SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND NATIONAL POLITICS:

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 000202 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2020 TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL AF SUBJECT: SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND NATIONAL POLITICS: NANGARHAR IN 2010 Classified By: Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone for Reasons 1.4 b,d. ¶1. (S) Summary: Ambassador Eikenberry and Jelani Popal, head of the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG), met with the integrated command element of Brigade Combat Team Task Force Mountain Warrior in Jalalabad on January 14 before lunch with Governor Gul Agha Sherzai and a walking tour of the capital of Khogyani district. The Ambassador told long-time acquaintance Governor Sherzai that while the United States can help with many things in Afghanistan, it cannot fix Afghanistan's internal political problems. Sherzai responded that the main political problem is the disconnect between the United States and Karzai. Sherzai shared his improvements in Nangarhar, as well as what he could achieve if he were to become Governor of Kandahar. He also assessed why the Provincial Council elections have generated unrest in Nangarhar, linking it to Karzai's alleged involvement in having certain candidates succeed through fraud. The walk through Khogyani's central bazaar gave the Ambassador an opportunity to witness security and development improvements achieved since his last time in the area, in 2005, when heavy fighting was the norm. End Summary. Fix Your Own Problems -------------- ¶2. (SBU) In a meeting before lunch, Governor Sherzai told Ambassador Eikenberry that the ANSF are working well with Coalition Forces because of effective communication and coordination. Further, the ANSF are now occasionally able to perform operations on their own. Sherzai praised USAID and others for their assistance with job creation in Nangarhar province. He was also content with the District Development Assemblies, claiming that most of the District-level line directors were "professionals making real improvements." Sherzai added that Nangarhar is the leading province in the East in terms of providing security and government accounting services for the greater region. For example, Nangarhar's Afghan Border Police (ABP) Brigade also covers Kunar and Laghman provinces and the Nangarhar Financial Ministry provides accounting for these provinces, according Nangarhar "greater responsibility." He spoke of the coordinating meetings held in Nangarhar for the Eastern provinces and their attempts to align their responses to region-wide problems. Sherzai said he hoped other Eastern provinces should model themselves on Nangarhar's success as their stability and improvement would help him in the long run. ¶3. (C) Governor Sherzai expressed his pride in the Peace and Development Jirga, recently organized by the controversial Haji Zaman, and thanked the PRT for its help in support of the Jirga. (Note: Haji Zaman has been accused of killing another warlord in a battle for control over Nangarhar after the fall of the Taliban and of allowing Osama bin Laden to escape from Tora Bora. End Note.) Sherzai reported that the Jirga agreed to levy a large fine and set fire to the homes of any village or tribe that does not report insurgent activity in its area. Sherzai mentioned two instances in Nangarhar where he brought "popular" Taliban in from the fight by paying them, expressing his hope that they would convince other Taliban to re-align with the GIRoA. Sherzai praised Nangarhar Police Chief Salangi, present at the meeting, who had also served with the police in Herat and Kandahar, saying Salangi was ready for any security challenge. ¶4. (S) When Ambassador Eikenberry asked why the January 6 IED explosion in Rodat, which injured nine PRT members, had been blamed on the USG, Sherzai expressed his displeasure over the successful misinformation campaign. He said that when the incident occurred, at 9:30AM, there was no negative reaction against the PRT, which went to treat nearby injured civilians before helping themselves. However, at 2PM, "an MP or other politician" arrived at the scene of the bombing and formed a demonstration. Sherzai was convinced that "someone working for the Afghan government" had created the problem and said that his and Coalition Forces intelligence officers "surely have Ql the (correct) information." ¶5. (C) Ambassador Eikenberry pointed out that both the Coalition and the GIRoA had made mistakes in Afghanistan, but that if America were ever to feel that Afghanistan didn't welcome us here, we would not stay. We can help Afghanistan fight extremists, build its security forces and infrastructure, and reconstruct itself, but we cannot fix its internal political problems. ¶6. (S) Sherzai responded that the majority of the tribes in Afghanistan supported the Coalition presence. However, if "you in Kabul" will solve your problem with the national government of Afghanistan, there will be no problems at the KABUL 00000202 002 OF 004 provincial level. He was adamant that problem was in Kabul