SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF COMMANDER USPACOM ADM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 000129 SIPDIS USPACOM FOR ADM WILLARD USPACOM ALSO FOR J1, J2, J3, J5 DIA FOR DHO-3 DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2020 TAGS: PREL MARR PTER ID SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF COMMANDER USPACOM ADM WILLARD TO JAKARTA Classified By: DCM Ted Osius, reasons 1.4 (b and d) ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Admiral Willard, Embassy Jakarta warmly welcomes your visit. Your visit comes shortly before President Obama,s late March visit to Indonesia and will help address key security issues while helping to set the stage for a successful Presidential visit. The U.S.-Indonesian military-to-military relationship continues to improve after the end of years of U.S. restrictions on the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI). The 2005 decision to waive Congressional restrictions on bilateral military assistance and normalize mil-to-mil relations has enhanced our ability to support Government of Indonesia (GOI) efforts to develop democratic institutions and to reform and professionalize TNI. We want the GOI and TNI to see the U.S. as a strong and credible partner, particularly where our values and interests coincide in the critical areas of democratization, bilateral and regional security cooperation, and counterterrorism. We support the GOI effort to empower the police CT capability and encourage the military to limit its CT role to providing intelligence and hostage rescue operations. Indonesian Army Special Forces (KOPASSUS) engagement remains a high priority issue, ONE that President Yudhoyono (SBY) views as central to the bilateral relationship. We believe that engagement offers the best way forward, but it is crucial that Indonesia continues to demonstrate a clear commitment to reform and accountability. END SUMMARY COMPREHENSIVE PARTNERSHIP ¶2. (SBU) Ten years of political and economic reform have made Indonesia democratic, stable, and increasingly confident about its leadership role in Southeast Asia and the Muslim world. Indonesia has held successful, free and fair elections; has weathered the global financial crisis; and is tackling internal security threats. The U.S. has a great stake in helping consolidate democracy in Indonesia, the world's fourth most populous nation, the third largest democracy, and the largest Muslim-majority country. These developments have created an opportunity to deepen our relationship through the United States-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership. This emerging effort seeks to build greater cooperation in defense, counterterrorism, health, education, trade, science and technology, and on key international issues such as Afghanistan. Indonesian leaders will look to your visit as a chance to engage the United States as a true partner in support of shared bilateral, regional, and global objectives. The Partnership will expand already robust regional security cooperation and deepen cooperation with the TNI. MILITARY REFORM ¶3. (C) Understanding that military reform was critical to maintaining a stable, legitimate democracy, President Yudhoyono put key reformers into top TNI and Indonesian National Police (INP) positions. Once a bastion of political power in Indonesia, the TNI has made solid progress on a long arduous road of reform to establish itself as a more professional military. TNI has acquiesced to the separation of the INP from the military's structure and the elimination of its former seats in parliament and is making some progress in divesting its business interests. The military, under new leadership and civilian control, has demonstrated support for the existing democratic system and has remained neutral in the election process. MIL-TO-MIL RELATIONS ¶4. (U) Indonesia Ministry of Defense policy is to secure Defense Cooperation Agreements (DCA) with regional partners (most notably China, Singapore and Australia) and the U.S. to codify current defense relationships. These agreements act as a foundation for future defense negotiations and serve as an umbrella for the TNI to initiate interactions with foreign militaries and ease their inter-governmental approval processes. We recognize the value of a DCA in that it can open the door for additional agreements, such as a Status of Forces Agreement and broader training opportunities. The Indonesians state that they require a joint presidential JAKARTA 00000129 002 OF 003 statement making reference to concluding a DCA before they are able to sign the DCA. In order to maximize the impact of the DCA, we are encouraging concluding negotiations and initialing the agreement in advance of the President's visit for possible signature immediately following the presidential joint statement, or later at the Shangri-La Dialogues in Singapore during May. ¶5. (C) While our mil-to-mil relationship is improving, we are not without issues. Indonesians can be stubbornly nationalistic, almost xenophobic at times, thus limiting cooperation. The past limitations placed on military equipment and training are perceived as an affront to professional pride and some distrust lingers within the TNI. ¶6. (C) During November 2009, all three military service chiefs changed command. Navy leadership changed from ADM Tedjo Edhy Purdijatno, Chief of the Indonesian Navy since 4 July 2008 to VADM Agus Suhartono. In recent encounters, VADM Agus has expressed openness toward expanding TNI Navy military relations with the United States Navy, while hesitating to commit to future activities. ¶7. (C) The new Chief of the Air Force, Air Marshall Imam Sufaat, is much more dynamic and pro-US than his predecessor. The mil-to-mil relationship with the Air Force had been quite frigid after the lifting of sanctions. The restrictions had the most visible impact on the TNI Air Force, as their ability to maintain and upgrade their U.S. made aircraft was virtually halted. With renewed and substantial IMET support and a robust U.S.