ROLLING BACK THE INSURGENCY--POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000120 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM, INR/B STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA USFOR-A FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2020 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM MOPS FR AF SUBJECT: ROLLING BACK THE INSURGENCY--POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN FRAGILE TAGAB DISTRICT, KAPISA PROVINCE, AFGHANISTAN Classified By: Interagency Provincial Affairs Coordinator Scott Kilner for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Tagab District, Kapisa Province, remains unstable with continued attacks on coalition forces. Several remote valleys in the district are insurgent sanctuaries. However, a series of recent incidents have combined to provide real opportunities to turn the tide. Most promising are examples of local Afghans successfully challenging and defeating insurgent forces, infighting amongst Taliban commanders, and a possible sea change in local attitudes following a Taliban rocket attack that resulted in the deaths of 16 local residents. An active new French battle space owner is implementing a series of encouraging measures, and U.S.-French coordination is growing stronger. In order to capitalize on these positive developments, we must vigorously press forward along all lines of effort as quickly as possible. END SUMMARY. LOCALS STAND UP TO TALIBAN*AND WIN -------------- ¶2. (SBU) In early November, insurgents attacked a cell phone tower situated on land belonging to a prominent family in the village of Joybar. The landowner was wounded and his son killed, but the family counterattacked, pursuing and killing Mafuz, the Taliban commander of Southern Tagab. Mafuz was an extremely bold and effective leader, reportedly responsible for scores of ambushes and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks on coalition forces. Joybar has been a hub of insurgent attacks and a haven to which Taliban retreat after conducting operations in the area. The death of Mafuz created a power vacuum as other insurgents vied to control the area. The resulting &red on red8 fighting caused the death of nine Taliban. Among the dead were two of the area's highest-ranking commanders, Rahullaoh and Rahman, who shot one another. ¶3. (C) Separately, a locally-hired debris removal crew operating on the road running through the Tagab Valley near Landakhel village--four kilometers north of Joybar--has eliminated IED attacks and reduced ambushes in another hotbed of insurgent activity. The 13-man crew is paid by the Kapisa Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) to clean up rubble and trash along the road, eliminating cover for IEDs. The crew is vetted and supervised by the Afghan National Police(ANP), and trained to report IEDs. ¶4. (C) Since the crew began operating in the area in mid-October, there have been no IED attacks and only three ambushes on coalition forces. During the previous six months, there were 11 ambushes and two IEDs reported in Landakhel. Other reporting indicates the Taliban is extremely frustrated by the success of this effort, and everyone credits the PRT-funded road crew for the downturn in attacks. TALIBAN ROCKET ATTACK BACKFIRES ON INSURGENTS -------------- ¶5. (SBU) On November 16, Kapisa-based French Task Force Lafayette hosted a large shura of community leaders at the Tagab District Center to introduce Brigadier General Druart, the TF's commanding officer. During the shura, insurgents fired two rockets at participants. The rockets fell short, landing in the crowded bazaar about 200 yards from the meeting, killing 16 civilians and seriously injuring 37 others. French and U.S. troops immediately provided medical assistance, and evacuated wounded to hospitals in Kabul and at Bagram Airfield. ¶6. (SBU) On December 10, the French task force hosted another shura at the Tagab District Center, during which victims and their families were presented with $15,000 worth of humanitarian assistance including food, clothing, portable heaters, and other items. USAID,s Local Governance and Community Development program and the PRT Kapisa Commander's Emergency Response Program funded the distribution. ¶7. (C) In a series of subsequent meetings with shura leaders, ANP officers, and elected officials, PRTOFFs heard the same message: the rocket attack and the coalition's humanitarian response seriously degraded the image of insurgents in Tagab. Shura leader Haji Khoshal explained that the Taliban tried to implicate the French in the attack, but &the people know the truth.8 Dr. Waheed, another shura leader, said: &The people now have enmity toward the Taliban.8 KABUL 00000120 002 OF 003 ¶8. (S) Illustrative of the change in attitude is a report from a mosque in Joybar. On December 4, the imam was delivering his typical Taliban-directed sermon about the need to resist the coalition and GIRoA. Men of the congregation interrupted him, angrily reminding him of the deaths caused by the