WHITHER BALKH PROVINCE GOVERNOR ATTA?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000475 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM, INR/B STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA USFOR-A FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2020 TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID AF SUBJECT: WHITHER BALKH PROVINCE GOVERNOR ATTA? KABUL 00000475 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Interagency Provincial Affairs Acting Coordinator Hoyt Y ee for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Balkh Governor Usted Mohammad Noor Atta told us that the decision as to whether he stays on as Governor of Balkh or moves on to some opposition role lies with him, as well as President Karzai. Atta named Junbesh Party Chairman Sayed Noorullah as his most likely replacement, should he (Atta) leave. On the new cabinet, he criticized Karzai for failing to use a &participatory approach8 in nominating ministers and for compiling a slate of &weak8 candidates. On local issues, he predicted that the incoming Balkh Provincial Council would support him; the new Council already has followed his recommendations in electing its leadership. Reacting to the rocketing of our Herat Consulate building, Atta suggested similar attacks in Mazar would be unlikely, and that he looked forward to swift progress in opening the Mazar Consulate. The Governor reiterated his long-standing pitch for more development assistance, especially in support of local government. He called for U.S. funding to construct district government buildings and to provide SUVs for district governors. END SUMMARY. PROVINCIAL COUNCIL: TO ATTA,S TASTE -------------- ¶2. (C) Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) and Mazar PRT officers met with Balkh Governor Atta at his private political office on January 13. Accepting our congratulations on his recent inauguration of the Balkh Provincial Council, Atta expressed confidence that the Council would be effective and cooperate closely with his office. He noted that even though the Council is independent, newly-elected members had approached him for advice on whom they should elect as their officers; he had recommended Dr. Mohammad Afzal Hadid as Chairman; election of one of the two Shia members as Deputy Chairman; and election of a woman as Secretary. The Council acceded to his wishes, naming Hadid as Chairman, Haji Ghulam Abas Akhlaqi as Deputy Chairman and Mahboba Sadat as Secretary. (NOTE: The Council subsequently chose Mawlawi Mahmod Danishjo and Haji Majid to represent Balkh in the Senate. END NOTE.) CABINET NOMINEES: WEAK AND NON-REPRESENTATIVE -------------- ¶3. (C) Atta regretted President Karzai,s second-round nomination of &weak8 candidates for ministerial positions. His disappointment went beyond the qualifications of the individual candidates; the President had failed to employ a &national participatory approach8 ) one that would take into account Afghanistan,s ethnic make-up. Notably, Karzai had allocated most of the key ministries (e.g., Interior, Defense, Foreign Affairs, Finance and Higher Education) to ethnic Pashtuns. Despite his opposition to the second list of nominees, Atta commented that he was very glad that Parliament had rejected the Junbesh and Mohaqiq-supported candidates from the first list of nominees. He thought it obvious that Junbesh and Mohaqiq,s party (Wehdat-e-Islami Mardum-e-Afghanistan) had sought such Ministries as Commerce and Transportation because they viewed them as ideal for &money-making.8 Atta also charged that western pressure had led Karzai to retain certain nominees. In particular, he asserted that Karzai had advised that he had no choice but to keep Minister of Interior Atmar in his position; Atta quoted Karzai as saying that the U.S. and U.K. had pressured him to do so. ATTA,S FUTURE AS GOVERNOR: A DECISION FOR HIM, AS WELL AS KARZAI -------------- ¶4. (C) Asked to comment on his own future as Governor, Atta initially responded that the question of whether he stays or goes is ¬ that important.8 But he added that the final decision would rest with him, as well as with the President. He also raised the possibility that he would resign, saying he would prefer to be in opposition to the government than be part of government failure. Clearly uncomfortable with the topic, he returned to his criticism of Karzai,s ministerial nominees. ¶5. (C) Later, when asked whom he thought the President might select as his replacement (should the President decide to take this step),Atta remarked that it was difficult to say, but that it was clear that Gen. Dostum was pushing Said Noorullah, head of the Junbesh Central Committee. &I am not a strong Governor," he added, &but anyone coming after me should be strong,8 in order to guard against a deterioration KABUL 00000475 002.2 OF 003 of the security situation. He warned against allowing the return of rival commanders establishing &empires8 in residential areas. CONSULATE AND MILITARY UPLIFT -------------- ¶6. (C) SCR also outlined the state of play on the Mazar Consulate, advising that incidents like the January 8 rocket attack on the Herat Consulate site would not deter us from moving ahead on the Mazar-e-Sharif property. Once issues involving the MFA and Ministry of Information and Culture were resolved we would be able to take full position of the Consulate site, and designated contractor PAE and others would be able to complete their survey and begin rehabilitation and security upgrades. The process likely would take several months to complete. SCR also outlined our uplift plans, highlighting the emphasis on training and advising that ISAF Regional Commander Leidenberger and U.S. military officials would be able to provide further details at a later date. ¶7. (C) Atta was quick to respond regarding the Consulate site, calling the security situation in Mazar-e-Sharif &much different8 than that in Herat. He did not anticipate similar attacks in Mazar, but said that he and his staff would take &necessary measures8 to prevent any. He conceded that the Consulate would be an attractive target for insurgents, however. He expressed optimism about early resolution of the disconnect between the Ministry of Information and Culture and its hotel management division on transfer of the Consulate site and offered his good offices to encourage local officials to comply with central government orders. On the uplift, Atta echoed his previous public remarks that a surge of foreign troops is not the solution. He believes increasing the number and capacity of ANSF forces and providing them with better equipment would be more effective. SCR reiterated that the additional U.S. forces coming to the North will focus on ANP and ABP mentoring, with the goal of expanding the capabilities of ANSF forces in the region. DEVELOPMENT -------------- ¶8. (C) As in past meetings, Atta asked for increased development assistance to the North as the most effective means of bolstering and sustaining security in the region. While he understood the need for some assistance to insecure areas in the South and East, he continued to look for expansion of assistance to the more permissive North. SCR and PRT officer outlined a series of civilian and military-funded infrastructure and other U.S. assistance programs for Balkh Province currently underway. SCR also highlighted our plans to deploy additional USAID and USDA employees throughout the RC-North area to enhance our project and capacity-building capabilities in the region. PRT officer noted development assistance facilitated by Swedish counterparts at PRT Mazar. ¶9. (C) As usual, Atta dismissed Swedish assistance efforts, adhering to his position that, apart from the USAID representative resident at PRT Mazar, the PRT contributes to security, but not to development. (He commented that he would rather have additional USAID assistance than Swedish assistance.) With respect to U.S. assistance, he expressed particular interest in initiatives to support Governors and Provincial Councils, but emphasized that money should not/not go directly into the hands of Governors; rather, he said, Governors should nominate projects only after engaging in consultations with Provincial Councils. ¶10. (C) Concerning the Ministry of Counter-Narcotics, Good Performers, Initiative (GPI),Atta reported that he and his staff already had identified for the Balkh Provincial Council's consideration some worthy projects for the use of the province's recent GPI award. While appreciative of GPI assistance, he lamented the bureaucratic hoops provincial administrations must jump through (including securing the endorsement of the Ministry of Counter-Narcotics) to gain project approval. ¶11. (C) Warming to his theme of the international community's lack of attention to the North, Atta shared his impression that in other regions PRTs and others were funding infrastructure projects and supporting local governments by constructing government buildings and providing vehicles for government officials, use. Where is the dignity when district governors lack sufficient or proper office space and KABUL 00000475 003.2 OF 003 have to rely on taxis or others, vehicles to move around their districts? How expensive would it be for donors to provide $30,000 Hi-Luxes to district governors? Provision of vehicles would enhance local governments, ability to deliver services to constituents, he argued. PRT officer promised to look into the possibility of U.S. assistance with respect to vehicles and additional support for construction of district government buildings. ¶12. (C) Returning to the broader issue of the level of assistance to Balkh Province, Atta claimed that outside assistance is so limited that he himself has had to pay some of the province's operational expenses out of his own pocket. He conceded that NGOs provide some assistance in the province, but complained that they customarily act without consulting or coordinating with local government officials regarding priorities or project design. COMMENT -------------- ¶13. (C) Our questions regarding his future as Governor had a deflating effect on Atta. Notwithstanding his claim that continuation of his tenure as Governor is ¬ that important,8 his melancholy tone suggested otherwise. Based on our conversation with Atta and (separately) with his close friend and political advisor, Zalmai Yonusi, we sense that Atta is at best uncertain whether Karzai intends to keep him in his position. Concerning our Consulate, we believe Atta genuinely supports its establishment and is prepared to assist in ensuring the security of the site and, to the extent possible, helping us overcome any local or GIRoA obstacles that may arise. ¶14. (C) Atta,s assertion that he often finds himself paying provincial operating expenses out of his own pocket was (unintentionally) amusing on a couple of levels, but it is clear that he believes Balkh and other northern provinces continue to get short shrift on development assistance. In that regard, the prospect of increased U.S. assistance to Afghanistan in support of sub-national governance piqued his interest. He believes funding of buildings for district governments and the provision of vehicles to district governors would enhance service delivery and promote public confidence in local governance and respect for local officials. Eikenberry