Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10ISLAMABAD431
2010-02-23 12:55:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Islamabad
Cable title:  

SRAP HOLBROOKE'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ZARDARI

Tags:  PGOV PREL PTER ECON EAID PK 
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 000431 

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2035
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ECON EAID PK
SUBJECT: SRAP HOLBROOKE'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ZARDARI

Classified By: Ambassador Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b, d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 000431 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2035 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ECON EAID PK SUBJECT: SRAP HOLBROOKE'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ZARDARI Classified By: Ambassador Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b, d). ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: In a February 18 meeting, Ambassador Holbrooke thanked President Zardari for GOP cooperation in fighting Taliban militants, especially the recent capture of Afghan Taliban military leader Mullah Beradar. Zardari agreed that the United States and Pakistan had weakened the Taliban leadership but noted that this was only the first stage, as success depended on turning local populations against the Taliban. Holbrooke noted that the popular perception of the U.S. reintegration and reconciliation efforts with the Taliban mistakenly overemphasized the possibility for reconciliation, explaining that reconciliation with Taliban leaders was less likely than reintegrating low-level Taliban who had given up the fight. Holbrooke said the ISAF military offensive was succeeding in Helmand, Afghanistan. Zardari said that if the United States could hold the captured territory there and bring in stable governance and needed social services, the Helmand strategy "could work." Holbrooke commended the upcoming February 25 talks between Pakistan and India's Foreign Secretaries. Zardari and Holbrooke discussed means for funding a road through Chitral to Tajikistan that would further integrate Pakistan with Central Asia. Zardari said Pakistan needed $50 billion in aid, though he recognized the United States could not provide such an amount of assistance. Holbrooke promised to follow up with Senator Kerry on the possibility of including U.S. trade concessions in Kerry's Security Package for Pakistan legislation. End Summary. Cooperation in capturing the Taliban leadership -------------- -- ¶2. (S/NF) In February 18 meeting, Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP) Ambassador Holbrooke commended Zardari for U.S.-Pakistan cooperation in the capture of Afghan Taliban military leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Beradar, describing it as a "text-book case." He noted that Afghan President Hamid Karzai was pleased with it, especially as Beradar comes from the same tribe as him. Holbrooke asked about the whereabouts of Pakistani Taliban leaders Sufi Mohammad and Mullah Fazlullah. Zardari said that Mohammad was in protective custody while Fazlullah remained at large, but "much weaker than before." ¶3. (S/NF) Zardari said the capture of Taliban leaders was only a first step and that the key to fighting militants was to turn the local populations against them. He noted that Pakistan had come a long way since the siege of the Red Mosque in 2007. Once the Pakistani people had begun to "take public ownership" of the fight against terrorism, it began to succeed. Talking to the Taliban -------------- ¶4. (S/NF) Holbrooke said that the media had over blown the prospects of political reconciliation with Taliban senior leadership and reintegration of low-level Taliban who had given up the fight. While the USG was pursuing reintegration, the prospects for reconciliation were less, although the USG was not opposed. Zardari agreed that with reconciliation "there was much less going on than meets the eye." ¶5. (S/NF) Holbrooke said the media was responding to President Karzai and UN Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) to Afghanistan Kai Eide's push to engage the Taliban. Holbrooke added that Karzai wanted to meet with the Taliban in Saudi Arabia, but that Saudi Arabia would not support such talks until the Taliban renounced al-Qaeda. Zardari confirmed that Saudi Intelligence Chief Prince Muqrin bin Abdel Aziz had discussed the possibile talks with him, but Prince Muqrin "would not guarantee" it would happen. Holbrooke stressed the USG was not currently *********************** * Missing Section 002 * *********************** *********************** * Missing Section 003 * ***********************

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