POWERBROKER AND GOVERNANCE ISSUES IN SPIN BOLDAK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000467 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM, INR/B STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA USFOR-A FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2020 TAGS: PGOV KDEM KCOR KCRM PREL AF SUBJECT: POWERBROKER AND GOVERNANCE ISSUES IN SPIN BOLDAK REF: A. (A) KABUL 463 ¶B. (B) KABUL 408 ¶C. (C) 09 KABUL 4039 ¶D. (D) 09 KABUL 4024 KABUL 00000467 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Interagency Provincial Affairs Deputy Director Hoyt Yee for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Spin Boldak District in Kandahar Province and its major border crossing point to Pakistan at Weech-Chaman have become the focus of a number of high profile coalition efforts given the upcoming military operations in Regional Command-South (RC-S). Although there is a high potential for large scale revenue collections through customs collected at the border, the lack of a strong, capable district government has allowed powerbrokers, especially Afghan Border Police (ABP) Chief Colonel Abdul Razzik, to fill the void. Accused constantly of illegal trafficking and taxing activities through Weech-Chaman (most recently by a January 19 Washington Post article),Razzik has been careful to maintain a cooperative relationship with the ISAF leadership to guard his position. ISAF and USG interlocutors walk a thin tightrope when working with this allegedly corrupt official who is also a major security stabilizing force. Despite Razzik's power and influence in Spin Boldak, we will press the GIRoA to establish and empower competent district governance to counterbalance the powerbrokers and make Spin Boldak a profitable customs hub within southern Afghanistan. As one of the 80 terrain districts, we expect it to ultimately become a focus of enhanced capacity building through the District Delivery Program (DDP). End summary. High Level Attention -------------- ¶2. (C) Reflecting the importance of Spin Boldak District to the coalition effort, particularly in light of the military surge in the South, COMISAF and the RC-South Commander visited the Weech border crossing point on January 18, arriving in Afghanistan from the Pakistan side of the border along with the head of the Pakistani Frontier Corps. The goal of their visit was to engage Afghan authorities on issues related to border security, including cooperation between the neighboring countries and ISAF convoy traffic. Unlike the Pakistani and ISAF delegations, which were comprised of high-level commanding officers, the Afghan contingent was led by Colonel Abdul Razzik, Fourth Zone Chief of the Afghan Border Police (ABP) responsible for Spin Boldak and local powerbroker, accompanied by the weak District Governor, Haji Abdul Ghani. No higher level Afghan officials, political or military, were in attendance, a sign of Razzik's apparent unquestioned -- but also unaccountable -- authority over issues pertaining to Spin Boldak and its environs. Cost Benefit Analysis -------------- ¶3. (C) Razzik's apparent autonomy and connections to many influential officials, including President Karzai (through former Helmand governor Assadullah Wafa, an Achekzai kinsmen and the president's adviser on tribal affairs) and former Kandahar governor and mentor Gul Agha Sherzai leave him well positioned to maintain power and influence in the district. Additionally, he has been amenable to many of the requests made of him by ISAF, including allowing his troops to partner with coalition forces. Requests to which he has acquiesced include support for interim improvements planned at the border crossing point intended to both expedite the increase in ISAF convoys and lay the groundwork for more efficient customs generation. The January 18 COMISAF visit underscored Razzik's key enabling role in this regard, and his calculated approach to working with ISAF. ¶4. (C) To this end, Razzik is not obstructing coalition requirements at the border (or throughout the district) though his longstanding disapproval of a visible ISAF presence in and around the crossing point during daylight hours is well known. (Note: Razzik tells ISAF that the reason for this is that the troops would become targets and result in civilian casualties. However, daylight is also the time of day when commercial traffic and money-making opportunities are at their peak. End note.) He knows that to reject coalition requests would be to engender unwanted ill will by ISAF and, in the near term, there is money to be made in labor and materials at the border and further up Highway 4 where ISAF plans to build a staging area for convoys on land near Razzik's compound and owned by his associate. A January KABUL 00000467 002.2 OF 003 18 meeting with MG Riley of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers provides an insight into his personal calculations: Razzik's main talking point was concern that trucks providing materials to ISAF in Spin Boldak were not locally-owned. It is probably not a coincidence that he himself owns a locally-based trucking fleet. Abetting the Status Quo -------------- ¶5. (C) Contrary to the prevailing narrative of Razzik's unchallenged authority in Spin Boldak, anecdotal evidence paints a picture of less than harmonious dynamics within Razzik's own Achekzai tribe with regard to the Colonel's prominence. Razzik's immediate predecessor in the ABP, Haji Fida Mohammad (a member of the Tribal Shura and District Development Assembly) does not hide his contempt in public for his nephew. One local account suggests that Razzik did not achieve his position through a tribal consensus but that he was thrust upon Spin Boldak by GIRoA, a view bolstered by the Colonel's reported links to former Governor Sherzai. District Governance -------------- ¶6. (C) At present, the District Government of Spin Boldak is presided over by Haji Abdul Ghani, a Popalzai tribesman and Karzai kinsman. The third District Governor (DG) in two years, Abdul Ghani's predecessor reportedly was removed for offending local sensibilities by pledging to tackle corruption. Abdul Ghani functions in an "acting" capacity, and recently requested coalition assistance to press Kabul to make his appointment permanent. The DG asserts that resolving his status will give him the necessary clout to properly address development needs and tackle corruption. However, the DST's experience to date with the DG does not instill confidence that this is all that is required to improve governance. A broader effort to empower local authority and fill civil service vacancies will be essential to strengthening local governance and reducing the unfettered role of local power brokers in the area. (Note: Reported to have little more than a fourth grade education, DG Abdul Ghani has demonstrated to the DST that what he may lack in managerial capacity he may make up for in other useful character traits. In a November shura in the village of Luy Karez, the DG challenged village elders, support of the Taliban. As reported in reftel A, the local ABP commander similarly confronted elders in the same shura only to be assassinated soon afterwards. End note.) ¶7. (C) The other pillar of district governance is a two-headed Tribal Shura-District Development Assembly (Shura/DDA),dominated in equal measures by the Noorzai and Achekzai tribes and their most assertive local leaders. Functioning as private clubs, the bodies primarily ensure that donor funds are monopolized by a select group of Spin Boldak notables. The cooperation of the district's two main tribes within this context belie the argument that Razzik,s mediation has averted inter-tribal conflict. As Haji Fida Mohammad told the DST in the company of fellow Achekzai and Noorzai Shura/DDA members, "there are some who don't want the tribes to get along," referring to his relative, the ABP chief. Without an empowered District Government, however, there is little check on the self-serving actions of these institutions, which ultimately undermines equitable distribution of development resources in Spin Boldak. District Development -------------- ¶8. (SBU) One consequence of the interests and arrangements underpinning district security is the limited reach of development outside of Spin Boldak center (reftel A). While security, or lack thereof, contributes to the precarious state of many communities in the areas north and south of Highway 4, district government staffing deficiencies and the absence of permanent representatives from ministries critical to district development -- specifically within the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development and the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL) -- equally hamper progress. Not receiving the services they need or the attention they deserve from the government, citizens outside the Highway 4 corridor, particularly in Noorzai tribal areas, do not see themselves as stakeholders in the district's development and thus are more susceptible to intimidation and insurgent propaganda. Razzik regularly spins this potential for the spread of this instability to his advantage in his dealings with the coalition. KABUL 00000467 003 OF 003 ¶9. (SBU) A number of initiatives are underway to remedy the developmental needs of the District and the alienation of its residents. USAID's Afghanistan Vouchers for Increased Production of Agriculture Plus (AVIPA Plus) program, for example, has the potential to play an important role in revitalizing the current state of agriculture in Spin Boldak and, thereby transform perceptions of GIRoA. A key component in realizing these end states will be the involvement of empowered local government officials beyond Razziq and the Shura/DDA to enable equitable distribution of resources -- a dynamic that does not currently exist in the district. Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) Colonel Razzik's alleged involvement in the District's illicit trafficking and illegal taxation on transit trade has been widely reported (most recently in a January 19 Washington Post article). His presence, however, need not forestall Spin Boldak's progress nor should it be an accepted excuse for continued neglect and underdevelopment in the district. By accepting the view that Razzik is both the guarantor of district security and the lynchpin in tribal power relations, we potentially are overlooking steps which could be taken in the near term to improve the overall state of governance and development in the district, short of removing Razzik. Additionally, by ascribing unaccountable authority to Razzik, the coalition unintentionally reinforces his position through its direct and near-exclusive dealings with him on all major issues in Spin Boldak. ¶11. (C) As a first step in remedying the current imbalance of power between Razzik and other GIRoA authorities, a public and visible commitment by GIRoA to the district's citizens is required. Attracting competent civil servants from key ministries should be a first step. Spin Boldak is among the 80 key terrain districts and likely will be targeted for the District Delivery Program (DDP) by the end of 2010. We will need to carefully manage eventual implementation of the DDP to emplace empowered, competent government personnel and the full complement of line ministry representatives and their respective resources. A carefully managed approach to support the growth of a functioning district government can lay an important foundation for improved governance with or without Razzik. ¶12. (U) This message was drafted at the DST in Spin Boldak and in Kabul. Eikenberry