THIRD FORCE? DEMOCRATIC PARTY SEEKS MODERATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HONG KONG 000016 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP/CM; ALSO FOR DRL E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2019 TAGS: PGOV PHUM HK SUBJECT: THIRD FORCE? DEMOCRATIC PARTY SEEKS MODERATE COALITION REF: HONG KONG 2377 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: Acting Deputy Principal Office Joseph A. Bookbinder for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Having rejected the resignation-as-referendum plan launched by the League of Social Democrats (LSD) and the Civic Party, the Democratic Party (DPHK) now hopes to collaborate with a group of pro-democracy scholars to produce an alternative reform plan. While they hope their plan could serve as the basis for a compromise with the Hong Kong government and Beijing, they recognize Beijing likely will not negotiate prior to the conclusion of the "referendum," and in the end may not deal at all. Should it do so, Beijing would have to do more than improve proposals for 2012, but might not need to make substantive commitments for future elections to win over the DPHK. The coming months may see the end of the pan-democratic coalition as it exists now, which one DPHK observer suggested is perhaps the only way Hong Kong's currently ossified pro-democracy/pro-Beijing bipolarity might evolve into a more productive political environment. End summary. -------------- The New Democratic Center -------------- ¶2. (C) The Democratic Party (DPHK) intended the January 1 democracy march (reftels) to be the first step towards moving public debate over political reform away from its current sole focus on the resignation plan and back on to the substance of democratic development. The party's next move involves collaborating with a network of scholars and prominent pro-democracy advocates on an alternative proposal (or at least a set of principles) on constitutional reform. The aforementioned network was convened by members of the Democratic Development Network (DDN) and SynergyNet, two non-partisan, pro-democracy think-tanks. The network announced itself in a December 17 Ming Pao advertisement condemning Chief Executive Donald Tsang Yam-kuen for failing to meet his 2007 election promise to resolve universal suffrage in his term and calling for the elimination of the small-circle functional constituencies (FCs). ¶3. (C) The DPHK, along with representatives of smaller pan-democratic parties other than the Civic Party and the League of Social Democrats (LSD),held initial discussions with the network in late December. Network organizer and �A;Chinese University (CUHK) professor Ma Ngok told us the Civics and LSD as parties had not been invited to the discussions, and even suggested that they might not be welcome if they asked to come. However, a number of the scholars and democracy advocates who signed the statement in Ming Pao (presumably in personal or DDN capacities) are Civics, including party General Secretary Kenneth Chan Ka-lok and strategist Joseph Cheng Yu-shek. ¶4. (C) CUHK's Ma said the alliance hoped to be "in for the long haul" on constitutional reform, working up to the anticipated universal suffrage elections for Chief Executive in 2017 and for the Legislative Council (LegCo) in 2020. Ma conceded, however, that while the group agrees on broad principles, arriving at a unified alternative plan to the government's reform proposal for 2012 may be difficult given the contentious issues involved. While Ma and the DPHK's Law saw such a plan as a basis to negotiate a compromise with the Hong Kong government and Beijing, January 1 march organizer Richard Tsoi Yiu-cheong suggested the plan may ultimately serve more as political cover. Many believe the pan-democrats went against public opinion to veto the 2005 reform proposal. If the DPHK an market an alternative that is more popular than the government's plan, Tsoi contended they would have cover to vote against the government in LegCo. -------------- Will Beijing Deal? -------------- ¶5. (C) Most observers agree Beijing is unlikely to approve negotiations on the reform proposal offered in the Hong Kong government's November consultation document until after the by-election, which means well after the conclusion of the consultation period in February. Mechanically, this means any changes would probably emerge in the actual legislative text offered to LegCo in late spring/early summer. (CUHK's Ma ventured Beijing might allow the Hong Kong government to announce some modifications to the proposal just prior to the by-election, presumably to draw votes away from the pan-democrats.) Politically, this scenario cuts both ways HONG KONG 00000016 002 OF 003 for the DPHK. On the one hand, they may fail to get either the Hong Kong government or the party's intermediaries with Beijing to discuss