SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) EXPANDED AD HOC WORKING GROUP MEETING,

S E C R E T GENEVA 000087 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/18 TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) EXPANDED AD HOC WORKING GROUP MEETING, FEBRUARY 9, 2010 -- CORRECTED COPY CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-028. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: February 9, 2010 Time: 12:15 P.M. - 1:00 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) The Ad Hoc Working Group met in expanded format (with experts) to discuss the U.S. proposal for definitions of deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers. Dr. Warner laid out the proposed framework, which elicited a series of preliminary questions from Admiral Kuznetsov. Following a back and forth between the sides regarding the application of the framework, the meeting concluded with the Russian side pledging to deliver a fuller response on the matter at the next session of the expanded Ad Hoc Group. As the meeting concluded, Colonel Ilin also expressed interest in discussing the conversion of ICBM launchers to launchers of ground-based missile defense interceptors at a future meeting. End summary. ¶4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Presenting the U.S. Approach on Deployed and Non-Deployed Heavy Bombers; and Some Russian Skepticism. -------------- PRESENTING THE U.S. APPROACH ON DEPLOYED AND NON-DEPLOYED HEAVY BOMBERS -------------- ¶5. (S) Warner, after remarking that Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller and Ambassador Antonov had proposed the meeting be convened, proposed focusing on criteria for distinguishing between deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers. Warner noted the sides had discussed the matter previously, but the substance of the matter had shifted over the past few weeks, based on the agreement reached in Moscow between Admiral Mullen and General Makarov to include deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers under the limit of 800 deployed and non-deployed items. ¶6. (S) Warner continued that, while there were several ways to deal with the issue, the U.S. side believed it had determined the "most useful approach." After first emphasizing the U.S. view that heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments would be excluded from both the deployed and non-deployed categories, Warner explained that, under his proposed framework, heavy bombers in a condition such that they were "readily available for operational use" would be considered deployed, while those heavy bombers "not readily available for operational use" would be deemed non-deployed. Warner elaborated that the non-deployed category would include three different groupings. He then welcomed comments from Ilin. ¶7. (S) Ilin emphasized that the situation had changed since the agreement in Moscow on an 800 limit on deployed and non-deployed items. Of principal import, he stated, was understanding how the United States proposed to count its heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments. Ilin commented that his first impression of the U.S. proposal regarding "available for operations" was that it had a "complicating" effect. He pointed out that, if, before, all heavy bombers were counted against the central limits, the new framework added a temporal dimension in differentiating between deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers. In light of this, he particularly looked forward to the U.S. list of types of non-deployed heavy bombers. He remarked that he admired the clarity of the previous arrangements for counting heavy bombers: deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, test heavy bombers, and heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments. ¶8. (S) Warner responded by laying out the three categories of non-deployed heavy bombers under the U.S. approach. A first category, Warner explained, would be test heavy bombers. The agreed limit of no more than 10 would be retained for test heavy bombers. Warner noted that test heavy bombers are usually based at flight test centers, which for the United States would be Edwards Air Force Base (AFB),California, and for Russia would be Ramenskoye. He pointed out that while test heavy bombers are generally flight-worthy; they are not in a condition to be readily used for operational purposes. ¶9. (S) The second category, Warner continued, would be heavy bombers in extended maintenance or repair. In the United States, he detailed, this would involve B-52s at Tinker AFB, Oklahoma, and B-2s at the production and repair facility at Palmdale, California. Heavy bombers falling within this category would, likewise, not be readily available for operational use. Warner noted that, when the issue had arisen in the previous session of the Ad Hoc Group, General Orlov had stated that Russia used an aviation repair facility at Ryazan for similar purposes. ¶10. (S) The third and final category, Warner explained, would be heavy bombers in storage awaiting elimination at a conversion or elimination (C or E) facility. This category, he noted, would at present only apply to the United States, specifically to the B-52Gs, B-52Hs, and B-1Bs awaiting elimination at the C or E facility at Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona. Warner pointed out that Russian inspectors had visited Davis-Monthan AFB many times and noted that the majority of the heavy bombers there had already begun to be cannibalized for spare parts, and thus were in disrepair and not flyable. ¶11. (S) Warner concluded by stating that this represented a "first cut" at the problem of identifying the various categories of non-deployed heavy bombers. -------------- SOME