Taliban, and demanded that his sermons stick to the Quran. SIGNS OF UNITY IN THE TAGAB SHURA -------------- ¶9. (C) For the last several years, Tagab has been divided into four competing shuras. The splits stem from a combination of political, tribal, and geographic differences that were exacerbated by 30 years on the front lines of conflict. There are now indications of cooperation between three of the largest shuras. Dr. Waheed of the Safi Shura recently expressed his support for Hajji Ibrahim, leader of the District Center Shura, saying he would serve as deputy shura leader rather than continuing to head a separate body. This would bring together the two largest shuras of Tagab that represent the general population, and reduce the potential for divisiveness that can be exploited by the Taliban. Another main shura leader is Hajji Khoshal who, like Dr. Waheed and Hajji Ibrahim, has a history of cooperation with the coalition. He has been mentioned by local powerbrokers as the possible overall shura leader should there be further consolidation. (Comment: These shura leaders, positions remain fragile as they seek to maintain a delicate balance between cooperation with coalition/GIRoA while avoiding outright hostilities with insurgents. None of the shura leaders have yet been able or willing to use their full influence against insurgents, and so far their talk of unity remains largely talk. End Comment.) LAFAYETTE HAS ARRIVED -------------- ¶10. (SBU) French Task Force Lafayette became the battle space owner of Kapisa on November 2. In its first two months, France has significantly increased its troops, Afghan National Security Forces mentors, and efforts such as information operations and development. Its 20-strong psychological operations team is fielding an extensive radio network that broadcasts in Dari and Pashto, and supports several other efforts to convince more of the population to separate from the insurgents. The French are replacing and fortifying nine ANP outposts and building ten new ones in the critical Tagab, Allisay, and Nijrab Valleys in an effort to limit insurgent freedom of movement. The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs is also expected to dispatch civilian political and development advisors to Kapisa for the first time. ¶11. (SBU) PRT Kapisa's U.S. civilian and military members have been with French troops during various hostile actions, including rocket attacks and fire fights. In recognition of the risks taken together, Brigadier General Druart recently presented U.S. civilians and military members with his unit's combat patch as well as a certificate. The certificate states that recipients have been deployed with Task Force Lafayette in operations in "hostile territory" and that each is a "brother in arms." While integration with the Task Force continues to be a work-in-progress, as both PRTs and civilian staff are new concepts to the French, cooperation gets stronger every day. General Druart has repeatedly stressed his reliance on the both military and civilian lines of effort within the PRT. His French and U.S. team members are working closely together on corruption cases, governance and rule of law issues, large and small development projects, engagement with tribal leaders, and reaching out to Afghans throughout the province. The week of January 10, perhaps with impetus from Paris, PRT Senior Civilian Rep was invited to present a wish-list of civilian staff for the PRT and District Support Teams. General Druart supports a list of 10 additional civilians proposed by the PRT and is pushing the Quai d'Orsay to staff as many of the positions as possible. The Task Force is especially interested in a provincial budget expert. COMMENT: SERIOUS CHALLENGES MUST STILL BE OVERCOME -------------- -------------- ¶12. (C) Tagab District remains fragile and insurgents are still a powerful force. The local GIRoA presence is ineffective at best. The Tajik governor is corrupt and has KABUL 00000120 003 OF 003 no traction with the Pushtuns of Tagab. Coalition/ANSF continue to be subject to attacks and several villages and remote valleys are insurgent havens. Despite the continuing realities, the positive developments outlined above merit our attention: we will need to bring to bear all of our civilian and military resources--with and through GIRoA--during the traditional winter lull in fighting if we are to roll back violence and instability. PRT Kapisa, working with the French Task Force, will build on relationships with shura leaders and maleks to motivate and empower them to more forcefully stand against insurgent intimidation. The widely rumored change in governorship will present us with new opportunities to build up the GIRoA presence in Tagab. The French Ministry of Defense appears from our perspective to have hand-picked the best and brightest among their military leadership, sending officers who have a firm understanding of what is required to run a successful counter-insurgency operation. ¶13. (U) This cable was drafted by PRT Kapisa. EIKENBERRY