Post London Conference Dinner with Dr. Ghani - Discussing

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000472 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV KJUS KCOR EAID AF SUBJECT: Post London Conference Dinner with Dr. Ghani - Discussing Anti-Corruption Strategy and the Road to the Kabul Conference ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Ambassador Wayne hosted a dinner with Dr. Ashraf Ghani, who led GIRoA in drafting its final Anti-Corruption Concept Paper presented at the London Conference. The attendees discussed the way forward for Afghanistan following the London Conference. Dr. Ghani responded to specific questions raised in Reftel regarding the implementation of the Afghan Anti-Corruption Concept Paper, including what milestones should be established, and steps the USG should take in preparation for the Kabul Conference. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) On February 4, Ambassador Wayne hosted a dinner for Dr. Ashraf Ghani, with Embassy, ISAF, and UK colleagues. Dr. Ghani said President Karzai asked him to head all of the preparations for the Kabul Conference. Dr. Ghani indicated negotiations concerning the specifics of his role had not been concluded. (Local Government Director Jelani Popal independently confirmed that Karzai wants Ghani to manage the substantive side of the Kabul Conference.) ¶3. (SBU) As requested in Reftel, post is providing Dr. Ghani's responses to the following questions. Q1: What are the concrete steps the Afghan government intends to take regarding the HOO and implementation of the Anti-Corruption Concept Paper, and over what period of time? A: The Afghan government is committed to complying with the London Communique. According to Ghani, the GIRoA has started drafting the "Ferman" (decree),which would strengthen the High Office of Oversight (HOO),among other measures. Q2: Will President Karzai meet the timelines set out in the communiqu? What milestones are we asking them to meet in the run-up to Kabul? A: Presenting his own views, which are not yet cleared with the POA, Ghani suggested GIRoA prepare for the Kabul Conference by establishing a series of consecutive, 100-day rolling plans for each of the concept papers, including anti-corruption. Dr. Ghani envisioned ten concept papers. The first cycle of the 100-day rolling plans would begin in anticipation of the Kabul Conference. GIRoA and the international community would monitor action on the rolling plans and modify or update them in succeeding versions. He said any support to the GIRoA in developing the plans should be in the form of technical professionals who currently work or have worked in government. Ghani viewed the Anti-Corruption Concept Paper as the basis for the first anti-corruption rolling plan, with implementation of specified actions in the Concept Paper to take place over the next five years. (Note: Using 100 day increments for measuring achievement early in the process could be helpful to establish deliverable Afghan results while maintaining steady progress to satisfy the IC donors. End Note). In terms of short- to medium-term actions GIRoA could take, Ghani stated efforts should focus on the "low-hanging fruit," or establishing goals to demonstrate real and immediate accomplishments to the Afghan people. He indicated most of the Government's efforts should focus on the "five Ministries that are the strongest and control 80% of Afghan government expenditures." (MAIL, MOF, MRRD, MoPH and MOE). Regarding milestones the U.S. should seek from GIRoA, post will engage Afghan officials during the drafting of the rolling implementation plans and executive order(s) to assist in developing language to advance HOO independence, including establishment of a regular Independent Monitoring and Evaluation Mission (IMEM),and specifying how HOO leadership would be recruited and vetted. Q3: How will [the Afghan Government] formalize the "Ad Hoc Monitoring Mission," i.e., its broad framework, composition (international or otherwise) and authority? What are we recommending as the minimum requirements, and is there a line in the sand? What do we recommend if they do not agree to substantial international participation or representation in the IMEM? A: There appears to have been a communication gap within the Afghan team in London on this particular issue. Because the Afghan team had not discussed the idea with President Karzai, the concept was diluted in the communiqu. According to Dr. Ghani, the IMEM needs to be raised again with the President which he said he would do. Ambassador Wayne stressed the importance of the original concept as was discussed in the Anti-Corruption Concept Paper, a position the UK supported in informal discussions. Post will suspend further action pending the outcome of the Ghani/Karzai discussions. If there is no movement on this issue, the issue will be raised bilaterally between the USG and the POA. Q4: How will the future director and senior staff of HOO be selected, in what timeframe, and how will they be insulated from the Executive Office? A: Informally, the UK agrees with Post's opinion that the HOO needs new pro-active and independent executive leadership to bring about a real change in management to the organization. KABUL 00000472 002 OF 002 Post will encourage GIRoA to consult on possible candidates to demonstrate Afghan commitment to strengthening the HOO. Absent evidence of commitment, these issues will have to be addressed at a higher level. In discussing HOO independence, and Afghan commitment to implementing strong anti-corruption measures, Ghani admitted the IC wants to establish firm "lines in the sand." In terms of "sticks," Ghani agreed that beyond moral persuasion, cutting off funding for the HOO would not have a significant impact on the Government, though it may be a necessary step for purposes of proper management of USG resources. He suggested (protect strictly) the USG consider establishing conditions related to direct funding to other Ministries, specifically the Ministry of Finance and USG support of the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF),or other current or future USG direct funding instruments. Dr. Ghani indicated that the US should avoid creating a perception by President Karzai that its support for anti-corruption is limited to using law enforcement to target key political allies. Ghani suggested the USG should employ other measures to promote the anti-corruption agenda, for example working directly with more receptive ministries such as the Finance Ministry. Finally, Ghani said any initiative should be viewed, to the maximum extent possible, as Afghan-originated rather than foreign-imposed. ¶4. (SBU) In a general comment by Dr. Ghani, he compared the opportunities ahead for the Afghan government to the Franklin Roosevelt Administration at the beginning of the "New Deal." He concluded that in the end it was necessary to make existing programs work better. He recognized however that efforts are needed to address the "drivers of anti-corruption" to achieve any measurable results. EIKENBERRY