NEW YEAR'S UPDATE WITH FORMER MAYOR VO VIET THANH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HO CHI MINH CITY 000051 SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/MLS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/12/2030 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM CH VM SUBJECT: NEW YEAR'S UPDATE WITH FORMER MAYOR VO VIET THANH REF: (A) 2009 HCMC 398, (B) 2008 HCMC 712, (C) 2008 HCMC 282, (D) HCMC 33, (E) HANOI 23, (F) OPENSOURCE.GOV PRODUCT ID SEP20100202124011 HO CHI MIN 00000051 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Kenneth J. Fairfax, Consul General, U.S. Consulate General Ho Chi Minh City, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Vo Viet Thanh, former HCMC Mayor and current advisor to both PM Dung and President Triet, remains deeply troubled by what he views as China's increasingly belligerent stance towards not only Vietnam but the rest of Asia. His message for the USG was that whether we are dealing with Vietnam, Burma, ASEAN or other nations, we should always consider how our actions will impact our counterparts' relations with China. He expressed great concern over China's increasingly aggressive stance in the East (South China) Sea, framing the GVN purchase of Russian arms in that light. He also noted that the Russians gave them a really good price. On the domestic political scene, Thanh predicted a "very early" release for the four democracy activists (including Le Cong Dinh) convicted in HCMC on January 20 and expressed great optimism that Vietnam would make a renewed push on fighting corruption and deepening grass roots democracy following the 2011 Party Congress. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) On February 10, CG and PolOff paid a pre-Tet call on Vo Viet Thanh, the former Chairman (Mayor) of HCMC as well as former Deputy Minister of Public Security and Central Committee Member and current advisor to President Nguyen Minh Triet. As in our numerous previous conversations (reftels A - C),Thanh was expansive and made a number of interesting observations. China Defines Many Issues -------------- ¶3. (C) As in previous conversations, Thanh devoted much of the conversation to China and tended to frame other issues in terms of how they impact Vietnam's -- and ASEAN's -- dynamic relations with China. He started off by "reminding" the CG that for over 2,000 years China has pursued territorial expansion through military conquest. Times and methods have changed, Thanh said, but the Chinese still want to control Vietnam and the rest of Asia. Without quite painting a picture of a China-USA balancing act, Thanh nonetheless said that it is important for the USA to �00A;carefully maintain its influence in Vietnam so as to provide a perspective other than China's in the region. This China focus included not just US-Vietnam relations but other issues as well. He cited North Korea as a type of worst-case scenario for the end result of Chinese efforts to dominate its neighbors by "supporting" them against aggressors (in other words, us). ¶4. (C) Turning to Burma, he said that the GVN agrees that the generals are simultaneously harming their people and playing a difficult and even obstructionist role in ASEAN, but added that Vietnamese leaders feel constrained by their desire to avoid actions that could push Burma even closer to China. He did not dispute CG's point that the generals are already steering Burma toward a quasi-satellite relationship with China, instead responding that the open question is what policies will be more effective in correcting Burma's worrisome behavior. Given the GVN's often-repeated policy of non-interference, leaders feel constrained into limiting their comments to Burmese authorities to "non-political" topics such as the economy and trade. He made a brief foray to Cuba to make his point, stating that when he accompanied GVN leaders on a visit to the island last June no one in the delegation made any political comments. They did, he asserted, make numerous economic and management comments, noting to Cuban leaders that they could greatly improve the productivity of both farms and factories by allowing people to directly benefit from their work. He said they used the example of state farms, noting that farmers produce little since their rewards are the same if they produce a little or a lot. East (South China) Sea -------------- ¶5. (C) Turning to the Spratley and Paracel islands, Thanh noted that China wanted to derail efforts to move toward a multilateral settlement since it stands a better chance of bullying nations one by one. Without asking the US to back Vietnam's claims, he urged the USG to take constructive steps to demonstrate our commitment to freedom of navigation and the dispute resolution process based upon principles in the Law of the Sea. HO CHI MIN 00000051 002.2 OF 003 ¶6. (C) Thanh commented that recent GVN