NEXT GENERATION MACAU LEADERSHIP: THE PLAYER, THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HONG KONG 000277 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP/CM E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2020 TAGS: PINR PGOV MC CH SUBJECT: NEXT GENERATION MACAU LEADERSHIP: THE PLAYER, THE GODFATHER, OR THE SHERIFF? REF: (A) 09 HONG KONG 2259 (B) 09 HONG KONG 1381 (C) 09 HONG KONG 983 Classified By: Acting Consul General Christopher Marut for reasons 1.4( b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Few of our counterparts seemed able (or willing) to tip anyone as a future leader in Macau. In some respects, argued one democratic politician, even Beijing was stuck on the issue, since the small-circle election system it devised gave Macau's establishment a veto effective against all but a direct order from the capital. Two names have come up sufficiently regularly to invite our analysis. One is Executive Council (ExCo) and Research Centre for Sustainable Development Strategies President Lionel Leong Vai-tac, and the other is ExCo member and legislator Chan Meng-kam, who is publicly a leader of the Fujianese community and privately thought to have major triad connections. Their chances, however, hinge on two factors: (a) the prospect for democratic reforms to the Chief Executive (CE) election process; and (b) whether incumbent CE Fernando Chui Sai-on lasts two terms. Should Chui fail as CE, he may not get a second term, and should he fall to corruption, it might revive the prospects of Prosecutor General Ho Chio-meng, who at one point was tipped as Chui's competitor in the CE race. End summary. -------------- Caught in its Own Trap -------------- ¶2. (C) As reported refs B and C, the Chief Executive (CE) "election" that ultimately saw Fernando Chui Sai-on run unopposed was almost a two-man race. In a popular contest, the winner would almost undoubtedly have been Prosecutor General Ho Chio-meng. Ho's undeclared but extremely popular candidacy was widely seen as a signal from Beijing regarding corruption in Macau. In the end, the Macau establishment, to whom Beijing granted the majority of seats on the 300-member CE Election Committee, appeared to have had the last word, nominating Chui (a scion of an influential "patrotic" business clan) with enough votes to preclue another candidate from even running. (Note: Chui netted 286 of 300 votes; 50 are required for nomination and each elector has one vote. End ote.) ¶3. (C) According to University of Macau (M) scholar Eilo Yu Wing-yat, Chui did have some upportin Beijing, but the key factor in his win as Chui's taking the initiative in announcing hi candidacy and lobbying for nominations. Chui culd not have done so over Beijing's objections, bu the impression Yu had was that Beijing acquiescd to, rather than endorsed, Chui's run. Proto-deocratic New Macau Association (NMA) legislator A Kam-sam concurred, suggesting Beijing's weightig the Election Committee in favor of Macau's econoic elite left Beijing to some extent at their mecy. Au joked that, if Beijing had wanted Ho to wn, they should have supported a universal suffrae election. Most polls had Ho trouncing Chui inan open ballot. ¶4. (C) Ho, 54, was seen by our ontacts as too old to stand for CE at the end ofa second Chui administration in 2019. Macau Polytchnic Institute scholar Larry So Man-yum suggestd Ho might have a chance should Chui fail. In prticular, should Chui fall to a corruption scandal -- and So thought there might be something out there that might eventually come to light -- Ho would be the natural successr. -------------- The Fair-haired Boy -------------- ¶5. (C) "Fresh" was a quality ur interlocutors ascribed to Executive Council (xCo) member Lionel Leong Vai-tac, although they meant "inexperienced" as much as "youthful." Widely seen as a protege of former CE Edmund Ho Hau-wah, businessman Leong, 47, kept his ExCo job under Chui (with whom he has good relations). Leong also represents Macau in the National People's Congress, having won the highest number of votes in the small-circle "election" for deputies. Leong was educated in Canada (his BA is from the University of Waterloo) and is now educating his two sons and a daughter in the UK. ¶6. (C) Leong himself was engaging in person, speaking fluent English with the de rigeur interjections of popular international buzzwords ("glocalisation" seemed a favorite). Leong expounded that Macau's strategy was to seek greater openness while drawing ever closer to Beijing. In the initial sense, openness applied to economic engagement with HONG KONG 00000277 002 OF 002 the international community. However, Leong stressed to us that drawing closer to Beijing also created scope for development within Macau politics. The more comfortable Beijing is that it knows what we're about, he said in essence, the greater scope we have for reform. ¶7. (C) Even as they acknowledged his connections, however, our interlocutors seemed to discount Leong's chances of becoming Chief Executive. Polytechnic's So didn't rule Leong out, noting his canny networking with new generation academics on the issues under consideration by the Research Centre for Sustainable Development Strategies (RCSDS - the Macau Government's in-house think-tank, analogous to Hong Kong's Central Policy Unit). However, UM's Yu noted that the future of RCSDS itself was in doubt. (Note: RCSDS was founded by former CE Ho, but the Chui administration has thus far extended its charter by only one year, to conclude December 19, 2010. End note.) So himself ruled out Leong should Ho Chio-meng succeed Chui, since Leong is not of Ho's ilk. The NMA's Au dismissed Leong out of hand as Edmund Ho's "ma jai" (a none-too-complimentary Cantonese term for "lackey"),and doubted Leong could win the CE-ship even from his fellows in the establishment. -------------- Friend of the Friends? -------------- ¶8. (C) Popular Fujianese community leader Chan Meng-kam (47) won the second highest number of votes in the September 2009 Legislative Assembly (LA) elections, behind Federation of Trade Unions grand dame Kwan Tsui-hang but ahead of NMA leader Antonio Ng Kuok-cheong. The Fujianese are the largest "ethnic" minority in largely Cantonese Macau, and Chan is thus reckoned as fronting for an influential bloc, which earned him one of only three seats opened in Chui's ExCo. That said, we have yet to meet anyone who does not believe Chan is linked to the triads. ¶9. (C) Oddly, NMA's Au evinced a certain admiration for Chan's political shrewdness and political "investment." That Chan runs six ward offices means that he is putting a considerable amount of his own money beside the modest salary and allowances given to legislators, Au explained (NMA's three legislators share a single ward office). If an ordinary citizen comes in to complain of a leaking roof, Chan sends someone to fix it -- again, out of his own pocket. ¶10. (C) Our contacts suspected Chan might have higher ambitions, but doubted he could be elected CE. Although his ExCo seat means Chan is now acknowledged as part of the establishment, NMA's Au said Chan remains an outsider among Macau's traditional elite. Polytechnic's So agreed, suggesting neither Beijing nor the Macau elite would want Chan to win. Indeed, So suggested even the triads are seeking to keep Chan in check, with some organizations allegedly having backed legislator Angela Leong On-kei (Mrs. Stanley Ho number 4) and unsuccessful candidate Lai Cho-wai in 2009. Au suggested (facetiously) that Chan should become a democrat, since he could probably win a direct election. So seemed to think Beijing and the establishment know -- and fear -- the same thing. MARUT