substance for several months. On the other hand, this also gives them time to develop an alternative reform proposal and then market it to the public. ¶6. (C) However, there is also the question of whether Beijing will negotiate at all. Observers including CUHK's Ma see Beijing's recent high-handed behavior in the international arena as suggesting Beijing will not negotiate. Similarly, the flurry of lobbying orchestrated by the Central Government Liaison Office (CGLO) for the 2005 reform package contrasts sharply with the current silence from Beijing's allies, leading observers to believe Beijing may rather the package fail than make concessions. -------------- Bridging the Gap -------------- ¶7. (C) Should Beijing choose to seek compromise, the next question is, what can the DPHK accept? Looking at the proposals for 2012 itself, observers suggest two points as potentially able to win fence-sitters in the pan-democratic camp. First is that the new functional constituency seats to be elected from the District Councils (DCs) be chosen by a proportional system, which would offer the pan-democrats the chance to take some of the seats (the alternative -- each DC member casting six votes -- is expected to generate a solid pro-Beijing bloc because of their numerical superiority among district councilors). The second would be a commitment from the government to phase out the system of appointed district councilors, a system the pan-democrats see as a means by which the government can dominate the political balance of the DCs. ¶8. (C) CUHK's Ma argued those proposals alone will not be enough to win over the DPHK. That said, he thought even some fairly vague commitments by Beijing on arrangements for 2017 and 2020 might suffice, and would let them be more flexible in their approach to 2012. The DPHK's Law sees the key issue as ensuring that the election for Chief Executive in 2017 is by "one man, one vote." (Note: the December 2007 National People's Congress Standing Committee Decision already explicitly makes that commitment.) Law took as given that Beijing will insist on some screening in the nomination process, and therefore was prepared to concede that argument as lost. ¶9. (C) On LegCo, Law thought Beijing should move away from the debate over whether FCs would or would not be retained by re-casting the discussion as one aimed at achieving the long-held Hong Kong political doctrine of "balanced participation" by all sectors of Hong Kong society (the philosophical justification for the FCs' existence). Switching to that rubric would let Beijing dodge the FC question for now, Law argued, but could also open the door to discussion of alternative models like party list elections and proportional representation. Comment: While Law is a shrewd political observer and sits in the inner circles of DPHK debates, we are uncertain his views reflect the thinking of, or could sway, the DPHK leadership and legislative caucus, particularly hawks like Vice Chair Emily Lau Wai-hing. We expect the DPHK as a party to continue to demand a formal pledge to phase out the FCs. End comment. -------------- End of the "Pan-Democrats?" -------------- ¶10. (C) Former legislator and political elder Allen Lee Peng-fei contended to us that the DPHK's failure to back the resignation plan meant they would lose either way: pan-democratic losses would be blamed on their lack of support, while a five-seat victory would boost the LSD and the Civics at the DPHK's expense (see reftel). The DPHK's Law conceded the point, but assessed the probable results differently. First, he thought those who will blame the DPHK would not have voted for the party anyway. Second, he expected popular opposition to the resignation plan to win back former DPHK supporters who had defected to the Civics, bringing with them moderates from the Civics' ranks who reject the plan and/or the party's alliance with the radical LSD. Law admitted, however, that the actual gains and losses would be difficult to quantify. ¶11. (C) Although he is not saying so publicly, Law believes that the fracturing of the current pan-democratic coalition represents a chance for Hong Kong to move beyond the current HONG KONG 00000016 003 OF 003 ossified bipolarity which exists between the pan-democratic and pro-Beijing camps. He hoped that such a split might allow for some realignment among Hong Kong's political forces. Comment: We agree in principle with Law's assessment, but are not sure how far "realignment" might play out. While Beijing opposes the resignation plan and dislikes both the LSD and the Civics, that is a far cry from giving tacit approval to an alliance between any of its supporters and the DPHK, whose leadership are heavily involved in a range of Mainland human rights causes that Beijing opposes. Ad hoc cooperation on specific issues, however, would be a possibility. End comment. MARUT