CORRECTED COPY: IDLG DIRECTOR POPAL MEETS WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000570 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM, INR/B STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA USFOR-A FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2020 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM AF SUBJECT: CORRECTED COPY: IDLG DIRECTOR POPAL MEETS WITH AMBASSADOR: MOVING AHEAD ON THE DISTRICT DELIVERY PROGRAM Classified By: Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: In the course of a February 6 meeting with the Ambassador, Independent Director of Local Governance (IDLG) Jelani Popal previewed his upcoming visit to Helmand to help finalize preparations for the rollout there of the District Delivery Program (DDP). He indicated he can work with the U.S. approach to supporting DDP but said he hopes over time that all donors will adopt the approach and funding mechanism being employed for Helmand,s Nad Ali district, with funding going primarily through the Ministry of Finance. He confirmed that the President has signed a decree designating the IDLG as the coordinating agency within GIRoA for DDP. On election reform, he endorsed the replacement of the head and the chief electoral officer of the Independent Election Commission (IEC) as well as the introduction of much stricter vetting standards for candidates in this year's parliamentary election. He also called for reducing international representation on the Election Complaint Commission from three positions to one. Popal said that governors in Paktika, Uruzgan, Ghazni, Baghlan, Takhar and Samargan provinces will soon be changed out. The Ambassador raised concerns about several other sitting governors, and the IDLG chief accepted his offer of additional background information on them. End summary. Comparing notes on the District Delivery Program -------------- --- ¶2. (SBU) On February 6 the Ambassador hosted IDLG Director Popal to a dinner attended also by the Embassy,s Coordinating Director for Development and Economic Affairs Ambassador Wayne and USAID Deputy Mission Director Black. Popal explained that the next day he would be leading a 50-person delegation including several ministers and deputy ministers; National Directorate of Security (NDS) officials; and several Afghan journalists to Helmand to help finalize preparations for and publicize the rollout of the District Delivery Program in Nad Ali district. Popal noted that the IDLG,s own role in DDP has been strengthened by the President,s signature of a decree designating his agency as GIRoA,s coordinator for the program. When Popal expressed 
some doubt that the President would make another trip to Helmand in advance of the upcoming operation in Marjah, the Ambassador pressed him to encourage the President to go. ¶3. (U) Popal described the DDP as a "bottom-up" program "with national involvement." In the form being launched in Nad Ali (with the UK playing the lead international role, the program involves filling vacant civil service positions and using block grant funds through the Ministry of Finance to pay for projects and services at the provincial and district level. The specifics of the district plan have emerged from consultations led by the Governor that have included local stakeholders and ministry representatives from Kabul (Popal put the input mix as 20 percent local and 80 percent Kabul). The plan also allows local residents a degree of influence over where national-level initiatives are undertaken, e.g. the exact location of a health center. Interaction between ministry representatives and the Provincial Development Committee on the DDP plan is meant to ensure it remains aligned with the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) and national-level priorities. The Provincial Council is also taking part in the plan,s review to help keep some degree of balance between what is going into Helmand,s various districts. Popal acknowledged that other donors may initially prefer to support a slightly different model and funding approach; but he said he hoped that over time, the UK model, including extensive channeling of funds through the Ministry of Finance, would be adopted more broadly. ¶4. (U) The Ambassador noted the Embassy,s interest in hearing from the IDLG on lessons learned from DDP implementation in Nad Ali; Popal indicated a willingness to share planned monthly progress reports. For his part, Ambassador Wayne recalled the elements of the U.S. approach, namely using a basic government services package as a starting point for any district, tailored as needed to the realities on the ground. This would be combined with funds through the Ministry of Finance to support salary supplements and operational expenses as well as some specific, community-requested projects that for the first year at least would be funded through existing USAID programs. USAID will also target DDP districts with its full array of programs and include those districts within the focus of its other income-generation initiatives. Popal indicated the IDLG can work with this approach. KABUL 00000570 002 OF 003 Parliamentary elections -------------- ¶5. (C) The Ambassador encouraged Popal to press President Karzai to the take action soon on replacing the top officials of the Independent Election Commission (IEC) and on instituting needed electoral reforms to enable the International Community to offer financial support for the elections. Popal agreed that both IEC head Ludin and chief electoral officer Najafi have become too controversial to be left in place. Regarding reform, he called for two basic changes ) reducing the international representation on the Elections Complaints Commission from three positions to one so Afghans will hold the majority; and tightening the vetting of candidates so as to exclude warlords, criminals and other undesirables. He suggested current candidate vetting through the Disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) is