RUSSIAN SKEPTICISM -------------- ¶12. (S) Kuznetsov queried whether the inclusion of heavy bombers awaiting elimination at Davis-Monthan AFB would still be necessary at the end of the 7-year reduction period, when the 800 limit on deployed and non-deployed would apply. Would all of the bombers in that category be eliminated by then or would some still remain? Warner replied that he believed that most category 3 heavy bombers would be eliminated during the 7-year period, and that the 800 limit on deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments would help push that elimination process forward. He noted that some small number of heavy bombers might remain and some might be added to the elimination queue from the current operational force of U.S. heavy bombers. ¶13. (S) Kuznetsov responded that he thought the three suggested categories should be specifically included in the treaty. In the long run, he asked, would there be individual limits for the second and third categories as there already was for test heavy bombers? Warner answered that the separate limit on test heavy bombers was useful and should be retained as agreed. Regarding other possible limits, Warner argued that additional ceilings were unnecessary because deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers would collectively fall under the 800 limit, which would then permit the sides more freedom to determine composition of their forces under that cap. ¶14. (S) Kuznetsov asked how inspections of non-deployed heavy bombers would be handled with respect to the three categories. Warner replied that under the current arrangements, flight test centers would not be subject to inspections, though test heavy bombers would be encountered but not be subject to inspection should they be visiting an operational base when a Type-1 inspection was held. Heavy bombers would not be subject to inspection when located at repair or production facilities. C or E facilities would be subject to Type-2 inspections, with the specifics for such inspections currently under discussion in the Inspection Protocol Working Group. Warner noted that Davis-Monthan AFB had been subject to inspections under START. ¶15. (S) Kuznetsov asserted that different inspection procedures would apply to the different categories of non-deployed heavy bombers. He pointed out that the sides had previously agreed that a heavy bomber would be considered deployed until it was eliminated or converted. In that light, he asked how the U.S. proposal would work with respect to non-operational heavy bombers at Davis-Monthan AFB. ¶16. (S) Warner clarified that those agreements had been concluded in December, before Admiral Mullen and General Makarov had established the 800 launcher limit. In light of this limit, Warner argued, the sides need to change some of the previously agreed provisions. In particular, he reasoned, the agreed statement on Davis-Monthan AFB might no longer be necessary. ¶17. (S) Kuznetsov commented that such changes would prove a daunting task. He then asked why it was useful to include category ¶3. Warner replied that it simply reflected reality, and that considerations of utility were not foremost. Further, it would, he argued, provide an additional incentive to ensure the elimination of the affected systems. ¶18. (S) Kuznetsov admitted that he had difficulty envisioning how this framework would look on paper. Should the basing/attribution model be employed? While criteria were available for flight test centers and repair facilities, it was hard to perceive criteria for conversion and elimination facilities. ¶19. (S) Mr. Elliott remarked that Kuznetsov had accurately described the right way to implement the framework. He pointed out that the definition of a deployed heavy bomber would encompass heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments based at an air base. In the same fashion, test heavy bombers could be based at flight test centers and be considered non-deployed. Regarding those heavy bombers in storage at Davis-Monthan AFB awaiting elimination, Elliott continued, the large number of aircraft that would not be flyable would be considered non-deployed and would be considered to be based at the Davis-Monthan C or E facility. Heavy bombers visiting Davis-Monthan AFB for conversion from nuclear capable to conventional only status would remain based at their air bases, be subject to notification requirements upon movement and return to their home bases following conversion. Elliott conceded that the least clear aspect was for the heavy bombers located at repair facilities. These, he reasoned, would probably need to remain based at their air bases. A notification could be created to change their status temporarily to non-deployed. They would then return to deployed status when they returned to their home air base. All other contingencies, he stated, would be covered by the existing system. ¶20. (S) Ilin offered that the Russian side would consider the U.S. proposal and return to the discussion at the next expanded Ad Hoc Group meeting. He further stated the Russian side wanted to speak about the issue of the conversion of silo launchers for ICBMs to silo launchers for ground-based missile defense interceptors. Warner agreed and stated the sides should report the results of the meeting to their respective Heads of Delegation. ¶21. (U) Participants: UNITED STATES Dr. Warner Mr. Elliott Amb Ries Mr. Siemon Mr. Trout Mr. Colby (RO) Lt Col Comeau Mr. Dean Dr. Fraley Lt Col Litterini Mr. Taylor Mrs. Zdravecky Ms. Gesse (Int) RUSSIAN Col Ilin Mr. Koshelev Mr. Luchaninov Gen Orlov Gen Poznikhir Col Ryzhkov Gen Venevtsev Adm (Ret) Kuznetsov Ms. Evarovskaya (Interpreter) ¶22. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS