S/CT AMB BENJAMIN BILATERAL MEETINGS WITH GOI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 000171 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, EAP/RSP, EAP/INR, S/CT, INL S/CT FOR D.MAHANTY, C. JOHN LONG NCTC NSC FOR D.WALTON KUALA LUMPUR FOR G.CHAPMAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2020 TAGS: PTER PREL PINS ASEC ID SUBJECT: S/CT AMB BENJAMIN BILATERAL MEETINGS WITH GOI OFFICIALS JAKARTA 00000171 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: Deputy POL/C Daniel A. Rochman, reasons 1.4 (b+d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Secretary's Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT),Ambassador Daniel Benjamin, conducted meetings with Indonesian officials on counterterrorism issues and cooperation in Jakarta on December 16. Ambassador Benjamin's interlocutors said the proposed GOI interagency Counterterrorism Coordinating Body is expected to focus on broadly facilitating interagency cooperation and policy, with GOI agencies remaining responsible for their individual CT activities. The GOI recently established a taskforce to finalize a new counterterrorism finance law and steer it through the legislature by the end of 2010. GOI officials highlighted successful regional CT cooperation, but noted porous borders remain an issue. The GOI hopes for increased sharing of U.S. and other countries' of intelligence related to UNSCR 1267 listings. High appreciation for DS-ATA assistance in developing the Indonesian National Police's Special Detachment 88 was among the other topics discussed during the day-long series of meetings. END SUMMARY. COORDINATING MINISTRY OUTLINED NATIONAL PRIORITIES ¶2. (C) Officials with the Counterterrorism Coordinating Desk at the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs--the GOI's overall CT policy body--briefed Ambassador Benjamin on Indonesia's anti-terror priorities. Ambassador Rhousdy Soeriaatmadja, the Desk's Director for International Cooperation, underscored that CT challenges remain despite recent successes against the perpetrators of the July 17 bombings. To address these challenges, the GOI was committed to taking terrorists off the streets and to undertaking what Soeriaatmadja called a "soft approach" to countering extremist messages. The Coordinating Ministry was working with the Department of Religious Affairs and other GOI entities to develop methods of delegitimizing extremist groups' appeals to religion. One approach involved using traditional cultural performances like wayang (shadow puppets) to reach young people. ¶3. (C) The United States had learned that a broad spectrum of anti-terror measures was important, Ambassador Benjamin explained. Too much reliance on hard-power approaches risked driving more people toward extremist groups. The USG, Ambassador Benjamin noted, was keen to learn about Indonesia's experiences on this front and hoped to incorporate some of the GOI's best practices into the U.S. approach. However, he cautioned, a soft approach alone would not be effective. ¶4. (C) Ambassador Benjamin noted that the deradicalization approach illustrated the importance of coordinating CT efforts across multiple government agencies and asked about the status of GOI plans to establish a counterterrorism body. Ambassador Soeriaatmadja explained that President Yudhoyono had committed to do this during his first one hundred days in office. The CT body would not be a new entity but rather an upgrading of the existing CT Desk augmented with additional personnel, resources and authority. The CT body would focus on facilitating interagency cooperation on a broad strategic and policy level. Individual GOI agencies and departments would remain responsible for the planning and conduct of their own CT activities. ¶5. (C) Turning to terrorism finance, Ambassador Benjamin asked about the status of pending new legislation on the matter. He underscored that funding was a key element for terrorist operations and pointed to the need to address emerging areas like bulk cash smuggling. Ambassador Soeriaatmadja agreed that these were important areas and said that the GOI had already established a taskforce to finalize the new CT finance law and move it through the legislature by the end of 2010. He noted that attempts to regulate nonprofit organizations that might divert money to extremist groups would be difficult. Indonesian law gave NGOs wide latitude in the conduct of their own affairs--a consequence of democratic reforms following decades of authoritarian rule when the government tightly controlled such things. As an alternative the GOI was encouraging nonprofit organizations JAKARTA 00000171 002.2 OF 004 and NGOs to draft a voluntary code of conduct to ensure that funds are not diverted for extremist purposes. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TERRORIST-PROSECUTING TASK FORCE OUTLINED PENDING CASES ¶6. (SBU) Ambassador Benjamin met with prosecutors from the Attorney General's Task Force on Transnational Crime and Terrorism (Satgas). Since its 2006 inception, this USG-funded task force has successfully prosecuted 64 terrorists, including 43 Jemaah Islamiyah members, as well as over 100 other transnational crimes. Senior prosecutor Laksmi Rohmulyati and task force members outlined the task force operation and described the terrorism and terrorism financing cases against some of the 14 defendants under prosecution for involvement for the July 17 Ritz Carlton and J.W. Marriott bombings. Laksmi said that the July 17 bombing cases will be particularly challenging because the terrorists most directly involved in the bombings were killed, and the evidence against the remaining defendants was largely circumstantial. ¶7. (SBU) The Satgas prosecutors reported an increasing level of public support for terrorism prosecutions. The USG funds that has supported Satgas over the past three years will shortly run out, and additional funding will be requested to support the task force's new prosecutions, including two new terrorism financing cases. ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERROR FINANCE LAW PENDING IN PARLIAMENT ¶8. (SBU) Ambassador Benjamin also met with Yunus Husein, Head of the Indonesian Financial Intelligence Unit (PPATK) to express ongoing U.S. support for GOI efforts to strengthen Indonesia's anti-money laundering/counterterrorism financing (AML/CTF) regime. Husein discussed PPATK's work and the role that they played in terrorist financing investigations, which entailed the collection of suspicious transaction reports which are referred as appropriate to the police for further investigation. Husein noted that a new law on terrorist financing is being finalized for submission to Parliament. Husein opined that Parliament understands the terrorism threat and he anticipated no difficulties in gaining parliamentary approval of the legislation. However, Husein also noted that new AML legislation had been pending in Parliament since 2006. ¶9. (SBU) Regarding potential use of non-profits for terrorism financing, Husein said Indonesia was completing a survey of non-profits as a first step toward regulation. Husein noted that PPATK recently co-sponsored a program on the investigation and prosecution of terrorism financing with DOJ/OPDAT, and expressed interest in co-sponsoring additional programs in Sulawesi, Bali, and Central Java. DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS HIGHLIGHTED REGIONAL CONCERNS ¶10. (C) Regional CT cooperation is good although porous borders remain a concern, according to officials at the Department of Foreign Affairs (DEPLU). DEPLU's Acting Director for International Security Fikri Cassidy told Ambassador Benjamin that Indonesian officials coordinated well with their counterparts in neighboring countries on CT matters. The main challenge on this front remained the region's porous borders. Indonesian authorities did not have sufficient personnel or resources to secure the country's extensive land and sea borders although information sharing with Malaysia and the Philippines was helping address the situation. ¶11. (C) Cassidy also pointed to Indonesian concerns regarding illegal migrants. (Note: In recent months, Indonesian authorities had intercepted groups of illegal migrants from Afghanistan, Burma, and Sri Lanka. Most appear to have been destined for other countries in the region.) GOI officials were worried at their relatively weak ability to screen arriving migrants for possible members of extremist groups. ¶12. (C) Also addressing regional cooperation, Ambassador JAKARTA 00000171 003.2 OF 004 Benjamin underscored President Obama's commitment to multilateral counterterrorism efforts. The USG was committed to working on CT matters within the UN as well as with regional organizations like ASEAN. As part of that effort, we hoped to strengthen the UN Counterterrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) and the Counterterrorism Committee (CTC) and reinvigorate the UNSCR 1267 sanctions process. Ambassador Benjamin explained that the USG sought to bring more non-UNSC member states into UN CT activities. ¶13. (C) Cassidy said Indonesia supported this more transparent and inclusive approach. As a non-UNSC member that is deeply concerned about terrorism, Indonesia wants to play a role. Cassidy pointed particularly to some difficulties involved in listing individuals and organizations subject to sanctions under UNSCR 1267. He explained that the provision of names without additional background information and documents made enforcement difficult. The GOI hoped that the USG and others would provide more intelligence data on individuals listed under USNCR 1267 to Indonesia and other countries responsible for enforcing those sanctions. Ambassador Benjamin said that the United States has encouraged our partners to provide such information when listing individuals under 1267. The USG would continue to look for ways to work with countries on this matter. ¶14. (C) Ambassador Benjamin asked about GOI efforts to monitor Indonesian students who might be exposed to extremist influences in the Middle East or South Asia. Cassidy responded that the GOI was increasingly concerned about the matter. The Indonesian Embassy in Yemen had recently flagged the possibility that Indonesian students were picking up radical ideas from institutions there. Pakistan was also an area of concern and Cassidy said that the GOI had difficulty even keeping track of how many Indonesian students had gone there to study. Further complicating the matter, the Indonesian government received little information from other governments about the activities of Indonesian students in their countries. As a result, the GOI directed its main efforts at monitoring students for potential radical activities after they returned to Indonesia. POLICE EXPLAINED THEIR APPROACH ¶15. (C) Brigadier General Tito Karnavian, head of anti-terror unit Detachment 88, briefed Ambassador Benjamin on police activities. He praised Diplomatic Security's Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program (ATA) training and assistance and said it was critical to building Detachment 88's capabilities. Ambassador Benjamin said that such assistance was a key USG priority and that we looked forward to doing more work with Detachment 88. ¶16. (C) Echoing CT Desk officials, Tito said that the police also focused on both hard and soft approaches to counterterrorism. While Detachment 88 had primary responsibility for the surveillance and arrest of terrorist suspects, the organization also sought to undermine the extremist message by delegitimizing religious justifications for violence. (Note: Tito is conducting research for a Ph.D. on this subject.) Tito underscored that Detachment 88 was coordinating its efforts on this front with other GOI entities as part of a whole of government approach. ¶17. (C) Tito described the radicalization process in Indonesia as having two primary roads: attraction to other global and regional events, e.g. jihadists traveling to Afghanistan and also to fight in the Ambon and Maluku conflicts, and secondly the ability of the Ustads (Islamic teachers) in Java to compel groups of impressionable young people to violence. ¶18. (C) Tito said that the first priority in Indonesian counter-radicalization policy is to prevent the spread of radical beliefs in a sort of "containment" strategy. The second priority is the rehabilitation programs. He compared the radicalization process as similar to vectors in biology, i.e., a virus spread by agents. The Ustads represents the vector, which means that the police must focus JAKARTA 00000171 004.2 OF 004 on areas where they intend to spread, for example one pesantren or another. Tito lamented the fact that the ministries of religion and education are not adequately responding to the threat. He also said that working with interfaith dialogues or with mainstream communities is not effective. Tito said that the proposed GOI Coordinating CT body should have the lead on both soft and hard GOI efforts to counter terrorism and radicalization, and the ability to both identify the drivers of extremism and to address them. ¶19. (C) BG Tito also explained proposed changes to Detachment 88's organization and command structure. Currently, the unit's personnel are distributed throughout the country where they serve under the operational command of regional police officials. The exact distribution of Detachment 88 personnel is not fixed but rather continually adjusted in response to assessments of the terrorist threat. While this arrangement provided flexibility, Tito explained that it also complicated efforts to coordinate CT activities. Because Detachment 88 personnel reported to local police commanders, the unit's headquarters had an imperfect picture of all activities. This stove-piped reporting created friction between the locals and DET-88 HQ, and also made it difficult for police terrorism analysts to identify patterns of extremist behavior or connections between extremist groups in different parts of the country. In response, Tito planned to bring Detachment 88 officers under more centralized control. While they would still coordinate with local commanders in the field, Detachment 88 personnel would report primarily to, and receive orders from, the detachment headquarters. ¶20. (C) Tito said he was concerned that Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) may be learning how to avoid detection, and may be able to regenerate without being noticed. He said that JI has developed and is utilizing sophisticated e-mail encryption methods to avoid police detection. ¶21. (U) S/CT cleared this message. OSIUS