SPIN BOLDAK POWERBROKER ENCOURAGES MODERNIZATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000408 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM, INR/B STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA USFOR-A FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2020 TAGS: PGOV KCOR KCRM PREL AF SUBJECT: SPIN BOLDAK POWERBROKER ENCOURAGES MODERNIZATION OF CUSTOMS OPERATIONS REF: A. (A) 09 KABUL 4039 ¶B. (B) 09 KABUL 4024 KABUL 00000408 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Interagency Provincial Affairs Deputy Director Hoyt Yee for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) for the South Frank Ruggiero discussed border control and development issues on January 28 with Colonel Abdul Razzik, a controversial commander of the Afghan Border Police (ABP) and the de facto political and security chief of Spin Boldak. Razzik endorsed the idea of reforming and modernizing customs operations, saying he wanted Spin Boldak to become Afghanistan's main international gateway. He invited its increased use by ISAF as a supply route. He also welcomed the prospect of U.S. mentors to improve customs and ABP operations, albeit with reservations on their freedom of movement. He promised to step up efforts to staunch the smuggling of ammonium nitrate fertilizer commonly used to make Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). He asked for big development projects for Spin Boldak and surrounding districts which he claimed were not receiving their fair share of assistance. Razzik also commented on the Taliban and on his personal wealth which he attributed, at least in part, to brothers who are businessmen in Dubai and India. End Summary. Razzik Meets with SCR Ruggiero -------------- ¶2. (C) SCR Ruggiero met for the first time in Spin Boldak with COL Abdul Razzik, commander of the 4th Directorate of the ABP responsible for securing the border areas of Kandahar and Zabul. Also attending were LTC William Clark, commander of 8/1 CAV (8th Squadron, 1st U.S. Cavalry Regiment),5th Brigade, 2d Infantry Division (Stryker Brigade Combat Team) who has been Razzik's primary U.S. military point of contact in Spin Boldak since August, and Owen Kirby, State Department representative of the Spin Boldak District Support Team. Razzik, just 33-years old, is a capable pro-government leader commanding strong loyalty of his forces, many of whom are fellow Achakzai tribesmen. He is the dominant GIRoA figure in the Spin Boldak area. He also reportedly collects large sums of money through involvement in a variety of illicit activities. 
Border Operations -------------- ¶3. (C) Razzik observed that GIRoA -- and coalition -- success in the Kandahar region depended heavily on keeping the area along the Pakistan border secure. He said his 3700-man police force was stretched thin; his staffing numbers, he added, were based on outdated assumptions and needed to be augmented. He also noted that the area constituted ISAF's primary ground supply route into Afghanistan from Karachi. He welcomed this routing and said he would welcome an even greater influx of ISAF trucking through Spin Boldak. He remarked, with seeming disdain, on rumors and reports of ISAF plans for alternative routes, including Uzbekistan and a new gateway in Shorabek. ¶4. (C) SCR commented on the importance of border operations in Spin Boldak for civilian as well as military purposes, noting that it represented an outlet for increased agricultural exports from the region and that better border controls were essential to raise government revenues. He said he would like to see the same level of effort put into upgrading Spin Boldak's Weesh-Chaman gate as has been put into the Torkham gate situated next to the Khyber Pass. "A good idea," Razzak agreed. Razzaik said he had visited Torkham four years ago and could attest to the fact that Spin Boldak's facility was substandard. He speculated that it had ten percent of Torkham's capabilities. Efforts needed to be pursued, including the tackling of corruption, to lift the standards at Spin Boldak/Weesh gate up to Torkham levels, he said. Not only was this important for raising revenue but also for seizing contraband from smugglers and insurgents. Deployment of Mentors -------------- ¶5. (C) SCR said the U.S. was proposing to send mentors to help improve customs operations in Spin Boldak. He asked for Razzik's support so that the mentors would have the necessary freedom of movement to pursue their assignment. Razzik responded that this was a "great idea" and promised his cooperation. His only concern, for security reasons, was KABUL 00000408 002.2 OF 003 that the mentors should not travel on their own outside the customs facility in the city or in the markets where they could become insurgent targets. He offered to provide security for the mentors and did not foresee problems as long as they were accompanied by his men. (Comment: Another reason for Colonel Razzik's reservations on freedom of movement may be concern that his money-making operations, such as illicit highway checkpoints, might be disrupted. This is the principal reason that Razzik has sought to restrict daytime movement of U.S. forces in the area, according to LTC Clark. End Comment.) In response to a query, Razzik said he would also welcome mentors for his ABP forces. Interdiction of Ammonium Nitrate Fertilizer -------------- ¶6. (C) SCR raised the issue of Ammonium Nitrate fertilizer brought in from Pakistan, the source for nearly all the explosives used in IEDs placed in southern Afghanistan. SCR pointed out that President Karzai had banned the fertilizer and emphasized the importance to the