HONG KONG RAIL PROTESTS: WHAT A FIELD DAY FOR THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HONG KONG 000101

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT PARAS 2, 3 AND 5)

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/CM; ALSO FOR DRL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2020
TAGS: PGOV PHUM HK CH
SUBJECT: HONG KONG RAIL PROTESTS: WHAT A FIELD DAY FOR THE
HEAT

REF: (A) HONG KONG 100 (B) HONG KONG 10

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Classified By: Acting Consul General Christopher Marut for reasons 1.4(
b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: As expected, Hong Kong's Legislative Council
(LegCo) Finance Committee approved funding to begin
construction of a link to the PRC national high-speed rail
system in the early evening of January 16. Though largely
peaceful, protesters clashed with police following a decision
not to allow them to continue marches around the LegCo
perimeter, which led police to use pepper spray against
protesters. An impromptu January 15 protest at Government
House, the residence/office of the Chief Executive, came off
without incident. Veteran activists noted the difficulty of
managing these new generation protests, which lack a single
organizing body able to speak for demonstrators and negotiate
authoritatively with police. Hong Kong society still does
not know what to make of the new generation of activists, but
the government appears to be moving to a harder line against
what it sees as unlawful activity. End summary.

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Something's Happening Here...
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2. (C) Opponents of Hong Kong's plan to build a link to the
PRC national high-speed rail system returned to the
Legislative Council (LegCo) building January 15-16 to protest
what everyone knew was a foregone conclusion: the government
had the numbers to win a "party-line" vote against their
pan-democratic opponents. The afternoon of January 15 saw
various groups expressing different points of view take to
the streets in modest numbers, with lion dancing and other
choreographed events from the pro-establishment side
contrasting with the more organic and passionate gatherings
of rail opponents. The night, however, belonged to the
anti-rail side, particularly the so-called "post-1980s"
generation, who eschew formal organization in favor of mass
gatherings that are announced on the internet via Facebook
and then evolve on site.


3. (C) January 15 saw activists take their protest up the road
from LegCo in an unplanned late-night demonstration outside
Government House, the official residence/workplace of the
Chief Executive (CE). Starting around 10:30 pm, a crowd
eventually numbering several thousand (we overheard a police
officer tell a journalist 4,000; later media quoted police as
saying 1,000) demanded CE Donald Tsang Yam-kuen come out and
talk to them. Unified in its message, the group had no
actual organizational structure -- individual speakers stood
up to speak from wherever they were seated, and appeared to
be listened to in proportion to their popularity. The one
unifying moment of the night came around 11:30 when maverick
legislator Leung Kwok-hung arrived to chants of "Long Hair!
Long Hair!" to briefly address the crowd (we couldn't make
out his remarks).


4. (C) One bystander predicted to us the police would
tolerate the demonstration until midnight, and the majority
of the crowd moved off at that time. In good Hong Kong
fashion, ringleaders urged participants to pick up their
trash as they departed, and many did. Activist Christina
Chan Hau-man exhorted her fellow protesters to remain and
stage a sit-in, but she appeared to have few takers as a
tired crowd headed for home.


5. (C) Protests on the afternoon and evening of January 16 went
less smoothly. While we did not witness the events, and have
conflicting reports from media, participants and observers,
it appears activists were thwarted in their efforts to
continue marching in circuit around LegCo (one group had done
so through past protests, kowtowing every 26 steps in
recognition of the 26km in the proposed rail link).
Activists felt they had a deal with police on which the
police reneged by blocking their intended path at two points.
In response, angry words were exchanged and metal police
barriers were at least shaken if not actually rushed, which
in turn lead police to discharge pepper spray at the
protesters.


6. (C) While there was no further clash with the police,
protesters continued to jeer Transportation Secretary Eva
Cheng Yu-wah and pro-government legislators with demands that
they come out and face the crowd. Cheng reportedly proposed
coming out, but said she decided not to because she was
warned police might not be able to maintain order. She and
several pro-establishment legislators found themselves
effectively trapped in the LegCo building for several hours,
until a police cordon escorted them to an MTR entrance a few

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meters from LegCo.


7. (C) Veteran human rights activist Law Yuk-kai, whose Hong
Kong Human Rights Monitor sent t-shirted "observers" to
monitor the protest, suggested the lack of organization among
the protesters was an obstacle for both sides: no one was
authorized to negotiate on behalf of the protesters, while
police could not be certain the people with whom they might
be speaking could then get the masses to accept the terms
agreed.

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...But What It Is Ain't Exactly Clear
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8. (C) Hong Kong is still sorting out what "youth activism"
actually is, and what it may mean for Hong Kong politics.
The older generation seems keen to categorize the post-1980s
generation as shouting out their frustration at the lack of
quality employment commensurate with their advanced
education. However, the few active youths we've spoken to or
heard speak suggested the real issues for them are more
specific: an unelected government which disdains true public
consultation and relies on an undemocratic bloc of functional
constituency legislators to pass its proposals.


9. (C) One activist suggested the opposition to the rail
project had less to do with age per se than the fact that,
while mainstream media were not digging in to the
government's explanations of costs and benefits, a lot of
fairly detailed information was being passed around via
Facebook and YouTube. He thus suggested the high level of
youth mobilization had more to do with the fact that young
people were more likely to access those fora for news and
information than their elders.


10. (C) The other big concern among the over-30s is that
youth activists are more likely to resort to "violent" means
of expression. In that respect, while the younger people
with whom we've spoken seemed to have a broader definition of
what is acceptable in a peaceful protest than their elders,
we have not heard any suggest they were looking for a fight.
There were a few who felt justified in rushing police
barriers -- Christina Chan led one such charge at the Central
Government Liaison Office January 1 (for which she may be
facing an assault on police charge),and a second at LegCo
January 15. Chan expressed considerable outrage (not to
mention chutzpah) at being thwarted in what she told the
media was an attempt to force her way into LegCo to stop
legislators from voting, although she stressed she did not
intend to attack the police per se. "I want to condemn
police who used violence disproportionate to what we were
doing," she said.


11. (C) Having spent the last week publicly mulling over the
need to talk with and listen more to the young, the Tsang
administration took a hard line in the media this week,
stressing that the "irresponsible" protesters were "in breach
of the core values of Hong Kong's society, the principle of
the rule of law, and overall interests (of Hong Kong). The
government and the general public definitely cannot accept
it." Tsang's critics suggested the new hard line reflected
either instructions from Beijing (which has become more vocal
itself in opposing Hong Kong's democrats -- see ref A) or a
desire to show Beijing he has the situation under control.
MARUT