HONG KONG RAIL PROTESTS: WHAT A FIELD DAY FOR THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HONG KONG 000101 C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT PARAS 2, 3 AND 5) SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP/CM; ALSO FOR DRL E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2020 TAGS: PGOV PHUM HK CH SUBJECT: HONG KONG RAIL PROTESTS: WHAT A FIELD DAY FOR THE HEAT REF: (A) HONG KONG 100 (B) HONG KONG 10 HONG KONG 00000101 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Acting Consul General Christopher Marut for reasons 1.4( b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: As expected, Hong Kong's Legislative Council (LegCo) Finance Committee approved funding to begin construction of a link to the PRC national high-speed rail system in the early evening of January 16. Though largely peaceful, protesters clashed with police following a decision not to allow them to continue marches around the LegCo perimeter, which led police to use pepper spray against protesters. An impromptu January 15 protest at Government House, the residence/office of the Chief Executive, came off without incident. Veteran activists noted the difficulty of managing these new generation protests, which lack a single organizing body able to speak for demonstrators and negotiate authoritatively with police. Hong Kong society still does not know what to make of the new generation of activists, but the government appears to be moving to a harder line against what it sees as unlawful activity. End summary. -------------- Something's Happening Here... -------------- ¶2. (C) Opponents of Hong Kong's plan to build a link to the PRC national high-speed rail system returned to the Legislative Council (LegCo) building January 15-16 to protest what everyone knew was a foregone conclusion: the government had the numbers to win a "party-line" vote against their pan-democratic opponents. The afternoon of January 15 saw various groups expressing different points of view take to the streets in modest numbers, with lion dancing and other choreographed events from the pro-establishment side contrasting with the more organic and passionate gatherings of rail opponents. The night, however, belonged to the anti-rail side, particularly the so-called "post-1980s" generation, who eschew formal organization in favor of mass gatherings that are announced on the internet via Facebook and then evolve on site. ¶3. (C) January 15 saw activists take their protest up the road from LegCo in an unplanned late-night demonstration outside Government House, the official residence/workplace of the Chief Executive (CE). Starting around 10:30 pm, a crowd eventually numbering several thousand (we overheard a police officer tell a journalist 4,000; later media quoted police as saying 1,000) demanded CE Donald Tsang Yam-kuen come out and talk to them. Unified in its message, the group had no actual organizational structure -- individual speakers stood up to speak from wherever they were seated, and appeared to be listened to in proportion to their popularity. The one unifying moment of the night came around 11:30 when maverick legislator Leung Kwok-hung arrived to chants of "Long Hair! Long Hair!" to briefly address the crowd (we couldn't make out his remarks). ¶4. (C) One bystander predicted to us the police would tolerate the demonstration until midnight, and the majority of the crowd moved off at that time. In good Hong Kong fashion, ringleaders urged participants to pick up their trash as they departed, and many did. Activist Christina Chan Hau-man exhorted her fellow protesters to remain and stage a sit-in, but she appeared to have few takers as a tired crowd headed for home. ¶5. (C) Protests on the afternoon and evening of January 16 went less smoothly. While we did not witness the events, and have conflicting reports from media, participants and observers, it appears activists were thwarted in their efforts to continue marching in circuit around LegCo (one group had done so through past protests, kowtowing every 26 steps in recognition of the 26km in the proposed rail link). Activists felt they had a deal with police on which the police reneged by blocking their intended path at two points. In response, angry words were exchanged and metal police barriers were at least shaken if not actually rushed, which in turn lead police to discharge pepper spray at the protesters. ¶6. (C) While there was no further clash with the police, protesters continued to jeer Transportation Secretary Eva Cheng Yu-wah and pro-government legislators with demands that they come out and face the crowd. Cheng reportedly proposed coming out, but said she decided not to because she was warned police might not be able to maintain order. She and several pro-establishment legislators found themselves effectively trapped in the LegCo building for several hours, until a police cordon escorted them to an MTR entrance a few HONG KONG 00000101 002.2 OF 002 meters from LegCo. ¶7. (C) Veteran human rights activist Law Yuk-kai, whose Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor sent t-shirted "observers" to monitor the protest, suggested the lack of organization among the protesters was an obstacle for both sides: no one was authorized to negotiate on behalf of the protesters, while police could not be certain the people with whom they might be speaking could then get the masses to accept the terms agreed. -------------- ...But What It Is Ain't Exactly Clear -------------- ¶8. (C) Hong Kong is still sorting out what "youth activism" actually is, and what it may mean for Hong Kong politics. The older generation seems keen to categorize the post-1980s generation as shouting out their frustration at the lack of quality employment commensurate with their advanced education. However, the few active youths we've spoken to or heard speak suggested the real issues for them are more specific: an unelected government which disdains true public consultation and relies on an undemocratic bloc of functional constituency legislators to pass its proposals. ¶9. (C) One activist suggested the opposition to the rail project had less to do with age per se than the fact that, while mainstream media were not digging in to the government's explanations of costs and benefits, a lot of fairly detailed information was being passed around via Facebook and YouTube. He thus suggested the high level of youth mobilization had more to do with the fact that young people were more likely to access those fora for news and information than their elders. ¶10. (C) The other big concern among the over-30s is that youth activists are more likely to resort to "violent" means of expression. In that respect, while the younger people with whom we've spoken seemed to have a broader definition of what is acceptable in a peaceful protest than their elders, we have not heard any suggest they were looking for a fight. There were a few who felt justified in rushing police barriers -- Christina Chan led one such charge at the Central Government Liaison Office January 1 (for which she may be facing an assault on police charge),and a second at LegCo January 15. Chan expressed considerable outrage (not to mention chutzpah) at being thwarted in what she told the media was an attempt to force her way into LegCo to stop legislators from voting, although she stressed she did not intend to attack the police per se. "I want to condemn police who used violence disproportionate to what we were doing," she said. ¶11. (C) Having spent the last week publicly mulling over the need to talk with and listen more to the young, the Tsang administration took a hard line in the media this week, stressing that the "irresponsible" protesters were "in breach of the core values of Hong Kong's society, the principle of the rule of law, and overall interests (of Hong Kong). The government and the general public definitely cannot accept it." Tsang's critics suggested the new hard line reflected either instructions from Beijing (which has become more vocal itself in opposing Hong Kong's democrats -- see ref A) or a desire to show Beijing he has the situation under control. MARUT