DAS MARCIEL DISCUSSES REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE WITH GVN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HANOI 000027

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
FOR EAP/MLS, EAP/RSP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/11
TAGS: PREL PGOV ASEAN MARR MOPS CH RS VM
SUBJECT: DAS MARCIEL DISCUSSES REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE WITH GVN
OFFICIALS

CLASSIFIED BY: Virginia Palmer, CDA; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Vietnam continues to push for a U.S. Presidential
visit in 2010 and, less forcefully, for the United States to join
the East Asia Summit (EAS). In separate conversations with EAP DAS
Marciel, Vietnam's Senior Official for ASEAN and the influential
Vice President of Vietnam's Diplomatic Academy (DAV) welcomed the
United States' "return" to the region, but warned that U.S.
engagement was insufficient to balance China's growing clout. The
DAV's Dang Dinh Quy was blunt, warning that senior CPV officials
were turning to Russia as a counter to China; Assistant FM Pham
Quang Vinh was more circumspect, though he too stressed that Hu
Jintao and Dimitri Medvedev had already committed to coming to
Hanoi this Fall. Speaking of ASEAN more generally, AFM Vinh said
that Vietnam was focused primarily on efforts to build an ASEAN
Community by 2015 but was also looking to strengthen ASEAN's
external relations; he cited disaster-relief coordination within
the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as a good way to build confidence.
Vinh affirmed that member countries backed an "ADMM +" mechanism,
though important details remained unresolved. Vinh acknowledged
that U.S. flexibility on Burma would be difficult to sustain absent
a substantive dialogue with the opposition that went beyond the
mere staging of an election. DAS Marciel assured his Vietnamese
counterparts that the President supported a second U.S.-ASEAN
summit but said that a late October visit to Hanoi was unlikely.
END SUMMARY.



Push for a POTUS visit, EAS

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2. (C) In separate meetings with EAP DAS Scot Marciel February 5,
Vietnam's Senior Official for ASEAN, AFM Pham Quang Vinh, and the
Vice President of the MFA-affiliated Diplomatic Academy, Dang Dinh
Quy, reiterated Vietnam's invitation for the President to visit
Hanoi at the end of October to participate in ASEAN and ARF-related
meetings. Quy struck a dramatic note, arguing that while the U.S.
"return" in the region was welcome, Vietnam's leaders viewed it as
insufficient to counter China's growing influence and were looking
to Russia to provide countervailing pressure -- a "dangerous trend"
in Quy's mind but one that reflected the "psychology" of several
key Politburo members. As an example of growing Russian influence,
Russia and Vietnam are close to concluding a deal for Russia to
build Vietnam's first commercial nuclear power plant, according to
recent press reports and National Assembly member Vu Xuan Hong.
Only more substantive engagement and perhaps a Presidential visit
would serve to dispel the perception that the United States was not
truly committed to the region, Quy insisted. AFM Vinh was less
alarmist, but he too emphasized that a Presidential visit to Hanoi
would be "extremely important" for ASEAN, reiterating that ASEAN's
foreign ministers had reached a "consensus" that Vietnam should
host the second U.S.-ASEAN Summit in Hanoi. Vinh also noted that
the Chinese and Russian Presidents had already committed to coming
to Vietnam. (Comment: In his current "track one and a half"
position, Quy -- a savvy diplomat known for blunt talk -- is
frequently employed to articulate positions that, while resonant
with GVN policy, are too sensitive for the MFA to own officially.
This was Quy's role as the co-leader of Vietnam's delegation to the
last two U.S.-Vietnam policy planning discussions. Not
coincidentally, a prominent Russian-educated member of Vietnam's
National Assembly Foreign Affairs Committee, Vu Xuan Hong,
delivered a similar message on Russia to DAS Marciel during an
informal lunch hosted by the Ambassador the same day. End
comment.)




3. (C) Quy and Vinh also urged the United States to participate
directly in the East Asia Summit. Quy argued that a U.S. presence
in the EAS would bolster Vietnam's ability to maintain an
independent foreign policy, a guiding principle for Vietnamese
diplomacy that Quy said was jeopardized by China's increasing might
and the resulting impulse to lean to Russia. (Note: MFA DG for the
Americas, Nguyen Ba Hung told DAS Marciel earlier in the day that
PM Dung had endorsed an Indonesia proposal that the United States
play a central role in the EAS. Septel. End note.) AFM Vinh was
again more guarded, saying that while it favored U.S. participation
in EAS, Vietnam would have to consult with other member states.
Vinh declined to characterize China's views but said that there was
a consensus within EAS that the summit should be "inclusive," with

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both Russia and the United States viewed as eventual participants.
Vinh said that with the U.S. decision to sign the Treaty of Amity
and Cooperation, there were no more "technical" obstacles to U.S.
involvement in the EAS. DAS Marciel cautioned that while the
United States was "interested" in the EAS, at this stage it was
still seeking other countries' views, especially on how the EAS
would fit with other pieces of the regional architecture, APEC most
particularly. Vinh sought to be reassuring, arguing that EAS and
APEC were complementary not competing: while APEC's main brief
remained economic security and trade, EAS was a "high-level policy
forum" better suited for "strategic questions."




