HONG KONG SHIP OWNERS WELCOME PLA TROOPS ON

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 HONG KONG 000267 SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/CM STATE ALSO FOR PM/PPA TREASURY FOR OFAC E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PHSA ATRN EWWT PREL KPIR KCRM IMO DA UK BA SO, CH, HK SUBJECT: HONG KONG SHIP OWNERS WELCOME PLA TROOPS ON MERCHANT SHIPS; WORRY ABOUT RANSOM BAN REF: 09 HONG KONG 2136 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST: China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy forces currently deployed in the waters off East Africa to counter Somali maritime pirate attacks have reportedly offered troops to merchant ships from China, Hong Kong and Taiwan. The Hong Kong Ship Owners Association (HKSOA) has welcomed this initiative but remains opposed to the use of civilian armed guards. Separately, HKSOA has joined the London-based International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) in raising concerns over a rumored U.S. ban on ransom payments. Post would appreciate any information on this rumored ban. Paragraph 7 contains ICS' recent letter on this matter. END SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST ¶2. (SBU) During a February 10 meeting with EconOff, HKSOA Managing Director Arthur Bowring shared that PLA naval warships on counter-piracy operations off the Somali Coast have been routinely offering up special forces units to serve aboard commercial ships from China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. PLA officers and the ship's captain would make arrangements on site, whereby troops could be stationed aboard more vulnerable ships during runs through the Gulf of Aden (GOA) and the Somali Basin (SB). Bowring knew neither the number nor the flag-state of the vessels that had allowed Chinese troops aboard. He added that the industry welcomed this type of military initiative, and it was not unique to the PLA. Other international naval forces in the region offered similar support to merchant ships from their flag-states, he confirmed. ¶3. (SBU) While the industry supported military deployments to protect cargo ships, Bowring reiterated HKSOA's strong opposition to the employment of armed private security guards to protect commercial shipping. Civilian guards would only lead to unnecessary escalation of violence on both sides, as civilian "mercenaries" were not bound by UN-style rules of engagement, he said. ¶4. (SBU) As a representative for some of the region's largest ship owners and ship management companies, Bowring said the HKSOA regularly received business proposals from private individuals and security firms eager to take the fight to the pirates, for a profit. The HKSOA did not endorse these 
proposals but instead encouraged the use of industry's Best Management Practices (BMP) to deter piracy (reftel). However, "the HKSOA cannot forbid ship owners from doing what they deemed best," Bowring recognized. (Note: Hong Kong's strict statutory controls on firearms' registration and licensing extend over its shipping registry. This constrains the decision for a civilian guard force on Hong Kong-flagged vessels. End Note.) ¶5. (SBU) Bowring lamented that the international community's reluctance to respond more decisively to piracy in the GOA and SB could potentially encourage hijacking and kidnapping elsewhere. Attacks had already been reported almost 1,000 nautical miles from the coast of Somalia, and pirates continued to develop new tactics, now launching smaller attack skiffs from larger mother ships on the high seas. The protection of sea trade from piracy was a clear and legitimate responsibility for governments under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. It was particularly upsetting when the main focus of some senior politicians seemed limited to objections to ransom payments, he added. Potential U.S. Ban on Payment of Ransoms to Pirates -------------- -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Ship owners were highly concerned over rumors that the U.S. government was contemplating prohibiting ransom payments to pirates, Bowring said. Specifically, in addition to banning ransom payments, the measure would also impose HONG KONG 00000267 002 OF 003 sanctions on companies that violated the ruling, including non-U.S. companies. Bowring stated this would do little to safeguard sea trade and seafarers' well-being. He shared a February 3 letter from the International Chamber of Shipping to the Chairman of the Consultative Shipping Group that expressed these concerns: ¶7. (U) Begin Text: From: Mr. Simon Bennett Secretary, International Chamber of Shipping 12 Carthusian Street London EC1M 6EZ Tel 44 20 7417 8844 Fax 44 20 7417 8877 ics@marisec.org www. marisec.org www.shippingfacts.com To: Mr. Andreas Nordseth Chairman, Consultative Shipping Group C/O Danish Maritime Authority Versmundsgade 38C DK-2100 Copenhagen At the request of the ICS Executive Committee, which met this week, we are contacting you, in your capacity as CSG Chairman, on a most serious matter of great concern to our member national shipowners' associations. This relates to reports that the United States may be considering some kind of ban on the payment of ransoms for the release of seafarers held hostage by Somali pirates. Moreover, it is understood that any such ban might apply to non-US companies and that penalties could be imposed when the ship of a company, that is known to have paid a ransom, visits a US port, or by applying sanctions against a shipping company's offices in the US. We understand the mechanism for doing this would be the Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) which, we are informed, amended its regulations last November, possibly (though we cannot confirm this) with such an action in mind. While exact information about who might be driving any decision about a ban is hard to come by, we believe it is being led by the State Department. (The OFAC regulations apparently require decisions to be made by the Secretary of State in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General.) Our first request is that, through the Cotton Club, and as matter of some urgency, the CSG collects any information it can about the truth behind any proposal for a ban, and the likely timing of any such decision, in order that we can determine how collectively we might resist it. Our second request is that Cotton Club members might be encouraged to begin raising the concerns of the international community to officials in the relevant departments, and that this topic should be a subject of discussion at the next CSG meeting in Korea. While the shipping industry will develop its arguments depending on the detail of whatever may be eventually proposed by the United States, in the first instance we wish to raise the following serious concerns about any potential ban on ransom payments: - The first is humanitarian. What else are shipowners meant to do when the seafarers they employ, and to whom they have a duty of care, are taken hostage, often for months at a time, in appalling conditions, with their lives at serious risk, and with no hope of rescue by their governments? - If such a ban were implemented, what would happen to those seafarers who are currently being held hostage (typically, at any one time, about 250 seafarers are being held by pirates)? HONG KONG 00000267 003 OF 003 - If such a ban were implemented, it has to be understood the likely result would be that the majority of shipowners would avoid the Gulf of Aden, the Suez Canal and north west Indian Ocean altogether (most large ships would divert around the Cape of Good Hope). Many ships' crews would also be likely to refuse to sail in the danger area (which covers well over a million square miles). This would clearly have a significant affect on the flow of a large proportion of international trade, and send a signal to the effect that the international community has been unable to prevent the creation by the pirates of a huge 'no go' area in a region of great strategic importance. - Finally, it is worth reiterating that there is absolutely no evidence (so far as we are aware) of any links between the pirates, who are criminal opportunists, and terrorism. Your assistance in finding out more and taking up our concerns on this most serious matter will be very much appreciated. End text. MARUT