to assist a village that had lost access to its sole water source after an avalanche. He suggested that a few thousand dollars could fund the digging of a well that would enable much of the village,s population to return to their homes. ¶22. (C) The Acting Director of the Provincial Office of the Economy Ministry (MinEcon),his assistant and their USAID-funded advisor were hard at work developing a current Provincial Development Plan (PDP),but were finding the work challenging. Both MinEcon officials had arrived within the past two years and have no support staff. ¶23. (C) PolOffs raised questions about the degree to which MinEcon,s process for establishing the PDP reflects the will of the populace. Apparently, residents meet at the village level and come up with a list of proposed projects, but then representatives of only six villages within each district (regardless of the number of villages within a district) are invited to argue their case at the district level. There, MinEcon relies upon District Governors (who are appointed, not elected) to determine which villages should be represented. Then, with the assistance of "sectoral" representatives from the local offices of line ministries (also not elected),the District Governor determines which projects merit consideration at the provincial level. ¶24. (C) PolOffs observed that such an approach likely facilitates quicker decision making; however, it also undercuts governance objectives by making the process less democratic and more "top down." The process as outlined by provincial-level MinEcon officials appeared to minimize the input of grassroots-based CDCs and DDAs in developing Faryab,s Provincial Development Plan. COMMENT -------------- KABUL 00000657 005 OF 005 ¶25. (C) Governor Shafaq is an engaging interlocutor and appears genuinely committed to improving governance in Faryab. But our sense is that his go-it-alone, trust-no-one approach to fighting corruption will limit his effectiveness in changing the way other government officials in the province carry out their responsibilities. Absent a cadre of capable good governance adherents in the line ministries and his own office willing to follow his lead, progress likely will remain halting. Shafaq may not have the opportunity to remain much longer as Faryab Governor, despite his understanding that President Karzai intends to keep him in place "for now." "For now" embraces a wide range of possibilities; it could mean a week, a month, a year, or more. Moreover, according to Junbesh contacts elsewhere in the North, Faryab,s governorship is high on the party,s wish list to reward its support for Karzai,s second-term victory. EIKENBERRY Eikenberry