between the Embassy and the President and his ministers, adding that we should not blame him for things we were not doing right in Kabul. Sherzai added that there was much political instability and in-fighting in Kabul and that the central government had forgotten its primary mission of reconstruction and fighting the insurgency. ¶7. (S) Governor Sherzai suggested that fixing the political battles in Kabul would prevent the "neighbors" from interfering in Afghanistan's internal affairs. He claimed he has delivered this same message to Karzai repeatedly and sees no need to "edit" his opinions because he receives no money from Karzai. Sherzai also asserted that he tells Karzai about all the problems he creates by criticizing America in the media. Sherzai and IDLG Director Popal, agreed that the media exacerbate tensions by reporting stories and accusations with no evidence to back them. Popal added that the media are influenced by foreign intelligence agents from Iran in selecting sensationalist stories in their drive to create ratings. Sherzai and Popal concurred that the Ministry of Information and Culture should issue regulations to prevent such incitement. Poppy Growth, the Taliban, and Locally-Selected Police -------------- -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Sherzai next turned to the subject of Nangarhar's poppy growth. After 60 years of poppy production in the province, Sherzai felt under considerable pressure to make the province poppy-free. He had told the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) that there was poppy in Sherzad but, as the UNODC did not yet believe him, he would allow the poppy fields to grow until they were tall enough to be detected so he could then obtain official clearance to eradicate them. According to Sherzai Police Chief Salangi harasses and jails poppy growers and the people of Nangarhar strongly support a poppy-free province. Sherzai suggested that more development aid and job creation in Khogyani, a focus district, would help prevent the pro-poppy Taliban influence there. He claimed he had no vehicles or fuel for his supporters and ventured that forming battalions from the tribes in Nangarhar under the ABP would help quell the insurgency as well as increase support for the Peace and Development Jirga. ¶9. (SBU) The Ambassador asked if such a tribal battalion would be trained policemen. ISAF Brigade Commander Col. Randy George clarified that they would be trained, uniformed police, the same as all other officers. Sherzai said that the only difference is that they would be hired for work in their own village rather than the current practice of assigning policemen nationwide, regardless of their tribal and linguistic affiliations. This practice has reportedly caused tensions in some areas. Sherzai said that because these ABP officers would clearly enjoy the support of their families, villages, and districts, the Taliban would not have the courage to fight them as it would lead them and their own families into generations-long blood feuds with the families of any of these locally selected officers. ¶10. (C) Ambassador Eikenberry asked about the composition of the police force, since when he has asked about the origins of officers he has met during his trips around the country, the majority have been from Nangarhar. Rarely have they come from Helmand, Kandahar, Nuristan, or other neighboring provinces. Sherzai replied that the large Nangarhar presence in the security forces is because he tells families and tribes participating in the jirgas to send their sons to the ANA and ANP. ¶11. (SBU) Governor Sherzai then requested an increase in aid to Nangarhar. The Ambassador noted that the development budget for Afghanistan was a much larger item in the USG budget for 2010 than it had been in 2009. He explained that we will try to direct funds through those certifiable ministries who we can be certain will direct the funds responsibly. The Ambassador added that our programs would be a success when the media no longer ask the American Ambassador about development programs for Nangarhar, but instead, ask the Provincial and District development bodies. Nangarhar Provincial Council Elections -------------- ¶12. (S) The Ambassador asked Governor Sherzai over lunch about the still-contentious results of the Provincial Council election. Sherzai alleged that the bad elements from the Arsalie family who had "forced their way" onto the Provincial Council were close to President Karzai and that Karzai had given them and their family patriarch, Hajji Din Mohammed KABUL 00000202 003 OF 004 (Karzai's Campaign Manager),money for their own campaigns, which they had "misused." The Ambassador asked why Karzai's friends would attempt to hurt the United States when Karzai is an American friend. Sherzai implied that the Arsalie family had their own political views, claiming he could show the Ambassador a video produced four months ago by Hajji Zahir, also a member of the Arsalie clan and a known narco-trafficker, wherein Zahir claimed that Afghans are guests in their own country and that America is the real ruler. ¶13. (S) Sherzai affirmed that Hajji Zahir was indeed still