U.S. of implementing this ban. Razzik said he was aware of and supported President Karzai's action that had strengthened an existing ban on the fertilizer. He pledged to enforce it with vehicle searches and by following up on information provided by cooperative shopkeepers. He added, however, that more could be accomplished to enforce the ban on the Pakistani side and recommended discussions with the Government of Pakistan. The Pakistanis, he claimed, were facilitating the smuggling of many goods, including fertilizer, into Afghanistan by allowing trucks to travel on routes that bypass customs facilities. The Taliban in Spin Boldak -------------- ¶7. (C) SCR asked Razzik for information on the insurgency in Spin Boldak and the extent to which tribal factors played a part in the conflict. Razzik explained that the vast majority of the insurgents in the immediate neighborhood were local residents, most of whom, he said, had moved across the border and were living in Chaman. He said 95 percent of these local insurgents were Afghans; only five percent were Pakistanis or other foreigners. He claimed, however, that the Pakistanis, and specifically Punjabi Pakistanis, had become the major of source of trouble in Spin Boldak. He pointed out that one of a relatively few violent incidents in Spin Boldak, a suicide bomber that attacked U.S. forces last fall, was a Punjabi. He suggested that "all" suicide bombers in the area were Pakistani. He said that Taliban members crossed tribal lines and therefore the tribal situation was often not a factor for their actions. He then acknowledged that certain tribes nonetheless had more Taliban supporters than others. Assessing the two main tribes of Spin Boldak, for example, he noted that during the Taliban era, the Noorzai had many more Taliban leaders than the Achakzai: 35 key Noorzai Taliban leaders compared to just two or three Achakzai. Having said that, he reiterated his opinion that Pakistani Punjabis represented the main insurgency problem; no such problem existed with Sindhis or Baluchis, he observed. (Comment: Razzik conveniently overlooked the role of Pashtuns but perhaps does not regard them as Pakistanis. End Comment.) Appeal for Development Aid -------------- ¶8. (C) Throughout the meeting, Razzik, at times in a jocular tone, made repeated requests for development assistance for his area. "The people in Spin Boldak and the other border areas of Kandahar and Zabul are very poor and often don't receive the assistance from the government that other districts receive," he claimed. He alleged that districts like his own were unfairly treated because they were relatively secure. GIRoA money is sent to the districts where there is fighting, he lamented. Asked by the SCR which districts he felt most deserving of U.S. assistance, Razzik listed Spin Boldak as the most important, followed by its neighboring districts of Shorabak and Takhtepol. ¶9. (C) Razzik said he had had meetings with many important visitors in the past few months, some of whom promised help. He had high expectations and was hoping they would deliver because he wanted to see the poor residents of the area helped. He joked that every time he sees Blackhawk helicopters landing in Spin Boldak, he now imagines that they are bringing money for his districts. He acknowledged that KABUL 00000408 003.2 OF 003 there have been a few USAID projects started in Spin Boldak but complained that they were small and insufficient. What he had in mind were much bigger projects: roads, dams and irrigation systems, and power projects. Personal Information -------------- ¶10. (C) Razzik reminisced briefly about his relationship with former Governor Gul Agha Sherzai in Kandahar saying he had helped fight to topple the Taliban regime before coming to Spin Boldak eight or nine years ago. He recalled working closely with U.S. Special Forces and said that he had helped to detain "many Arabs." They were held on what had been a Taliban camp but which later became a U.S. military facility at Spin Boldak. Although the land belonged to his family, he said, with a smile, that up to now, neither the Taliban nor the Americans have paid any rent. (Note: LTC Clark said U.S. forces are looking into the issue and that Razzik may be correct.) SCR said he had heard and read that that Razzik had a lot of money. To which Razzik laughed and readily conceded, "I have plenty of money." He had nothing to add, however, about the sources of his income other than to say, "Thank God, I have a brother in Dubai and another brother in India who are successful businessmen." Asked whether he had ever visited his brothers overseas, Razzik said he had traveled to Dubai and Sharjah but had never been to India. Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) Colonel Razzik came across as engaging, confident and comfortable with his foreign visitors. His GIRoA connections are reported to be substantial and he has managed a constructive working relationship with coalition forces. He appears to have had a stabilizing influence in Spin Boldak, although there are mixed views about the degree of his popularity and the extent to which he is able to control events. Nobody, including his U.S. military counterparts, is under any illusions about his corrupt activities. (It is possible that his overseas brothers are helping to launder his ill-gotten gains.) Razzik is thus at least part of the long-term problem in the border area. As noted in septel, countering this culture of corruption personified by Razzik will require steady efforts to strengthen governance institutions, establish rule of law, and correct customs abuses. Eikenberry