PALESTINIAN MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS SET FOR JULY 17

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JERUSALEM 000292 SIPDIS NOFORN NEA FOR FRONT OFFICE, SEMEP, AND IPA; NSC FOR SHAPIRO/KUMAR E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2020 TAGS: PGOV PREL KPAL KWBG KDEM SUBJECT: PALESTINIAN MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS SET FOR JULY 17 REF: JERUSALEM 129 Classified By: CG Daniel Rubinstein, per reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) On February 9, the Palestinian Authority (PA) Cabinet announced that municipal elections would be held on July 17 throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and called on the Central Elections Committee (CEC) to proceed with making arrangements. CEC Chairman Hanna Naser said efforts are underway to persuade Hamas to participate, or at least not to actively impede polling. Whether Hamas allows voter registration to move ahead as scheduled on February 27 will be a key test. Minister of Local Government Khaled Qawasmi said a provision in the local election law could be used to allow elections to go forward in the West Bank if Hamas blocks CEC efforts in Gaza. Fatah Central Committee member (and elections head) Mohammed al-Madani said Fatah sought to borrow a page from Hamas's 2006 election playbook by enticing respected independents and candidates from other PLO factions to run together on joint tickets. These contacts described municipal elections as a dry run for eventual national and legislative elections, but differed in their assessments of Fatah's readiness. End summary. Elections Commission Head Encourages Broad Participation -------------- -------------- ¶2. (U) In a public statement issued on February 9, the PA Cabinet issued a decision to hold local and municipal elections on July 17 throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The PA tasked the independent CEC with implementing the decision. ¶3. (C) In a February 10 meeting with PolChief, CEC Chairman Dr. Hanna Naser confirmed that the CEC will attempt to hold simultaneous elections in all 335 electoral districts in Gaza and the West Bank on July 17. Comment: The previous round of municipal elections were distributed into five phases between 2004-2005. The fifth round was never held. End comment. Naser added that the goal of including Gaza at the outset was to ensure elections were seen as "national" rather than "factional." ¶4. (C) Naser stressed the importance of a free and fair electoral process, saying, "We must ensure that there is no intimidation, otherwise, it will be a blemish on all of us." He stressed the importance of allowing all candidates, regardless of their affiliation, to participate. Naser claimed that PA President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen),Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, and Minister of Local Government Khaled Qawasmi all agreed on this point. Biggest Challenge: Hamas Opposed -------------- ¶5. (C) Naser continued, "Hamas's refusal to participate is the biggest problem facing us (the CEC)." He noted that Hamas had released a statement on February 9, the same day as the PA cabinet decision, criticizing the call for elections in the absence of intra-Palestinian reconciliation. Nonetheless, Naser said, the CEC would try to convince Hamas to participate in elections, both in Gaza and the West Bank. Note: Naser subsequently met with Hamas official Omar Abdel Razek on February 15. After the meeting, Abdel Razek said publicly that Hamas continued to view the situation as "not conducive" to holding elections, but added that the movement had not yet taken a final decision on participation. End Note. ¶6. (C) The key test of Hamas's intentions would be whether it allows the CEC to conduct voter registration in Gaza, which could only occur if Hamas allowed CEC offices to reopen there. Naser was not optimistic on this point. He noted that in Egyptian-led intra-Palestinian factional reconciliation talks, Hamas had insisted on the creation of a new elections commission composed of representatives of all the Palestinian factions. Nonetheless, if Hamas chooses not to participate, Naser said his hope is that they will not interfere with elections or intimidate voters. Election Mechanics -------------- ¶7. (C) Naser said that updating voter registration rolls remains the key logistical challenge. He estimated that 400,000 Palestinians had become eligible to vote since the JERUSALEM 00000292 002 OF 003 2006 legislative elections. The CEC would begin registration drives on February 27 at high schools and colleges, targeting high school seniors and college students in the period before exams begin. Naser estimated that elections will cost USD 8-9 million (7 million USD for the West Bank alone); he predicted the PA would cover these costs. Finally, Naser said the CEC would likely invite international observers to monitor elections. Fallback Plans if Hamas Boycotts -------------- ¶8. (C) In a separate meeting, PA Minister of Local Government Qawasmi explained that the PA and the CEC had jointly concluded that a provision in the existing municipal election law would allow elections to take place even if Hamas refused to participate or blocked elections in Gaza. According to Qawasmi, the current (2005) law allows for a delay in specific electoral districts if circumstances are not conducive to holding elections. This provision can be renewed up to three times, he said. Note: The 2005 law states that the CEC may request the postponement of the elections in "one or more local councils for a period not exceeding four weeks for technical needs and elections integrity purposes. The postponement decision shall be issued by the Cabinet." There is ambiguity in the law as to how many times elections can legally be delayed. End note. ¶9. (C) Moving ahead on the basis of the existing elections law strengthens the legitimacy of these elections, Qawasmi claimed, since any law promulgated under current circumstances could be viewed as an attempt to reshape the playing field in Fatah's favor. Note: The Palestinian Legislative Council has not convened since Hamas seized control of Gaza in June 2007. Since that time, President Abbas has relied on the use of presidential decrees, which carry the force of law, in the absence of a functioning legislature. However, Hamas has challenged previous decrees on elections-related issues as illegitimate in the absence of an agreement on intra-Palestinian reconciliation. End note. Fatah Moves Ahead With Preparations -------------- ¶10. (C) Fatah Central Committee member (and head of the Fatah election effort) Muhamad al-Madani told Post that "intense" preparations are ongoing for general, legislative, local, and syndicate elections. Al-Madani said that Fatah had begun compiling lists of candidates to run on a PLO-wide ticket. Fatah sought to borrow a page from Hamas's 2006 elections playbook by enticing respected independents and candidates from the PLO's other factions to strengthen electoral slates, he said. ¶11. (C) Al-Madani said he had adopted a three-tiered approach to municipal elections. First, he described ongoing efforts to mobilize Fatah's grassroots supporters in all 14 West Bank electoral districts (he acknowledged such work could not be conducted in Gaza at present). Second, al-Madani said he was working to form a national steering committee of PLO and independent figures, who would mobilize funds for the PLO slates. Third, he said, Fatah was closely coordinating with the CEC and PA Ministry of Local Government to ensure the success of elections. Al-Madani expressed pessimism over prospects for Hamas's participation in municipal elections, but noted that elections cannot be held hostage to Hamas' will. Dry Run for National Elections -------------- ¶12. (C) All of our contacts described municipal elections as a dry run for eventual national and legislative elections. Al-Madani said that if the joint slate experiment is successful, Fatah would try to replicate it in future legislative elections. Qawasmi highlighted the need for Fatah to focus on candidate selection, develop its elections apparatus in the West Bank's ten largest municipalities (where Hamas outpolled Fatah in previous elections),and maximize prospects for wide participation by the PLO factions, which would provide a degree of legitimacy to the contest even if Hamas chose not to participate. ¶13. (C) Naser added that while Fatah had made some headway in terms of reform, it still had a long way to go. Naser contrasted Fatah's past use of money to cement party members' loyalty with the ability of other factions (such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) to persuade members to donate money to the party. While the PA patronage JERUSALEM 00000292 003 OF 003 system remains an asset to Fatah, more must be done to expand its appeal among independents, he concluded. RUBINSTEIN