BEDLAM AND CORRUPTION PERMEATE CUSTOMS PROCESS AT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000463 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM, INR/B STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA USFOR-A FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2020 TAGS: PGOV KCOR KCRM PREL AF SUBJECT: BEDLAM AND CORRUPTION PERMEATE CUSTOMS PROCESS AT SPIN BOLDAK REF: KABUL 408 KABUL 00000463 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Interagency Provincial Affairs Deputy Director Hoyt Yee for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. On January 28, the Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) for Regional Command ) South (RC-S) met with Deputy Customs Director Sardar Ashraf Weesa, the lead customs officer for Spin Boldak and brother of Kandahar Governor Weesa. Weesa candidly reported a sorry state of affairs and a bleak outlook for the Weech-Chaman border crossing point, admitting that his office is rife with corruption and that kickbacks are a way of doing business at this time. He claimed that customs officials in Spin Boldak were "intimidated" while performing their jobs, possibly referring to the presence of Afghan Border Police in customs offices. Weesa, who obtained his government job under Taliban rule, explained the current customs process and noted ruefully that the customs system had operated more efficiently during the days of the Taliban. When questioned about what could make Weech-Chaman a prosperous point again, Weesa welcomed the idea of mentors from the Border Management Task Force (BMTF) and reported that only an automated system of customs collection - to cut down on the corruption - would solve the issues permeating the viability of the crossing point. End Summary. CUSTOMS COLLECTION SYSTEM "INADEQUATE" -------------- ¶2. (C) On January 28, the Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) for Regional Command ) South (RC-S) met with Deputy Customs Director Sardar Ashraf Weesa, lead customs officer for Spin Boldak district (Kandahar province) and brother of Kandahar Governor Toryalai Weesa, at Forward Operating Base Spin Boldak. Weesa, who was a director of finance in Uruzgan province during the Taliban regime and claims to have assumed his customs job before his brother became Governor, described the current system of customs collections at the Weech-Chaman border crossing (the crossing between Balochistan, Pakistan and Kandahar). He said the system is severely inadequate due to an unclear process and lack of internal controls, which allow for easy corruption. He was skeptical that the system could be corrected. Customs Process at Weech-Chaman -------------- ¶3. (C) With the high levels of both pedestrian and vehicular traffic, Weesa said it was not possible to properly monitor and control both the people and goods coming across the border. He noted that residents in the area were accustomed to crossing the border and carrying goods without controls. However, as briefed, the current customs process at Weech-Chaman is supposed to work in the following manner: Pedestrian Traffic -- The 8th Squadron, 1st U.S. Calvary Regiment (the 8/1), based in the district, report that hundreds of pedestrians walk through the Weech-Chaman Gate daily, and each is supposed to be immediately escorted from the Gate to the Immigration Office, located approximately 100 yards from the crossing. However, the 8/1 and Weesa confirmed that the majority of the foot traffic is allowed to cross freely without any kind of immigration processing, especially those with any kind of Afghan identification. Regular Vehicular Traffic -- The 8/1 reports that on any given day, hundreds of vehicles, bicycles, and donkey carts will cross the Gate from Pakistan into Afghanistan. For this traffic, screening of the vehicles and drivers is supposed to take place at the crossing; however, like the foot traffic, if the vehicle has Afghan tags or the driver has an Afghan ID, typically no screening is done. Commercial and ISAF Traffic -- Commercial and ISAF traffic from Pakistan in Pakistani trucks are subject to an arduous, complicated process that allows for multiple money making opportunities for those working the border. After crossing through the Gate, the Pakistani trucks are taken to the Weech Customs Office where the goods are invoiced and verified based on the Bill of Lading received on the Pakistani side. From there, the truck is subject to additional Pakistani charges and an Afghan toll. KABUL 00000463 002.2 OF 003 -- The driver of the vehicle is then taken to the Passenger Control office within the Immigration Building where the driver's passport and visa are checked while the load is rechecked and the Manifest of Goods is stamped. -- The truck and driver are then taken to the Spin Boldak Customs Yard where additional fees are paid and the load and manifests are checked yet again. It is at this point that the goods from the Pakistani trucks are