4. (C) DAS Marciel assured his counterparts that the President
valued the U.S.-ASEAN Summit mechanism and was committed to meeting
again in 2010. A Presidential visit to Hanoi at the end of October
was unrealistic, however, given that the President had committed to
traveling to Seoul and Tokyo to attend the G20 and APEC meetings in
mid November. More likely, DAS Marciel noted, was a New York
summit in connection with UNGA, unless something could be worked
out in Asia in connection with the G20/APEC trip. Both Quy and
Vinh seemed prepared for this response. While reiterating the
"need" for a Presidential-level summit, preferably in Hanoi, the
two said that Vietnam was prepared to be flexible with the timing
(for both the US-ASEAN Leaders' Meeting and the EAS) though Vinh
noted China and Russia also had scheduling concerns. (Vinh also
reminded DAS Marciel that Vietnam wanted to participate in the
G20.) DAS Marciel stressed that as far as the U.S.-ASEAN Summit
was concerned, it was simply a question of scheduling. Alluding to
his more difficult conversation with MPS Vice Minister Nguyen Van
Huong earlier that day (septel),DAS Marciel told AFM Vinh that
Vietnam could, however, do more to make itself a more attractive
site for a bilateral visit.



Visions for ASEAN, China, South China Sea

--------------




5. (C) In each of his meetings, DAS Marciel stressed that the
United States was committed to becoming an even stronger partner
with ASEAN, and that our goal was to help ASEAN ensure member
countries' prosperity, security, and independence. Emphasizing
"independence," DAS Marciel added that the United States had no
designs on ASEAN and believed that no country in the region should
become too dependent on any one power. A key piece of this was
economic, he said, noting that successful economic integration
would facilitate progress on ASEAN's other two pillars
(political/security and social/economic). AFM Vinh concurred,
arguing that Vietnam held a similar vision for ASEAN. Vietnam's
primary focus for its chairmanship would be to support internal
efforts to build an ASEAN Community by 2015, Vinh said, but added
that Vietnam would also look to strengthen ASEAN's external
relations, both through ARF and through the various "ASEAN +"
mechanisms. Vinh cited connectivity as a priority, first within
ASEAN and then with the region as a whole; he also mentioned the
ASEAN single window as a key step toward establishing a single
market by 2015. On ARF, Vinh highlighted discussions on
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief as a particularly
fruitful area of cooperation. While not specifically mentioning
Status of Forces Agreements, Vinh said that he agreed with the U.S.
assessment that it was not enough to respond to a crisis when it
occurs; countries must prepare in advance by ironing out the
procedures for cross-border cooperation, including among member
countries' militaries. Vinh said that member countries agreed that
the ADMM should be expanded, though the precise mechanism remains
undecided. (Note: In a conversation last week, reftel, Vinh's
subordinate, MFA DDG Vu Ho, indicated that there was now informal
agreement on an "ADMM+8" framework. End note.)




6. (C) Both Vinh and Quy took DAS Maricel's message on
"independence" as an opportunity to raise Vietnam's concerns about
China and the South China Sea. Vinh said that at Davos Prime
Minister Nguyen Tan Dung had reiterated Vietnam's position that the
matter should be resolved peacefully and in accord with the 1982 UN
Law of the Sea. Vietnam's approach was pragmatic, Vinh emphasized.

HANOI 00000027 003 OF 003


Vietnam acknowledged that China preferred to handle the issue with
individual claimants on a bilateral basis; although Vietnam did not
share this view, this was not a point that Vietnam argued directly
with China. Vinh also conceded that it was difficult to coordinate
within ASEAN -- not only do some countries not have a stake in the
territorial dispute, there remain significant disagreements among
those ASEAN countries that do have claims. The best approach, Vinh
said, was to put sovereignty claims aside and to make progress on
confidence building measures by building on the Declaration of
Conduct. This too was difficult, though, because, "like it or
not," even the most basic confidence-building measures turned back
to sovereignty issues. Quy was more alarmist, stressing that
Vietnam had "big problems" with China. Along the Tonkin Gulf
meridian line, for example -- an area supposedly not in dispute --
Vietnamese ships engaged in oil exploration faced daily
intimidation, with Chinese fighter jets flying as low as 200 meters
and naval vessels approaching within 500 meters.



Burma

--------------




7. (C) "Burma's generals are hard to love," DAS Marciel told AFM
Vinh, explaining that U.S. flexibility had so far not been
reciprocated. Holding elections in 2010 would not be sufficient,
if the Burmese elections were not also part of a larger process
involving a genuine, inclusive dialogue between the generals and
Aung San Suu Kyi. Absent such a dialogue, it would be difficult to
sustain the current U.S. stance, DAS Marciel stressed, adding that
ASSK was a realist and understood that the generals would not
simply yield power. "We know that," Vinh responded without further
elaboration. Asked if the Burmese had set a date for elections,
AFM Vinh backed away from an earlier report that FM Nyan Win had
mentioned May during January's ASEAN Foreign Ministers retreat in
Danang.




8. (U) This cable was cleared by DAS Marciel.
Palmer