SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND NATIONAL POLITICS:

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 000202

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2020
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND NATIONAL POLITICS:
NANGARHAR IN 2010

Classified By: Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone for Reasons 1.4 b,d.


1. (S) Summary: Ambassador Eikenberry and Jelani Popal, head
of the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG),
met with the integrated command element of Brigade Combat
Team Task Force Mountain Warrior in Jalalabad on January 14
before lunch with Governor Gul Agha Sherzai and a walking
tour of the capital of Khogyani district. The Ambassador
told long-time acquaintance Governor Sherzai that while the
United States can help with many things in Afghanistan, it
cannot fix Afghanistan's internal political problems.
Sherzai responded that the main political problem is the
disconnect between the United States and Karzai. Sherzai
shared his improvements in Nangarhar, as well as what he
could achieve if he were to become Governor of Kandahar. He
also assessed why the Provincial Council elections have
generated unrest in Nangarhar, linking it to Karzai's alleged
involvement in having certain candidates succeed through
fraud. The walk through Khogyani's central bazaar gave the
Ambassador an opportunity to witness security and development
improvements achieved since his last time in the area, in
2005, when heavy fighting was the norm. End Summary.

Fix Your Own Problems
--------------


2. (SBU) In a meeting before lunch, Governor Sherzai told
Ambassador Eikenberry that the ANSF are working well with
Coalition Forces because of effective communication and
coordination. Further, the ANSF are now occasionally able to
perform operations on their own. Sherzai praised USAID and
others for their assistance with job creation in Nangarhar
province. He was also content with the District Development
Assemblies, claiming that most of the District-level line
directors were "professionals making real improvements."
Sherzai added that Nangarhar is the leading province in the
East in terms of providing security and government accounting
services for the greater region. For example, Nangarhar's
Afghan Border Police (ABP) Brigade also covers Kunar and
Laghman provinces and the Nangarhar Financial Ministry
provides accounting for these provinces, according Nangarhar
"greater responsibility." He spoke of the coordinating
meetings held in Nangarhar for the Eastern provinces and
their attempts to align their responses to region-wide
problems. Sherzai said he hoped other Eastern provinces
should model themselves on Nangarhar's success as their
stability and improvement would help him in the long run.


3. (C) Governor Sherzai expressed his pride in the Peace and
Development Jirga, recently organized by the controversial
Haji Zaman, and thanked the PRT for its help in support of
the Jirga. (Note: Haji Zaman has been accused of killing
another warlord in a battle for control over Nangarhar after
the fall of the Taliban and of allowing Osama bin Laden to
escape from Tora Bora. End Note.) Sherzai reported that the
Jirga agreed to levy a large fine and set fire to the homes
of any village or tribe that does not report insurgent
activity in its area. Sherzai mentioned two instances in
Nangarhar where he brought "popular" Taliban in from the
fight by paying them, expressing his hope that they would
convince other Taliban to re-align with the GIRoA. Sherzai
praised Nangarhar Police Chief Salangi, present at the
meeting, who had also served with the police in Herat and
Kandahar, saying Salangi was ready for any security challenge.


4. (S) When Ambassador Eikenberry asked why the January 6
IED explosion in Rodat, which injured nine PRT members, had
been blamed on the USG, Sherzai expressed his displeasure
over the successful misinformation campaign. He said that
when the incident occurred, at 9:30AM, there was no negative
reaction against the PRT, which went to treat nearby injured
civilians before helping themselves. However, at 2PM, "an MP
or other politician" arrived at the scene of the bombing and
formed a demonstration. Sherzai was convinced that "someone
working for the Afghan government" had created the problem
and said that his and Coalition Forces intelligence officers
"surely have Ql the (correct) information."


5. (C) Ambassador Eikenberry pointed out that both the
Coalition and the GIRoA had made mistakes in Afghanistan, but
that if America were ever to feel that Afghanistan didn't
welcome us here, we would not stay. We can help Afghanistan
fight extremists, build its security forces and
infrastructure, and reconstruct itself, but we cannot fix its
internal political problems.


6. (S) Sherzai responded that the majority of the tribes in
Afghanistan supported the Coalition presence. However, if
"you in Kabul" will solve your problem with the national
government of Afghanistan, there will be no problems at the

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provincial level. He was adamant that problem was in Kabul
between the Embassy and the President and his ministers,
adding that we should not blame him for things we were not
doing right in Kabul. Sherzai added that there was much
political instability and in-fighting in Kabul and that the
central government had forgotten its primary mission of
reconstruction and fighting the insurgency.


