WHITHER BALKH PROVINCE GOVERNOR ATTA?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000475

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM, INR/B
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA
USFOR-A FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2020
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID AF
SUBJECT: WHITHER BALKH PROVINCE GOVERNOR ATTA?

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Classified By: Interagency Provincial Affairs Acting Coordinator Hoyt Y
ee for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Balkh Governor Usted Mohammad Noor Atta told
us that the decision as to whether he stays on as Governor of
Balkh or moves on to some opposition role lies with him, as
well as President Karzai. Atta named Junbesh Party Chairman
Sayed Noorullah as his most likely replacement, should he
(Atta) leave. On the new cabinet, he criticized Karzai for
failing to use a &participatory approach8 in nominating
ministers and for compiling a slate of &weak8 candidates.
On local issues, he predicted that the incoming Balkh
Provincial COUNCIL would support him; the new COUNCIL
already has followed his recommendations in electing its
leadership. Reacting to the rocketing of our Herat Consulate
building, Atta suggested similar attacks in Mazar would be
unlikely, and that he looked forward to swift progress in
opening the Mazar Consulate. The Governor reiterated his
long-standing pitch for more development assistance,
especially in support of local government. He called for
U.S. funding to construct district government buildings and
to provide SUVs for district governors. END SUMMARY.

PROVINCIAL COUNCIL: TO ATTA,S TASTE
--------------


2. (C) Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) and Mazar PRT
officers met with Balkh Governor Atta at his private
political office on January 13. Accepting our
congratulations on his recent inauguration of the Balkh
Provincial Council, Atta expressed confidence that the
Council would be effective and cooperate closely with his
office. He noted that even though the COUNCIL is
independent, newly-elected members had approached him for
advice on whom they should elect as their officers; he had
recommended Dr. Mohammad Afzal Hadid as Chairman; election of
one of the two Shia members as Deputy Chairman; and election
of a woman as Secretary. The COUNCIL acceded to his wishes,
naming Hadid as Chairman, Haji Ghulam Abas Akhlaqi as Deputy
Chairman and Mahboba Sadat as Secretary. (NOTE: The COUNCIL
subsequently chose Mawlawi Mahmod Danishjo and Haji Majid to
represent Balkh in the Senate. END NOTE.)

CABINET NOMINEES: WEAK AND NON-REPRESENTATIVE
--------------


3. (C) Atta regretted President Karzai,s second-round
nomination of &weak8 candidates for ministerial positions.
His disappointment went beyond the qualifications of the
individual candidates; the President had failed to employ a
&national participatory approach8 ) one that would take
into account Afghanistan,s ethnic make-up. Notably, Karzai
had allocated most of the key ministries (e.g., Interior,
Defense, Foreign Affairs, Finance and Higher Education) to
ethnic Pashtuns. Despite his opposition to the second list
of nominees, Atta commented that he was very glad that
Parliament had rejected the Junbesh and Mohaqiq-supported
candidates from the first list of nominees. He thought it
obvious that Junbesh and Mohaqiq,s party (Wehdat-e-Islami
Mardum-e-Afghanistan) had sought such Ministries as Commerce
and Transportation because they viewed them as ideal for
&money-making.8 Atta also charged that western pressure
had led Karzai to retain certain nominees. In particular, he
asserted that Karzai had advised that he had no choice but to
keep Minister of Interior Atmar in his position; Atta quoted
Karzai as saying that the U.S. and U.K. had pressured him to
do so.

ATTA,S FUTURE AS GOVERNOR: A DECISION FOR HIM, AS WELL AS
KARZAI
--------------


4. (C) Asked to comment on his own future as Governor, Atta
initially responded that the question of whether he stays or
goes is ¬ that important.8 But he added that the final
decision would rest with him, as well as with the President.
He also raised the possibility that he would resign, saying
he would prefer to be in opposition to the government than be
part of government failure. Clearly uncomfortable with the
topic, he returned to his criticism of Karzai,s ministerial
nominees.


5. (C) Later, when asked whom he thought the President might
select as his replacement (should the President decide to
take this step),Atta remarked that it was difficult to say,
but that it was clear that Gen. Dostum was pushing Said
Noorullah, head of the Junbesh Central Committee. &I am not
a strong Governor," he added, &but anyone coming after me
should be strong,8 in order to guard against a deterioration

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of the SECURITY situation. He warned against allowing the
return of rival commanders establishing &empires8 in
residential areas.

CONSULATE AND MILITARY UPLIFT
--------------


6. (C) SCR also outlined the state of play on the Mazar
Consulate, advising that incidents like the January 8 rocket
attack on the Herat Consulate site would not deter us from
moving ahead on the Mazar-e-Sharif property. Once issues
involving the MFA and Ministry of Information and Culture
were resolved we would be able to take full position of the
Consulate site, and designated contractor PAE and others
would be able to complete their survey and begin
rehabilitation and SECURITY upgrades. The process likely
would take several months to complete. SCR also outlined our
uplift plans, highlighting the emphasis on training and
advising that ISAF Regional Commander Leidenberger and U.S.
military officials would be able to provide further details
at a later date.


7. (C) Atta was quick to respond regarding the Consulate
site, calling the SECURITY situation in Mazar-e-Sharif &much
different8 than that in Herat. He did not anticipate
similar attacks in Mazar, but said that he and his STAFF
would take &necessary measures8 to prevent any. He
conceded that the Consulate would be an attractive target for
insurgents, however. He expressed optimism about early
resolution of the disconnect between the Ministry of
Information and Culture and its hotel management division on
transfer of the Consulate site and offered his good offices
to encourage local officials to comply with central
government orders. On the uplift, Atta echoed his previous
public remarks that a surge of foreign troops is not the
solution. He believes increasing the number and capacity of
ANSF forces and providing them with better equipment would be
more effective. SCR reiterated that the additional U.S.
forces coming to the North will focus on ANP and ABP
mentoring, with the goal of expanding the capabilities of
ANSF forces in the region.

DEVELOPMENT
--------------


8. (C) As in past meetings, Atta asked for increased
development assistance to the North as the most effective
means of bolstering and sustaining SECURITY in the region.
While he understood the need for some assistance to insecure
areas in the South and East, he continued to look for
expansion of assistance to the more permissive North. SCR
and PRT officer outlined a series of civilian and
military-funded infrastructure and other U.S. assistance
programs for Balkh Province currently underway. SCR also
highlighted our plans to deploy additional USAID and USDA
employees throughout the RC-North area to enhance our project
and capacity-building capabilities in the region. PRT
officer noted development assistance facilitated by Swedish
counterparts at PRT Mazar.


9. (C) As usual, Atta dismissed Swedish assistance efforts,
adhering to his position that, apart from the USAID
representative resident at PRT Mazar, the PRT contributes to
security, but not to development. (He commented that he
would rather have additional USAID assistance than Swedish
assistance.) With respect to U.S. assistance, he expressed
particular interest in initiatives to support Governors and
Provincial Councils, but emphasized that money should not/not
go directly into the hands of Governors; rather, he said,
Governors should nominate projects only after engaging in
consultations with Provincial Councils.


10. (C) Concerning the Ministry of Counter-Narcotics, Good
Performers, Initiative (GPI),Atta reported that he and his
staff already had identified for the Balkh Provincial
Council's consideration some worthy projects for the use of
the province's recent GPI award. While appreciative of GPI
assistance, he lamented the bureaucratic hoops provincial
administrations must jump through (including securing the
endorsement of the Ministry of Counter-Narcotics) to gain
project approval.


11. (C) Warming to his theme of the international community's
lack of attention to the North, Atta shared his impression
that in other regions PRTs and others were funding
infrastructure projects and supporting local governments by
constructing government buildings and providing vehicles for
government officials, use. Where is the dignity when
district governors lack sufficient or proper office space and

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have to rely on taxis or others, vehicles to move around
their districts? How expensive would it be for donors to
provide $30,000 Hi-Luxes to district governors? Provision of
vehicles would enhance local governments, ability to deliver
services to constituents, he argued. PRT officer promised to
look into the possibility of U.S. assistance with respect to
vehicles and additional support for construction of district
government buildings.


12. (C) Returning to the broader issue of the level of
assistance to Balkh Province, Atta claimed that outside
assistance is so limited that he himself has had to pay some
of the province's operational expenses out of his own pocket.
He conceded that NGOs provide some assistance in the
province, but complained that they customarily act without
consulting or coordinating with local government officials
regarding priorities or project design.

COMMENT
--------------


13. (C) Our questions regarding his future as Governor had a
deflating effect on Atta. Notwithstanding his claim that
continuation of his tenure as Governor is ¬ that
important,8 his melancholy tone suggested otherwise. Based
on our conversation with Atta and (separately) with his close
friend and political advisor, Zalmai Yonusi, we sense that
Atta is at best uncertain whether Karzai intends to keep him
in his position. Concerning our Consulate, we believe Atta
genuinely supports its establishment and is prepared to
assist in ensuring the SECURITY of the site and, to the
extent possible, helping us overcome any local or GIRoA
obstacles that may arise.


14. (C) Atta,s assertion that he often finds himself paying
provincial operating expenses out of his own pocket was
(unintentionally) amusing on a couple of levels, but it is
clear that he believes Balkh and other northern provinces
continue to get short shrift on development assistance. In
that regard, the prospect of increased U.S. assistance to
Afghanistan in support of sub-national governance piqued his
interest. He believes funding of buildings for district
governments and the provision of vehicles to district
governors would enhance service delivery and promote public
confidence in local governance and respect for local
officials.
Eikenberry