Analysis of UNAMA's Proposed New Donor Coordination

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000335 SIPDIS LONDON HOLD FOR AMBASSADORS HOLBROOKE, EIKENBERRY, WAYNE DEPT FOR GWI, S/SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/RA, SCA/A DEPT PASS AID/ANE CENTCOM FOR USFOR-A AND CSTC-A NSC FOR JJONES DASD FOR DSEDNEY E.O. 12958 N/A TAGS: EAID PREL PGOV AF SUBJECT: Analysis of UNAMA's Proposed New Donor Coordination Arrangements REF: KABUL 215 ¶1. (U) Summary: In preparation for the London and Kabul Conferences, outgoing United Nations SRSG Kai Eide recently submitted a proposal to the Afghan Government (GIRoA) and international community partners to improve consultation and coordination of assistance in institution building and economic development. The proposal recommends: 1) the main donor countries and institutions second up to 20 Senior Advisors to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) to form an Advisory Group on Donor Coordination and Aid Effectiveness, reporting to the SRSG; 2) ISAF appoint a high level representative responsible for political and civilian efforts; and 3) the EU merge its two missions to enable it to take greater responsibility for coordinating efforts of all European Union (EU) member states. While the UNAMA proposal has merits, we have concerns regarding the proposal's practicality, the UN's ability to recruit its own senior level talent, and the possible establishment of a parallel 'donor cabinet of Advisors,' thus creating an additional layer of administration between GIRoA and the international community. While GIRoA and international community unanimously support UNAMA, the current draft of the proposal does not support efforts to develop Afghan capacity and could shift leadership away from GIRoA. Specifically, the proposal duplicates the Civilian Technical Assistance Plan (CTAP) efforts to provide coaching and initiative development in priority Ministries. CTAP is already underway, with its efforts Afghan-led and demand-driven. This cable provides our analysis, critique, and suggestions of both the UNAMA proposal and Terms of Reference for consideration prior to operationalizing the approach. End Summary. UNAMA Proposal and Advisors' Terms of Reference - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (U) Kai Eide's proposal, dated January 19 in anticipation of discussion at the January 28 London Conference, recommends that: --1) the main donor countries and institutions in economic development and governance "second" 15-20 Senior Advisors, reporting to the SRSG; --2) ISAF appoint a high level representative responsible for political and civilian (including development and governance) efforts; and --3) the EU should merge its two missions to enable it to take greater responsibility for coordinating efforts of all EU member states. ¶3. (U) The Senior Advisors seconded to UNAMA must be senior career officers of the donor government with the ability to influence donor policy. The proposed role of the advisors is: --1) to develop capacity of a newly-created Secretariat, possibly staffed by CTAP, within the Ministry of Finance (MoF) in coordinating national development programs; --2) coach and support other Ministers, in consultation with the MoF; --3) to assist the SRSG in identifying weaknesses in ministries, their need for support and impediments to donor coordination; and --4) to maintain a link to their respective donors. ¶4. (U) Concerns over the proposal begin with the likelihood that enacting it may result in a parallel 'donor cabinet of advisors' that might duplicate the responsibilities of the GIRoA and/or work without a specific mandate or metrics to gauge and monitor its actions. Lines of authority and responsibilities are also unclear; for example, individuals would report to the SRSG (who is often out of country),a Minister, and their respective home agency. This makes for a confused picture. Not all donors will have Senior Advisors represented in this new UNAMA Advisory Group, so a regular system to facilitate information flow to all engaged donors and the GIRoA is needed. Furthermore, the proposal lacks details on how UNAMA will improve communication with the GIRoA to set priorities, let alone how the SRSG would manage 20 advisors reporting individually to him. SRSG Eide told Ambassador Eikenberry on January 23 that he only expected five to ten of the new Advisors to be senior enough to command the respect of the Provincial Governors. ¶5. (U) Efforts to have Embassy staff work at UNAMA met with too many administrative difficulties to come to fruition, and UNAMA and KABUL 00000335 002 OF 003 international community in Kabul already face great difficulties in attracting and retaining senior-level staff to take new and replacement positions in Kabul. (Reftel describes the staffing shortages at UNDP and UNAMA which have a direct impact on upcoming elections.) ¶6. (U) UNAMA's recommended approach seems to duplicate the role that CTAP already offers by placing qualified advisors in Ministries while working to improve the professional capacity in the Ministries. While CTAP (ironically formulated by the MoF and UNAMA) is consistent with "Afghanization," it has not yet reached its full potential. The proposal recognizes CTAP as a 'good vehicle'; Mission offices believe it is a vehicle to which more members of the donor community can contribute, rather than placing additional advisors through UNAMA. The resulting addition of UNAMA Advisors coaching and supporting ministries while located outside of ministries, could dilute capacity building efforts and move leadership away from government. ¶7. (U) The section pertaining to the recommendation for a Senior Representative within ISAF to direct PRT efforts is consistent with COMISAF, NSC, and USNATO PermRep Ambassador Daalder's recommendations. The proposal lacks information, however, regarding how a senior ISAF PRT representative would coordinate with UNAMA. In previous drafts, there was a call for an ISAF representative to be located at UNAMA; this suggestion still seems reasonable, and the ISAF position within UNAMA could be developed in conjunction with the Senior Advisors positions as a way to fully integrate and coordinate PRT efforts. We are concerned as to how a US PRT Senior Representative would report to a non-US Senior Advisor. ¶8. (U) We strongly agree with UNAMA's suggestion for the EU/EC missions to merge. Recommendations - - - - - - - - ¶9. (U) We suggest the following Recommendations for the Proposal and terms of reference: - The proposal should avoid creating a parallel 'donor cabinet of advisors' that could duplicate the role of GIRoA officials rather than building their capacity. - We should not undermine CTAP or other good ongoing programs through this proposal. The CTAP is placing qualified advisors in Ministries while working to improve the professional capacity in the Ministries. - Donor coordination should also focus on program implementation mechanisms, so the international community can co-fund, co-plan and co-implement assistance using agreed upon systems. - The proposal needs to explain how UNAMA will set priorities with GIRoA and the donor community. - The proposal should clearly build in a role for Afghan partners. - The proposal needs clear definitions of how the senior ISAF PRT representative will coordinate with UNAMA. - Reporting and responsibility lines need to be well defined, especially where the PRT and Senior Advisor come under different Chiefs of Mission. - The proposal should define a regular system to facilitate the information flow to all engaged donors and the GIRoA. OUTSTANDING ISSUES - - - - - - - - - ¶10. (U) COMMENT: We need further information to analyze the merits of the proposal. For example, we need to understand what responsibility the Chief of Mission (COM) will have for the new Advisors: whether they will reside at the Embassy; whether they will be under COM authority; and whether the Embassy will be responsible for their security and life support, including daily transport to their UNAMA assignments. Also, the incoming SRSG may have differing views on how to improve consultation and coordination between the GIRoA and international community. ¶11. (SBU) UNAMA, under Eide's leadership, has played a commendable, proactive role in engaging GIRoA on capacity development while KABUL 00000335 003 OF 003 building functional relations with the donor community. Any expectations to have Advisors in place soon are overly optimistic. A new SRSG may require more time to approve the proposal and help it evolve into a program. Recruiting qualified senior advisors will require cooperation and shared effort by the donors with UNAMA, and filling positions may take several months. We recommend that USUN engage the UN at the HQ level, even as we continue discussions with UNAMA and the donor community in Kabul. END COMMENT. RICCIARDONE