KARZAI AMENABLE TO ECC CHANGE, FOCUSED ON CAPACITY

S E C R E T KABUL 000606

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2020
TAGS: PGOV AF PREL
SUBJECT: KARZAI AMENABLE TO ECC CHANGE, FOCUSED ON CAPACITY
BUILDING

Classified By: Ambassador Eikenberry for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: President Karzai expressed confidence in the
ongoing Marja operation in a meeting with General McChrystal
and me on February 16. Speaking privately with me afterward,
Karzai was receptive to the suggestion that the Electoral
Complaints Commission (ECC) include two international
members, in contrast to the decree recently passed by
Karzai's cabinet that would strip the commission of all
international members. I told Karzai that I would be holding
VTCs with principals on February 16 and then with the NSC the
next day and that elections and reconciliation and
reintegration were likely to be the top issues raised in
those discussions. While battling an ongoing throat ailment,
Karzai appeared confident and alert during the meeting. End
Summary.



2. (C) Karzai was receptive to General McChrystal's briefing
on the Marja operation, and was particularly appreciative of
COMISAF's explanation of the circumstances that led to
civilian casualties during the operation, and of the steps
ISAF forces are taking to learn from this incident and to
avoid civilian casualties in the future. General McChyrstal
assured Karzai that preventing civilian casualties is one of
his highest concerns. The President, expressing confidence in
the military operation, said he understood the explanation of
the event, and that he hoped to travel to Marja as soon as
the security situation would permit.

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ECC - Progress Still Possible
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3. (C) After reviewing the way ahead and sequencing of
bilateral events for the coming year, I raised the issue of
modifying the ECC. I told Karzai I endorsed the plan that UN
SRSG Kai Eide put forward to have two international
representatives as commissioners on the ECC, with the caveat
that at least one vote from a foreign commissioner would be
required for a ruling to pass. This plan, I explained, would
please Afghans because it speaks to their desire for
sovereignty, but also obviates the risk that, if something
goes wrong, all the blame will fall on the Karzai
Administration. This interim step, I said, can start the
process of nationalizing the ECC, while retaining
international support as Afghanistan works on developing the
capacity of its electoral systems. Karzai acknowledged that
Eide had raised this idea with him, and said he agreed with
the plan and would proceed on implementing it. Speaking of
the long term, Karzai emphasized his interest in
strengthening Afghanistan's electoral institutions, and cited
India, with its impartial and respected elections system, as
a model he thinks Afghanistan should emulate. (Comment: We
immediately called Eide after this conversation, and urged
him to bring this issue to a close when Eide meets with
Karzai in the next few days. Eide told us on 17 February he
would see Karzai the next day and had been informed by the
President's Chief of Staff Dauzdai that Karzai has agreed to
the proposal.)


4. (C) When asked whether Independent Elections Commission
(IEC) chief Azizullah Ludin would remain in his position,
which, by law, he should have vacated in January, Karzai
acknowledged the concerns surrounding Ludin, but cited his
stubbornness as a reason to retain him. If Karzai intended
to have a fresh start with the upcoming elections, I
countered, it would be beneficial to have a fresh face at the
IEC. Karzai replied that he had not yet seriously considered
potential replacements for Ludin but seemed to recognize the
need for change.

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Capacity Building - Priority for Second Term
--------------


5. (C) After reflecting on some of the weaknesses of the IEC
and ECC, Karzai expressed his wish to focus on improving
capacity throughout his government's civil service. I cited
the extensive work the U.S. is doing in training sixteen
thousand civil servants through USAID programs, but also
acknowledged the need for longer-term training. I said that
I had recently met with the head of the Civil Society
Institute (CSI),who seemed to have a direction and vision
for the institute, and I encouraged Karzai to do the same.
Karzai agreed to go soon and assess the CSI director. I
noted the large gains Afghanistan has already made in
capacity building since 2002, especially in the form of
increased human capacity brought about by a new generation of

educated Afghans who are graduating and entering the work
force. This cadre of people will allow for sustained
institution building, I said.


6. (C) I informed Karzai that I had recently met with the
Kabul mayor, as part of a US initiative to work closely with
the Kabul City Municipality to help develop and beautify the
capital. In the short term, I said, we are focused on
helping the city prepare to host the conference this spring,
so the international community will see that Kabul is a city
that is coming back to life. The development of Kabul, I
said, is a key legacy for the people of Afghanistan.

-------------- --------------
Structure Needed for Reconciliation & Reintegration
-------------- --------------


7. (S) Karzai asked me about the New York Times report
regarding the capture of Mullah Barader, which I acknowledged
was true. Responding to my comment that it is yet another
example of U.S. government employees leaking sensitive
information to the media, Karzai quipped that "this is a good
leak." I offered to arrange a briefing for Karzai by our
Chief of Station, which he readily accepted. I asked Karzai
if Barader was from his tribe, and what he thought of his
capture. He replied that Barader was from the same tribe, and
that he had long been viewed as someone who is a soft target
for reconciliation. He only became more radicalized, Karzai
claimed, after there was a security raid on his house, which
prompted him to move to Pakistan. Karzai said he would like
to have Barader in Afghan custody, because he felt that
Barader could prove useful in advancing reconciliation. If
they treat him with respect, Karzai said, Barader could
encourage many Taliban leaders to follow his example of
returning to Afghan society. He added that transferring
Barader to Afghan custody would be a sign that Pakistan is in
clear support of reaching a peaceful settlement of the
Taliban problem with Afghanistan, Karzai said.


8. (C) I contrasted for Karzai the difference between
reconciliation and reintegration, saying that reconciliation
is a process, whereas reintegration involves practical work
that requires a machinery to support it. Karzai raised the
possibility that Sibghatullah Mojaddidy would leave the
Senate to become the "spiritual" leader of the reintegration
effort and confirmed that Stanekzai would serve as the
pragmatic leader for reintegration. As there are
increasingly positive signs that reintegration can work, I
said, it is becoming more urgent that GIRoA develop the
mechanism that will support the reintegration effort. I
suggested it would be helpful to have this mechanism set up
before Karzai's proposed trip to Washington this spring, and
the President agreed.


9. (C) Seeking to preclude any misunderstandings, I informed
Karzai that I had met with Abdullah Abdullah February 15 and
was surprised by his positive assessment of the security
situation, which he described as improving. Abdullah also
offered his support for the Marja operation, which he saw as
a building block for Afghans' sense of confidence that their
country is heading in the right direction. Karzai asked me
if Abdullah was still in town and was amused to learn that he
is in France, where he is being honored by the French
Socialist Party.


10. (C) Karzai continues to battle a throat ailment that has
been bothering him since his trip to Munich earlier this
month. I asked him if he would like to receive treatment
from a U.S. military doctor, especially if there was one in
theater who specializes in treating throats. Karzai said
that he would appreciate that. (Comment: I have known Karzai
for many years and know he is not one to complain about his
health. His readiness to seek further medical treatment
shows that he is either in great pain, or troubled by his
illness, or both. USFOR-A did send an ENT specialist, who
diagnosed Karzai as simply suffering from a very persistent
common cold.)
Eikenberry