-Indonesia military training plan, the relationship between our Air Forces is regaining strength. ¶8. (U) The new Chief of the Army is Gen George Toisutta. Relations and training with the Army are strong and growing, but with ONE significant outlier. The current U.S. policy prevents training and engagement with KOPASSUS, the TNI Army's Special Forces unit. HUMAN RIGHTS AND KOPASSUS ¶9. (C) We are working on an incremental strategy to change the situation. ONE of the efforts is exploring the possibility of engaging with KOPASSUS Unit-81, a Counter Terrorism force. Unit-81 was renamed, restructured, and "re-missioned" from Group 5 in June 2001, during the overall restructuring of KOPASSUS. There is no credible reporting of human rights abuses committed by Unit-81. This provides an opportunity to engage with a unit that the Indonesians reorganized to better suit their designated mission and has no record of human rights abuse. Unit-81 is the TNI national mission force and is the primary counter-terrorism unit within TNI that SOCPAC is interested in engaging with. If Unit 81 is designated as a "clean8 and &vet-able8 unit, U.S. SOF engagement and training could follow. This would focus limited U.S. Army SOF resources on developing the capability of the primary force we are interested in. ¶10. (SBU) President SBY and other senior Indonesian officials have made it clear to us that SBY views the issue of KOPASSUS training as central to the bilateral relationship and that he believes the March visit of President Obama will not be successful unless this issues is resolved in advance of the visit. We continue to believe that engagement offers the best way forward, but it is crucial that Indonesia continues to demonstrate a clear commitment to reform and accountability. OVERCOMING SECURITY THREATS ¶11. (SBU) While we work with Indonesia to address the underlying causes of violent extremism, we also work together to put terrorist groups out of operation. The GOI's response to the July 17 terrorist attacks in Jakarta was swift and effective. While the GOI is still pursuing a few remaining associates of militant ringleader Noordin Top, the killing of eight July 17 operatives, including Top, and the arrest of 11 others appears to have severely crippled Top's network. The GOI has heightened security nationwide and the INP continues to combat terrorism. Until the July 17 bombings, Indonesia experienced three-and-a-half years without a major terrorist JAKARTA 00000129 003 OF 003 incident, demonstrating how the GOI's counterterrorism efforts reduced the ability of militant groups to carry out attacks. ¶12. (SBU) The historical TNI task of fighting terrorism has been transferred to the police, though this has been difficult for the military to accept. The bulk of U.S. CT assistance has been geared toward helping the police build a more robust CT infrastructure, including the creation of an elite CT strike force known as Detachment 88. The police Mobile Brigade (BRIMOB) also play a key counterterrorism role. While the United States provides critical training to Detachment-88, current policy restricts contact with BRIMOB due to concerns over their involvement in past human rights violations. We support the GOI effort to empower the police CT capability, encouraging the military to limit its CT role to providing intelligence and hostage rescue operations. DEFENSE COOPERATION, PRIORITIES AND PROCUREMENT ¶13. (SBU) Security cooperation programs have expanded greatly since the United States ended sanctions in 2005. IMET remains a key tool in supporting defense reform by providing professional military education opportunities. Indonesia's IMET allocation increased from $1.5 million in 2009 to $1.8 million in 2010. With foreign military sales to Indonesia we aim to improve airlift capability and aviation safety. Indonesia will receive $20 million in foreign military grant aid for 2010, up from $15.1 million for 2009. U.S. Pacific Command coordinates Indonesian military participation in Global Peace Operations Initiative-funded training programs and plans to contribute $5.5 million in funding to support the GOI's desire to develop a permanent peacekeeping training center facility. ¶14. (SBU) The scrapping of expensive modernization programs, coupled with a shortage of critical spare parts, has left major military equipment items worn out or obsolete. Navy and Air Force readiness rates never exceed 40 percent. This is a grave concern to TNI officers who, in general, regard professionalism as having the correct, operational, modern equipment to accomplish the mission. The small defense budget became an issue during the presidential campaign and parliament approved a 20 percent increase to the 2010 defense budget. CONCLUSION ¶15. (SBU) We want Indonesia to continue its comprehensive political transformation by building lasting democratic institutions and firmly rooting and nurturing the values of tolerance and moderation. The U.S. also wants to encourage active engagement and cooperation with the war on terror while supporting a democratic Indonesia's capability to act regionally and globally in a manner befitting a responsible democracy. Our relations with the TNI support U.S. national security interests and reinforce military reform. Indonesia's tremendous size and strategic location, its majority Muslim population, and concerns over regional terrorist groups all underline the importance of cultivating and strengthening our bilateral military ties. ¶16. (SBU) Your visit will impress upon the Indonesian government and military our genuine desire to strengthen the pillars of democracy through mutually beneficial military ties that encourage professionalism, proficiency, and effectiveness. Support for the Defense Cooperation Agreement and the Strategic Partnership will be a key aspect of your discussions with Indonesian civilian and military leadership. Your presence will signal that Indonesia and its military have no better friend than the United States government and the American military, while we work to normalize our military relationship with the TNI by addressing the issues surrounding training with the KOPASSUS. Your visit -- and forward movement on the Defense Cooperation Agreement -- will help set the stage for a successful Presidential visit to Indonesia this March. HUME