GIROA TO RELEASE 4 GTMO DETAINEES

S E C R E T KABUL 000332 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2020 TAGS: PREL PGOV AF SUBJECT: GIROA TO RELEASE 4 GTMO DETAINEES Classified By: Deputy Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone for Reasons 1.4 (B) and(D) ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Afghan government officials told us January 19 they plan to release four Afghan detainees whom DoD had transferred from Guantanamo as soon as possible.,, GIRoA has been holding these detainees in the Afghan National Detention Facility (ANDF) since December 20, asking that the U.S. provide prosecutable evidence in two of the more serious cases. However, the U.S. has been unable to provide what Afghan Attorney General Aloko considers sufficient evidence to prosecute the cases. Aloko has also asked whether the U.S. will offer reintegration support for these soon-to-be-released individuals. Recognizing that former GTMO detainees are heavily recruited by insurgents for propaganda and/or combat purposes, we are working with U.S. military detentions Joint Task Force 435 to identify what level of support we can offer to lessen the chances that these detainees will return to the battlefield, while underscoring to GIRoA our view that they also bear responsibility for providing returnees with incentive and opportunity to peacefully reintegrate. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (S) Afghan government officials told Embassy officers January 19 they plan to release four Afghan detainees whom DoD had transferred from Guantanamo as soon as possible. Both Karzai,s Chief of Staff and the Afghan National Security Council have pressured the AG to carefully review the two most troublesome files - those of Abdul Kakal Hafis (AF 1030) who according to GTMO files was involved in the murder of an ICRC worker in Kandahar in 2002; and, Mohammad Hashim (AF 850),who, according to GTMO files, was likely part of the 40-man unit responsible for the assassination of Afghan Vice President Haji Abdul Qadir in 2002. According to GTMO files the two additional detainees are: Sharifullah Sharifullah (AF 944),who was arrested in possession of an improvised explosive device and Mohammad Rahim (AF 1104),who worked for a cooperative which sold supplies to the Taliban. ¶3. (SBU) Three days before the detainees were transferred to Afghanistan, the Embassy provided the Attorney General (AG), Afghan National Security Council and the Presidential Palace with the releasable version of each detainees, GTMO file, which we received from OSD. The Aloko Commission, however, headed by the AG and established to review detention cases, found that the files lacked evidence compelling enough for successful prosecution. The Afghan government continued to detain these individuals to allow time both for its own agencies to investigate these cases, and for the USG to declassify and release additional evidence. JTF 435 received some further information from Guantanamo, but nothing sufficient for prosecution. JTF 435 continues to work with the Foreign Disclosures Office at GTMO to classify additional evidence as releasable to the Afghans. ¶4. (SBU) COMMENT: Presidential Chief of Staff Mohammad Omer Daudzai told Deputy Ambassador Ricciardone on December 17, that despite Karzai,s usual reluctance to prosecute alleged members of the Taliban without evidence of ties to Al Qaeda or to terrorist acts, We want to prosecute these cases, but you have to give us the evidence to do it. We believe that GIRoA has made a good faith effort to find their own evidence to prosecute these two most recent cases, but concluded that the available evidence does not rise to the level necessary to mount a successful legal action. ¶5. (S) Consequently, the Embassy is working with JTF-435 to determine how best to identify reintegration support and monitor these men as they are released into Afghan society, while reminding GIRoA of our view that they also bear responsibility for providing Afghan GTMO returnees with incentives and opportunities peacefully to reintegrate. Nonetheless, we must face the fact that neither GIRoA nor the USG now appear able or willing to provide reintegration support sufficient enough to keep all four of these individuals from returning to the battlefield or becoming Taliban recruiters. According to military intelligence, approximately 20 percent of GTMO detainees return to insurgency after release. We and JTF 435 are pushing GIRoA to take responsibility for these individuals, including by coordinating basic reintegration support and monitoring them and their actions, for example, through sustained GIRoA liaison with the communities to which these individuals return. We will coordinate whatever support we may be able to muster with the Afghan National Security Council staff, who in November offered to work with us on such cases. EIKENBERRY