woefully inadequate. He warned that, under the present system, the new parliament could continue to include many drug traffickers and other malefactors. He would therefore support replacement of the key IEC personnel and initiating a very severe vetting process for candidates running for a seat in the Lower House. The IDLG Director advised that major international stakeholders looking for action from Karzai on electoral reform should approach him individually rather than as a group. Sub-national Governance Policy -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Asked about his statements at the London Conference suggesting the Cabinet will soon approve the long-awaited Sub-National Governance Policy, Popal said he is hoping to have it on the agenda of next week,s Cabinet meeting. He acknowledged there may be "one or two" ministries that still have some reservations, but he expressed confidence that the President will push the policy through, given his support for it. Governor Appointments -------------- ¶7. (C) Popal indicated there will be governor changes soon in Paktika, Uruzgan, Ghazni, Baghlan, Takhar and Samargan provinces. He said he is also trying hard to get Atta and Sherzai removed but is not optimistic he will succeed. Contrary to fairly widely held concerns, Popal insisted Atta,s removal would have no impact on security. He claimed that most Pashtuns, Hazaras and Uzbeks do not support Atta, and Tajik support is divided, with half of it going to President Karzai. He said Vice President Fahim Khan has been lobbying for retention of Atta (despite their differences during the Presidential election). Popal reasoned that this is simply a case of Tajik warlords protecting one another. He insisted Governors should represent President Karzai (which Atta has not),and exceptions should not be made simply because particular governors might be effective at maintaining security. He conceded, however, that Karzai is reluctant to remove Atta since he provides a good counterweight to the influence of Dostum (with Uzbeks) and Mohaqeq (with Hazaras) in Balkh. To underscore the importance of keeping Mohaqeq,s influence in check, he went on to recall how Ismail Khan had managed to put a halt to earlier efforts by the Iranians to purchase land via Afghan Shias in an attempt to extend their influence from Herat to Hazara areas inside the country. On Sherzai, Popal suggested the Governor,s good personal relationship with the President was likely to keep him in his current job. ¶8. (C) The Ambassador raised a number of other governors not cited by Popal as due for replacement soon. On Kapisa, the AMB indicated both the French and U.S. have very negative things to say about Governor Abobaker. Popal admitted the IDLG too has received some adverse reports, but he did not say explicitly that Abobaker is going to be removed. Regarding Governor Salangi in Parwan, about whom the Ambassador also expressed concern, the IDLG chief said simply that his own criticism of Salangi is not criminal-related but is based in the Governor,s lack of competence. He also cited the recent incident in which Salangi tried to steer the Koreans to lease land for their new PRT from friends of the Governor rather than provide government land, as the Koreans preferred (and the IDLG had instructed). Ambassador Wayne raised concerns about Paktya Governor Hamdard and corruption. Popal insisted he has received no complaints about the Governor and feels he has been doing a good job. Popal suggested that any criticism of Hamdard could be rooted in the fact that the Governor and the NDS are at odds and the KABUL 00000570 003 OF 003 Governor has important detractors in both Dostum and Atta, rivals from the north. Popal said he would be happy to receive any additional information on Hamdard or others cited by the Ambassador if such information went beyond the reports already in the hands of the NDS, to which he has access. The Ambassador offered to follow up. ¶9. (SBU) Particularly in light of the roll-out of the District Delivery Program in Helmand, Popal mentioned that he had already informed Governor Mangal that he will need to remain in place in Helmand for another year. Asked about President Karzai's failure during a recent visit to praise Governor Mangal publicly while repeatedly making favorable references to local strongman Shir Mohammad Akhundzada, Popal insisted that Mangal remains on a firm footing with Karzai and that it would have been against normal cultural practices for the President to publicly endorse someone already endorsed as his local agent by virtue of his position as governor. In this context, he told the Ambassador he is considering instituting a practice of providing governors in hard-pressed provinces like Helmand periodic, two-week breaks to help them cope with the demands of their job. ¶10. (C) Comment: Obviously recovered from the rigors of last year,s election and its aftermath, Popal appeared upbeat and in control. The Presidential decree strengthening his hand on DDP is likely reinforcing the general enthusiasm we have seen for some time now from the IDLG for the District Delivery Program. It remains to be seen whether this sign of Presidential backing will extend to Presidential support in the Cabinet for endorsement there in the proximate future of the new Sub-National Governance policy (on hold since August),as Popal predicts. We were certainly left unconvinced by his suggestion that Governor Atta in Balkh has only negligible remaining support; a recent visit to Balkh by the Ambassador would indicate otherwise. ¶10. (SBU) Comment (cont'd) We plan to follow up with Popal,s deputy when he returns to Afghanistan this week to ensure we have full understanding and support from the IDLG for our &basic services package8 approach and our proposed funding mechanism. We will also pursue with the IDLG our concern over the retention, at least for now, of a number of current, badly performing (or worse) governors. End Comment. Eikenberry