SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP MEETING,

S E C R E T GENEVA 000085 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/18 TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP MEETING, FEBRUARY 8, 2010 -- CORRECTED COPY REF: 10 MOSCOW 000225 (SFO-MOS-007) CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-025. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: February 8, 2010 Time: 3:30 P.M. - 6:00 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) At the Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG) meeting co-chaired by Dr. Warner and Colonel Ilin, the sides discussed the proposed approaches for Type-2 inspections of converted or eliminated strategic offensive arms (SOA). At the heart of the matter was the percentage of eliminated solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs and mobile launchers of ICBMs that would be subject to inspection. The U.S. side proposed that each year 100 percent of such eliminated SOA be subject to selection for inspection via quarterly accumulations or "batches" and the U.S. side would have the right to inspect each conversion or elimination facility, where these batches of eliminated items would be displayed in the open, a maximum of twice each year. The Russian side proposed a twice-yearly accumulation, with each batch containing 25 percent of the annual elimination plan, and both batches being subject to on-site inspection, thus making it possible for Russia to control which 50 percent of SOA eliminated each year would be subject to inspection. In both methods, a total of 50 percent of the eliminated solid fueled ICBMs and SLBMs and mobile launchers of ICBMs would be subject to on-site inspection, with the rest being viewed by national technical means (NTM) while displayed in the open. ¶4. (S) The U.S.-proposed text also contained a broadened formulation that provided Type-2 inspection procedures for inspecting converted heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments into conventional-only heavy bombers, converted SLBM launchers, and eliminated silo ICBM launchers. The Russian side noted that it disagreed with various aspects of these approaches but said it would study the U.S. proposal. End summary. ¶5. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Summary of U.S.-Proposed Changes to Sections V and VII; Main Issue: "Squaring the Circle" on Batched Eliminations; and UIDs Still in Brackets. -------------- -------------- SUMMARY OF U.S.-PROPOSED CHANGES TO SECTIONS V AND VII -------------- -------------- ¶6. (S) Warner gave the Russian side updated versions of the U.S.-proposed joint draft text (JDT) of Sections V and VII of Part Five of the Protocol. These sections included both the Russian and U.S. concepts for monitoring the results of conversion or elimination (CorE) as Type-2 inspections. Warner summarized three issues that arose as the United States developed the draft text. First, the U.S. view included a broadened formulation to include provisions for inspection of the conversion of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, the conversion of SLBM launchers, and the elimination of ICBM silo launchers. The Russian-proposed concept had concentrated mainly on solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs and on mobile launchers of ICBMs. Second, Warner highlighted that previously agreed text had already provided for full Type-2 inspections of the CorE facilities at the facility used to eliminate mobile ICBM launchers and the CorE facility at Votkinsk, where solid-fueled ICBMs are eliminated. Therefore, under both sides' new proposals for Type-2 batched elimination inspections, both the entire facility as depicted on the site diagram, and the batch of eliminated items, would be inspectable. Third, Warner noted that the U.S. side did not accept the Russian proposal to limit the number of inspectors to a maximum of five or the provision to reduce the duration of the CorE inspection to 12 hours. A reduction in the number of inspectors would make the inspection team "tip its hand" concerning the inspection site to be designated when it provided initial notice that an inspection team would be arriving at the point of entry and make sequential inspections, which would typically require a full 10-man inspection team, infeasible. The shorter duration also was not consistent with the agreed concept for Type-2 inspections. ¶7. (S) Ilin responded negatively to Warner's summary. Ilin maintained that disassembled missiles would not be inspectable at the Votkinsk CorE facility during Type-2 inspections. Mr. Smirnov said there would never be disassembled missiles at the Votkinsk CorE facility, but only at the adjacent Votkinsk production facility, which would not be subject to inspection. Ilin stated that for Type-2 inspections at CorE facilities, the only inspection rights would be to confirm the number and type of items that had been eliminated, and to read and record the unique identifiers (UIDs) for these eliminated items. He asserted that the concept of inspecting for first stages of ICBMs or SLBMs at the Votkinsk CorE facility was something new from the U.S. side. Ilin turned to the Inspection Activities Article of the treaty and stated that nothing was written there to allow inspection of missiles awaiting elimination. Warner reiterated that the right to inspect the entire facility had long been agreed. The CorE facilities were included on the list of Type-2 inspectable facilities as locations where non-deployed SOA could be located and inspected and these facilities were included in the database. In the end, Ilin agreed to study the U.S. proposal and to respond at the next meeting of the IPWG after consultations with the delegation and with Moscow. ¶8. (S) Warner reviewed the U.S. version of the JDT for Section V of Part Five of the Protocol. Ilin inquired as to whether the U.S.