cross-loaded onto Afghan trucks. (Note: At this point, ISAF trucks are released and allowed to continue their journeys. End note.) -- Without the use of scales, the commercial trucks are weighed by sight and "guesstimation." If the truck is randomly determined to have a customs fee of below 5000 AFN (approximately 105 USD),the fees and taxes are paid at Spin Boldak. However, if it is determined that the truck weighs above this limit, the money is technically supposed to be delivered to Kandahar and then transferred to Kabul through the Afghan National Bank. Weesa explained that this system does not always work. For example, load manifests will often be split on their manifests to reflect customs fees that allow for the payments to remain in Spin Boldak, where additional kickbacks and bribes are paid. -- After running the gauntlet at the Gate, the trucks are then expected to drive seven kilometers further to yet another Customs House for one last check. However, Weesa noted that many of the trucks just simply take alternate routes to avoid the House or end up distributing their loads at markets established between the Gate and the House to avoid any additional fees if caught. -- This entire process typically takes two days for each truck to complete, and at any time, a driver might be forced to start the process all over due to an incorrect signature or an inadvertently skipped step. BLEAK OUTLOOK FOR THE BORDER -------------- ¶4. (C) During the conversation with the SCR, Weesa continued to speak negatively about his department and the customs collections process as a whole. He explained that with the complicated process, coupled with the long, porous border with Pakistan rife with smugglers, the system is broken and ineffective. Ultimately, this means that efforts to stop the importation of banned commodities, such as ammonium nitrate fertilizer ) the main ingredient used in the majority of the improvised explosive devices (IEDs) targeting ISAF convoys ) will not succeed without dramatic changes to the existing customs process. Weesa fully admitted that corruption runs deep within his own office. He said that if the U.S. mission chose to place custom mentors from the Border Management Task Force (BMTF) within his office, they would be welcomed but would face a tough time changing the corrupt culture. (Note: The Spin Boldak District Support Team (DST) reports that Weesa is accused by other actors in the district of being a direct beneficiary of the weak system of customs revenue generation and typically travels to the district two or three times a week to collect his cut from the illicit profits. Implicating others in corrupt activities is a habit of officials in Spin Boldak, including Chief of Afghan Border Police Abdul Razziq (reftel),who has directly pointed the finger at Weesa. End note.) TALIBAN DOES IT BETTER -------------- ¶5. (C) Weesa noted that when he first joined the "government" under the Taliban regime, the customs system was better organized, with little corruption and less smuggling. He admitted that he was paid less under the Taliban, but, despite many fewer customs officers, greater amounts of revenue was transferred from Kandahar to the central government during that time, which he praised. Guessing that approximately 50 percent of possible revenue is lost due to corruption and smuggling, he reluctantly stated that people take full advantage of the current broken customs system. He claimed that customs officials in Spin Boldak were "intimidated" in their offices, possibly a reference to the presence of Afghan Border Police (ABP) officers. (Note: Asked by the SCR whether the ABP or other government officials were allowed in customs areas, Weesa avoided a direct answer. End note.) Weesa added that if he were to stand up against those involved in the corruption, he would fear for his security and that of his family, whom he moved KABUL 00000463 003.2 OF 003 to Kabul due to this fear. COMMENT -------------- ¶6. (C) Considering the number of rumors swirling around about Sardar Ashraf Weesa, his willingness to scam his own customs system, the possible money flows to his brother, and his links to Abdul Razziq, it was quite surprising to hear Weesa so bluntly discuss the current customs system at Spin Boldak and the corruption surrounding the Gate and his office. As if he had nothing to lose, Weesa made no bones about the state of the Gate, and his sharp criticisms, coupled with his praising of the system during the Taliban, did not provide an optimistic outlook for the future. In the end, he offered no suggestions on improvement beyond stressing the need for a new, automated way of conducting business. As the U.S. Mission and ISAF look to ways to improve the Gate and the customs process, we must remain acutely aware that corruption runs deep, and with so many prospering on both sides of the Pak-Afghan border under the current system, change will likely not come easy or quickly. Eikenberry