involved in the drug trade. The Ambassador asked if Sherzai's own success in combating the drug trade had soured his relations with Zahir. Sherzai claimed to be unconcerned and said he sent Zahir's men to jail and closed his drug factories. However, he said that the next step was for Kabul to begin punishing people and threatening the big drug traffickers. Kandahar -------------- ¶14. (C) The Ambassador asked Governor Sherzai if the situation in Kandahar was improving since the U.S. forces there had begun their push. He said that it was getting worse, not better; evidence of this deterioration was the considerable increase in kidnapping for ransom. Sherzai blamed the situation on the weakness of the current Governor (Note: Karzai appointed Sherzai Governor of Kandahar, but he was later moved to Nangarhar after complaints about Sherzai's corruption grew too loud for Karzai to ignore. End Note.) Sherzai asserted that Kandahar needs a strong, experienced leader. When the Ambassador asked who Sherzai would recommend, he replied that he would "have to think about it." He recounted the well-known story of Karzai's having offered him the Kandahar job two months ago and his having turned it down on the grounds that he could not work within the sphere of Karzai's brother Ahmad Wali -- even though he said he and Ahmad Wali Karzai had "ironed out their personal differences" and he had come to visit Sherzai in Nangarhar. ¶15. (C) Later, Sherzai acknowledged that he wouldn't mind serving again as the governor of Kandahar, his home province, and the one which he took over from the Taliban and held during the American offensive in 2001, but that he could only do it if Kabul solved the "tribal issues." Sherzai said he visits one district a week to help maintain security in Nangarhar but that this wouldn't be possible in Kandahar or Helmand as it is too dangerous there. He added that because the tribes there are all linked, they are too likely to choose sides. (Note: Sherzai did not go into detail regarding this point. End Note.) Bio Info -------------- ¶16. (SBU) During the lunch, Governor Sherzai smoked Davidoff cigarettes and spoke of his family, relating that he had 10 sons, the eldest aged 26, and seven daughters. He confirmed that he had recently married a fourth wife, a former Kam Air stewardess from the Popalzai tribe whom he had first seen as a 12-year-old girl in Pakistan, during the Taliban years. He claimed that she had proposed marriage to him because she had heard so many good things about him. Be Realistic -------------- ¶17. (SBU) After lunch, Governor Sherzai and Jelani Popal accompanied Ambassador Eikenberry; Acting SCR for RC-East Abigail Friedman; Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) at Taskforce Mountain Warrior, Dante Paradiso; and Brigade Commander Col. Randy George to a village in Khogyani, a focus district, for a walk in the bazaar and a discussion with District officials. During the walk, the District Support Team's integrated command element briefed the Ambassador. In the bazaar the Ambassador spoke with local businessmen and farmers about their views on security and the prosperity of the village since 2001. At first, the general response was that security had deteriorated and that because there had been no rain, business was not good. However, when queried about comparing the current situation with 2001, there was unanimous agreement about an overall improvement, though all remained concerned about either water or electricity issues. When villagers asked the Ambassador when the USG was going to fix their problems, reiterating our model for true success in Afghanistan, the Ambassador directed them to their own government's representative, standing next to him, Governor KABUL 00000202 004 OF 004 Sherzai, who, at a later event with the District Development Assembly, directed them back to the Ambassador. ¶18. (SBU) Following the bazaar walk-through, the group met with the District Development Assembly and a number of ministry line directors. They presented a long list of requests and repeatedly highlighted their priority need for a dam and for electricity. The Ambassador marveled at the fact that he was in Khogyani walking through town and having a meeting with respected district officials. He recalled when he was last there in 2005 and the fact that he could never have done anything remotely similar. The Ambassador thanked the members of the Assembly for their hard work and pointed out that they would need to be realistic in their requests. He explained that the United States is in the middle of a sharp economic crisis and we have less money to give. He stressed that overall the situation is much better than they were in 2001 and that our primary mission is to protect the Afghan people. The Ambassador noted that we have made commitments to help build the Afghan government and economy which we will honor and will attempt to route through Afghan ministries, where possible, but we will have to work step-by-step. He asked Assembly members to remain committed to security as they made decisions on development priorities for their own people, instead of foreigners making those decisions. EIKENBERRY