INDONESIAN RESPONSE TO TEHRAN RESEARCH REACTOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 000251 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, ISN/RA NEPHEW NSC FOR D WALTON E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2020 TAGS: PREL KNNP MNUC PARM IR ID SUBJECT: INDONESIAN RESPONSE TO TEHRAN RESEARCH REACTOR DEMARCHE REF: STATE 15979 Classified By: A/Polcouns Darcy Fyock Zotter ¶1. (SBU) At a February 23 meeting with Rolliansyah (Roy) Soemirat of the Foreign Ministry's Directorate of International Security and Disarmament, Poloff delivered reftel demarche regarding U.S. policy toward the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). ¶2. (C) Soemirat said the issue was one of interest to FM Natalagewa and that he would pass on the contents of the demarche and non-papers to "higher authorities." Soemirat said the basic position of the GOI regarding recognition of Iran's right to peaceful use of nuclear technologies remained unchanged. However, Indonesian support for Iran's nuclear program was not unconditional. Iran had clearly been sending mixed signals. The GOI's preliminary assessment was that this was a strategy to gain leverage -- in other words, that Iran expected the dialogue with the IAEA to continue for some time. For its part, Indonesia was awaiting Iranian response to its request for clarification on Iran's reaction to the latest IAEA DG's report and, via Indonesian delegations in New York and Vienna, what Iran's true red-lines were. One problem was that the GOI was unsure whether their Iranian counterparts in New York and Vienna were able to speak authoritatively. ¶3. (SBU) Soemirat said the GOI felt that if the IAEA were able to address Iranian concerns regarding France as the site of fuel fabrication and the potential third-country location of the nuclear materials "escrow," the Iranians would lose those issues as bargaining chips and would have virtually "nowhere to hide." ¶4. (C) According to Soemirat, in a recent conversation with UK Foreign Secretary Miliband, FM Natalegawa had said Indonesia would do what it could to make sure Iran did not miss the current opportunity for an agreement with the IAEA, but that sanctions at this stage would fuel conflict and aid hardliners within the Iranian government. Soemirat said the GOI was working to lead the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) toward a more balanced position on the issue (rather than simply protecting Iran) and wanted to accommodate concerns from outside the NAM. Soemirat pointed out that this was reflected in Natalegawa's comments to the press on the sidelines of an Iran National Day reception. As reported in the February 13 Jakarta Post, Natalegawa said, "Commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and the right to obtain nuclear power for peaceful purposes go hand in hand. You cannot take one and exclude the other. They are integrated responsibilities and rights, not one at the expense of another." HUME