agreements to purchase roughly $1 billion in Russian arms reflects an increasing realization that Vietnam must be able to defend its claims to the East (South China) Sea. He emphasized that while the GVN does not want confrontation, it also realizes that it will accomplish nothing dealing from a position of extreme military weakness. He said the decision to buy Russian arms came down to two points. First, the U.S. market is closed to them. Second, Russia offered them a very good deal. According to Thanh, Vietnam will pay 40% less than other nations that have purchased similar equipment in recent years. (Comment: The fact that most senior CPV leaders were educated in Russia, maintain a close affinity for Russia, and Russia's historic role in providing Vietnam defense-related equipment likely were also factors behind Hanoi's decision. End comment.) Early Release For Activists? -------------- ¶7. (C) Thanh predicted that the four democracy activists convicted on January 20 (ref D) would be released "very soon" but did not provide a date. (Comment: It is likely that Thanh was trying to put some lipstick on that pig. In this context, "very soon" could mean several months, a year or even longer, especially considering that the MFA DG for the Americas told visiting DAS Marciel February 5 that it was "too early" even to discuss Le Cong Dinh's release, given the sensitivity of the case and the overwhelming evidence against him -- ref E. End Comment.) While he expressed understanding for the U.S. position and added his own view that the four were guilty only of acting too soon rather than pursuing the wrong goal, he reacted negatively to CG's and other public statements on the trial, noting that such public statements make it more difficult for GVN and Party leaders to show flexibility, particularly by creating a contrast between the USA and China. Following a pattern established in previous exchanges, he expressed his own hopes for democracy in Vietnam but urged patience and caution, adding that more could be accomplished via direct, quiet diplomacy and high-level discussions than public announcements. The CG countered by saying the increasingly negative attention Vietnam's human rights and religious freedom record was receiving in the U.S. makes it difficult for the USG to push the relationship forward, and could affect our efforts to push for high level visits and increased engagement. Upbeat on 2011 Party Congress -------------- ¶8. (C) When the conversation turned to the upcoming Party Congress, Thanh was among the most optimistic people we have spoken to recently. While agreeing that the run-up to January 2011 will not be easy, he predicted that the results of the Party Congress will be to reinvigorate the reform movement. He rested part of his optimism on what he described as democratization moves within the CPV. He predicted that the Central Committee would approve a proposal before it that would require all candidates for senior positions within the party to prepare personal platforms detailing not only their political positions but the types of policies and reforms they intended to advocate if elected. He predicted that the Party Congress itself would focus heavily on the issue of administrative reform, which in the Vietnamese context essentially means fighting corruption by CPV and GVN insiders. One key reform that he believes has a good chance of passing is direct elections of commune and district officials without the CPV (via the Fatherland Front) choosing who is allowed to run. (Comment: Thanh's list of hoped-for reforms is consistent with a longer set of fundamental reforms that Le Phuoc Tho, retired Chairperson of the CPV's Organization Committee, presented in an interview marking the 80th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of Vietnam. In the interview, Tho acknowledged that many CPV members are "opportunistic" and "corrupt." He advocated "democratically and publicly" electing CPV leaders. The interview was translated and published by OpenSource.gov -- ref F.) COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (C) Thanh's personal political star appears to be rising. HO CHI MIN 00000051 003.2 OF 003 While he mainly occupied himself with golf just a few years ago, he now travels to Hanoi frequently in his capacity as advisor to the Prime Minister and President and frequently meets with the Central Committee's Standing Committee. He also accompanies the President and PM on their foreign trips. Our meeting with Thanh had to be rescheduled due to the fact that he was having dinner at President Triet's private residence in HCMC. While we cannot say for certain, many of his statements probably do reflect his own personal views, although they are views that he assures us he shares during private conversations with top CPV and GVN leaders. ¶10. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassy Hanoi. FAIRFAX