7. (S) Governor Sherzai suggested that fixing the political
battles in Kabul would prevent the "neighbors" from
interfering in Afghanistan's internal affairs. He claimed he
has delivered this same message to Karzai repeatedly and sees
no need to "edit" his opinions because he receives no money
from Karzai. Sherzai also asserted that he tells Karzai about
all the problems he creates by criticizing America in the
media. Sherzai and IDLG Director Popal, agreed that the
media exacerbate tensions by reporting stories and
accusations with no evidence to back them. Popal added that
the media are influenced by foreign intelligence agents from
Iran in selecting sensationalist stories in their drive to
create ratings. Sherzai and Popal concurred that the
Ministry of Information and Culture should issue regulations
to prevent such incitement.

Poppy Growth, the Taliban, and Locally-Selected Police
-------------- --------------


8. (SBU) Sherzai next turned to the subject of Nangarhar's
poppy growth. After 60 years of poppy production in the
province, Sherzai felt under considerable pressure to make
the province poppy-free. He had told the UN Office of Drugs
and Crime (UNODC) that there was poppy in Sherzad but, as the
UNODC did not yet believe him, he would allow the poppy
fields to grow until they were tall enough to be detected so
he could then obtain official clearance to eradicate them.
According to Sherzai Police Chief Salangi harasses and jails
poppy growers and the people of Nangarhar strongly support a
poppy-free province. Sherzai suggested that more development
aid and job creation in Khogyani, a focus district, would
help prevent the pro-poppy Taliban influence there. He
claimed he had no vehicles or fuel for his supporters and
ventured that forming battalions from the tribes in Nangarhar
under the ABP would help quell the insurgency as well as
increase support for the Peace and Development Jirga.


9. (SBU) The Ambassador asked if such a tribal battalion
would be trained policemen. ISAF Brigade Commander Col.
Randy George clarified that they would be trained, uniformed
police, the same as all other officers. Sherzai said that
the only difference is that they would be hired for work in
their own village rather than the current practice of
assigning policemen nationwide, regardless of their tribal
and linguistic affiliations. This practice has reportedly
caused tensions in some areas. Sherzai said that because
these ABP officers would clearly enjoy the support of their
families, villages, and districts, the Taliban would not have
the courage to fight them as it would lead them and their own
families into generations-long blood feuds with the families
of any of these locally selected officers.


10. (C) Ambassador Eikenberry asked about the composition of
the police force, since when he has asked about the origins
of officers he has met during his trips around the country,
the majority have been from Nangarhar. Rarely have they come
from Helmand, Kandahar, Nuristan, or other neighboring
provinces. Sherzai replied that the large Nangarhar presence
in the security forces is because he tells families and
tribes participating in the jirgas to send their sons to the
ANA and ANP.


11. (SBU) Governor Sherzai then requested an increase in aid
to Nangarhar. The Ambassador noted that the development
budget for Afghanistan was a much larger item in the USG
budget for 2010 than it had been in 2009. He explained that
we will try to direct funds through those certifiable
ministries who we can be certain will direct the funds
responsibly. The Ambassador added that our programs would be
a success when the media no longer ask the American
Ambassador about development programs for Nangarhar, but
instead, ask the Provincial and District development bodies.

Nangarhar Provincial Council Elections
--------------


12. (S) The Ambassador asked Governor Sherzai over lunch
about the still-contentious results of the Provincial Council
election. Sherzai alleged that the bad elements from the
Arsalie family who had "forced their way" onto the Provincial
Council were close to President Karzai and that Karzai had
given them and their family patriarch, Hajji Din Mohammed

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(Karzai's Campaign Manager),money for their own campaigns,
which they had "misused." The Ambassador asked why Karzai's
friends would attempt to hurt the United States when Karzai
is an American friend. Sherzai implied that the Arsalie
family had their own political views, claiming he could show
the Ambassador a video produced four months ago by Hajji
Zahir, also a member of the Arsalie clan and a known
narco-trafficker, wherein Zahir claimed that Afghans are
guests in their own country and that America is the real
ruler.


