KEY AMBASSADORS IN KABUL DISCUSS REVIEW OF COMMAND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000046

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM, INR/B
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA
USFOR-A FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM MOPS UK CAN IT NL AS AF
SUBJECT: KEY AMBASSADORS IN KABUL DISCUSS REVIEW OF COMMAND
STRUCTURE IN SOUTH WITH COMISAF

Classified By: Coordinating Director for Development and Economic Affai
rs Ambassador E. Anthony Wayne


1. (C/Rel US, ISAF, NATO) Begin Summary. In a New Year's Day
briefing by Generals McChrystal and Rodriguez for the
embassies most active in the South and Southwest of
Afghanistan ) Australia, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, the
United Kingdom, and the United States ) the Generals
outlined the conflicting military and political
considerations in deliberations about how to effectively
manage the large number of troops flowing into the South,
including the option to split the regional command in two,
either along provincial borders or some other configuration
that makes sense militarily. Recognizing the political and
economic linkages across the South and the fact that the
insurgency recognizes Kandahar and Helmand as one area,
General McChrystal said the large and slowing size of the
coalition force in the South is driving the review of the
current command structure. Additionally, the group discussed
the need to better coordinate political approaches with
malign actors, including restricting contracting. Ambassador
Wayne noted that we need to better refine and coordinate a
plan for limiting the role of malign actors in Helmand and
Kandahar so that in parallel with our troop and civilian
build-up we can act to help create a better model of Afghan
governance in these key areas. End Summary.

Calculations for Splitting the Military Command in RC-South
-------------- --------------


2. (C/Rel US, ISAF, NATO) On New Year's Day, ISAF Commander
General Stanley McChrystal and ISAF Joint Command (IJC) LTG
David Rodriguez held a meeting to discuss the issues
surrounding splitting Regional Command-South (RC-South) in
two. Ambassadors from Australia, Italy and the Netherlands,
the charges from the UK and Canada, and U.S. Coordinating
Director for Development and Economic Affairs Ambassador E.
Anthony Wayne attended. General McChrystal emphasized that
while he is focused on the military options, he wants the
decision to take political dimensions into account. He said
his intention is to make a decision on how to proceed before
the London conference on January 28, and to implement the
decision between July and September when forces move into
Kandahar, but he wants political input from key contributing
countries before any decision.


3. (C/Rel US, ISAF, NATO) General McChrystal said RC-South is
the biggest command in Afghanistan ) well beyond the size of
a normal two-star headquarters, has a disproportionate number
of significant incidents, and will be getting many more
troops in the coming months. Likewise, he emphasized the
many political and economic factors influencing the RC-South
command decision, including: 1) a population concentrated on
rivers, which link Helmand and Kandahar provinces; 2) the
insurgency recognizes Kandahar and Helmand as one geographic
entity; 3) the international boundary with Pakistan could be
complicated by a split as it currently aligns with RC-South
and redeployment of troops could have a destabilizing impact
on the current Afghanistan-Pakistan balance; and 4) the
continuity of the economic corridor between Helmand and
Kandahar, which impacts development and infrastructure
activities. Additionally, LTG Rodriguez highlighted the
increased number of Afghan troops heading into the region,
and the heavy emphasis in the new strategy to partner with
the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police
(ANP),which would lead to more than 150 friendly force
locations. All of these create serious span of control
issues should RC-South remain a single entity.


4. (C/Rel US, ISAF, NATO) General McChrystal said the
cleanest military solution is to divide the command down the
line between Helmand and Kandahar provinces, but that others
may have a better solution. The key, he said, is that the
solution needs to be militarily defensible. The Dutch
Ambassador asked where Uruzgan would figure into this
planning, also noting that there may be news on the future of
Dutch troops following a January 8 meeting in The Hague. The
UK Charge said the UK sees the logic of keeping Helmand and
Kandahar together but understands the military logic of a
split. In response to a question from the Italian Ambassador
about changes to the geographic structure of RC-West, LTG
Rodriguez said he did no, he does not anticipate such a
change.


5. (C/Rel US, ISAF, NATO) The bridging organization for the
period of transition would be the IJC, said LTG Rodriguez.
Ambassador Wayne noted that whatever decision is ultimately
made ) whether a split between Helmand and Kandahar, or some

KABUL 00000046 002 OF 002


other configuration that takes into account the political
issues -- will require regular and frequent interactions
among the Regional Commands and the senior civilians if the
stand-up of a new Command in the South is to work. General
McChrystal agreed, noting the importance of determining and
communicating clear accountability for each area of
responsibility (AOR),which is not the case now. (Note: the
current construct divides the battlespace among coalition
partners within the provinces themselves. End Note)

Coordinating an Approach to Sideline Malign Actors
-------------- ---


6. (C/Rel US, ISAF, NATO) Discussion turned to development of
a strategy to effectively minimize the influence of malign
actors. General McChrystal said that the coalition needs to
develop a coordinated strategy that identifies those actors
we must influence or sideline to have effective results.
Amb. Wayne said we need a plan targeted to address these
actors that in Helmand and Kandahar so that we can act in
parallel with troop and civilian build-up to show the Afghan
people that the future can be different. To succeed,
McChrystal said, there must be a concerted and coordinated
strategy, he said, and a delicate approach to President
Karzai. A coordinated decision-making process on how to deal
with malign actors, which has been lacking up to now, will
help ensure the success of the approach, said McChrystal.
Addressing the systemic corruption that has plagued our
contracting must be part of the approach, emphasized LTG
Rodriguez. The UK Charge noted that even our friends are not
pure. Rodriguez agreed, emphasizing the need to better
monitor our contracting with our working partnerships and
find ways to show we are serious about dealing with malign
actors.

Comment
--------------


7. (C/Rel US, ISAF, NATO) While the decision to divide the
RC-South Command is a military one, there are serious
political implications for governance and development efforts
in the South. ISAF outreach to key coalition ambassadors is
a welcome step in ensuring a collaborative approach to the
final decision on how to proceed. Whatever the final
decision is on how to split the command, a key challenge will
be coordination and collaboration during the July-September
timeframe, a time of peak operational activity across all
civil-military lines of effort. Strong coordination and
planning among the civ-mil leadership at the regional
commands will be essential. Additionally, clear strategies
and guidance on how we intend to sideline malign actors
during this period of enhanced economic activity in the South
will be an essential element of our efforts there. Embassy
Kabul is working closely with our civilians in the South to
develop these strategies and will ensure close collaboration
with coalition partners to ensure a unified approach,
particularly in Helmand and Kandahar.
EIKENBERRY