13. (S) Sherzai affirmed that Hajji Zahir was indeed still
involved in the drug trade. The Ambassador asked if
Sherzai's own success in combating the drug trade had soured
his relations with Zahir. Sherzai claimed to be unconcerned
and said he sent Zahir's men to jail and closed his drug
factories. However, he said that the next step was for Kabul
to begin punishing people and threatening the big drug
traffickers.

Kandahar
--------------


14. (C) The Ambassador asked Governor Sherzai if the
situation in Kandahar was improving since the U.S. forces
there had begun their push. He said that it was getting
worse, not better; evidence of this deterioration was the
considerable increase in kidnapping for ransom. Sherzai
blamed the situation on the weakness of the current Governor
(Note: Karzai appointed Sherzai Governor of Kandahar, but he
was later moved to Nangarhar after complaints about Sherzai's
corruption grew too loud for Karzai to ignore. End Note.)
Sherzai asserted that Kandahar needs a strong, experienced
leader. When the Ambassador asked who Sherzai would
recommend, he replied that he would "have to think about
it." He recounted the well-known story of Karzai's having
offered him the Kandahar job two months ago and his having
turned it down on the grounds that he could not work within
the sphere of Karzai's brother Ahmad Wali -- even though he
said he and Ahmad Wali Karzai had "ironed out their personal
differences" and he had come to visit Sherzai in Nangarhar.


15. (C) Later, Sherzai acknowledged that he wouldn't mind
serving again as the governor of Kandahar, his home province,
and the one which he took over from the Taliban and held
during the American offensive in 2001, but that he could only
do it if Kabul solved the "tribal issues." Sherzai said he
visits one district a week to help maintain security in
Nangarhar but that this wouldn't be possible in Kandahar or
Helmand as it is too dangerous there. He added that because
the tribes there are all linked, they are too likely to
choose sides. (Note: Sherzai did not go into detail
regarding this point. End Note.)

Bio Info
--------------


16. (SBU) During the lunch, Governor Sherzai smoked Davidoff
cigarettes and spoke of his family, relating that he had 10
sons, the eldest aged 26, and seven daughters. He confirmed
that he had recently married a fourth wife, a former Kam Air
stewardess from the Popalzai tribe whom he had first seen as
a 12-year-old girl in Pakistan, during the Taliban years. He
claimed that she had proposed marriage to him because she had
heard so many good things about him.


Be Realistic
--------------


17. (SBU) After lunch, Governor Sherzai and Jelani Popal
accompanied Ambassador Eikenberry; Acting SCR for RC-East
Abigail Friedman; Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) at
Taskforce Mountain Warrior, Dante Paradiso; and Brigade
Commander Col. Randy George to a village in Khogyani, a focus
district, for a walk in the bazaar and a discussion with
District officials. During the walk, the District Support
Team's integrated command element briefed the Ambassador. In
the bazaar the Ambassador spoke with local businessmen and
farmers about their views on security and the prosperity of
the village since 2001. At first, the general response was
that security had deteriorated and that because there had
been no rain, business was not good. However, when queried
about comparing the current situation with 2001, there was
unanimous agreement about an overall improvement, though all
remained concerned about either water or electricity issues.
When villagers asked the Ambassador when the USG was going to
fix their problems, reiterating our model for true success in
Afghanistan, the Ambassador directed them to their own
government's representative, standing next to him, Governor

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Sherzai, who, at a later event with the District Development
Assembly, directed them back to the Ambassador.


18. (SBU) Following the bazaar walk-through, the group met
with the District Development Assembly and a number of
ministry line directors. They presented a long list of
requests and repeatedly highlighted their priority need for a
dam and for electricity. The Ambassador marveled at the fact
that he was in Khogyani walking through town and having a
meeting with respected district officials. He recalled when
he was last there in 2005 and the fact that he could never
have done anything remotely similar. The Ambassador thanked
the members of the Assembly for their hard work and pointed
out that they would need to be realistic in their requests.
He explained that the United States is in the middle of a
sharp economic crisis and we have less money to give. He
stressed that overall the situation is much better than they
were in 2001 and that our primary mission is to protect the
Afghan people. The Ambassador noted that we have made
commitments to help build the Afghan government and economy
which we will honor and will attempt to route through Afghan
ministries, where possible, but we will have to work
step-by-step. He asked Assembly members to remain committed
to security as they made decisions on development priorities
for their own people, instead of foreigners making those
decisions.
EIKENBERRY