-proposed text contained any other "original ideas"; Warner said that it did not. Both sides repeated and expanded upon earlier arguments. The United States did not accept Russian-proposed provisions to limit the number of inspectors and reduce the duration for Type-2 CorE inspections. Ilin stated that five inspectors were sufficient to view the burned-out first stage motor cases of ICBMs and SLBMs, and that reading UIDs also was not difficult. Concerning sequential inspections, he reminded Warner that the Russian side had not been keen on them in the first place, and he considered it a concession from the Russian side to agree on inclusion of such procedures. Warner pointed out that transportation within an ICBM base to inspect an eliminated silo could take up to 12 hours by itself if weather conditions were poor, so it would be practical to keep the duration of the CorE inspection at 24 hours and allow for the standard 8-hour extension of the inspection period, by mutual agreement. Warner noted such disagreements over durations of inspections had occurred earlier in the negotiations, but eventually a compromise was found. Ilin said the Russian side would study the U.S. proposals, but noted that the U.S. side had bracketed all of Russia's new proposals for this section. -------------- -------------- MAIN ISSUE: "SQUARING THE CIRCLE" ON BATCHED ELIMINATIONS -------------- -------------- ¶9. (S) Warner stated that the heart of the matter was to try to "square the circle" regarding the sides' differing perceptions of the results of the meeting between CJCS Adm Mullen and CHOD Gen Makarov in Moscow on January 22, with regard to the monitoring of elimination of solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs and mobile ICBM launchers (Reftel). The two sides agreed to accumulate or "batch" eliminated solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs and mobile ICBM launchers for viewing by NTM and for on-site CorE inspections. Warner reviewed the U.S. version of the JDT for Section VII of Part Five of the Protocol, which contained both sides' proposals for batching such eliminated SOA and provisions for openly displaying and inspecting them. The U.S. proposal would require quarterly batching of such eliminated items, with each side having the right to inspect up to two such batches each year. Every year 100 percent of the eliminated missiles and mobile launchers of ICBMs would be subject to inspection. The United States could inspect up to 50 percent of these eliminated missiles and mobile ICBM launchers during up to two inspections at each facility. ¶10. (S) The Russian proposal, in contrast, was to require batched eliminations in a manner so that two batches containing 50 percent of the yearly amount of eliminated missiles and mobile launchers of ICBMs would be made available annually for inspection. Only that 50 percent of the items eliminated in a given year would be subject to on-site inspection and Russia would select which eliminated missiles and mobile launchers of ICBMs fell into this group. The remaining 50 percent of the eliminated items each year would be displayed in the open for viewing by NTM, but would not be subject to on-site inspection. ¶11. (S) Ilin said he believed there might be a more effective approach for elimination inspections based on a 2-year cycle, but he was unable to succinctly describe his new idea. Ilin said he would continue to think through this approach and possibly discuss it at the next IPWG meeting. He explained that he thought it would be easier to batch missiles over a 2-year period and the United States would be able to inspect a larger percentage of the missiles. Warner said he was willing to explore the idea but admitted it was not clear at this point how it would work. ¶12. (S) Ilin noted that with either the U.S. or Russian proposals, there would be little parity in elimination inspection opportunities made available to the Parties, as the United States exploded its SLBM first stages in order to eliminate them and conducted static test firings with its MMIII first stages, neither of which readily provided opportunities to inspect the results of elimination. Ilin inquired about the possibility of inspecting the results of the static test firings; Warner said the U.S. side would examine the possibility. ¶13. (S) Warner and Ilin agreed that provisions for the batched elimination of solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs needed to be described in detail, but for mobile launchers of ICBMs the simple sentence "the same quantitative parameters and procedures shall apply," might be sufficient. Mr. Brown stated that from a legal standpoint, it would be better to use the same structure and full descriptive language to outline the provisions for inspecting the results of elimination of mobile ICBM launchers. Warner agreed the U.S. side would adopt that approach. -------------- UIDS STILL IN BRACKETS -------------- ¶14. (S) Ilin noted some issues with the broadened formulation that the U.S. proposed. In paragraph 9 of Section VII, Ilin noted that the Russian-proposed text allowed for recording of UIDs only on eliminated solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs; the U.S.-proposed text broadened that to allow for recording of UIDs during all Type-2 inspections. Ilin opined that such broadening of the concept undercut the logic behind the Russian approach that justified shortening the duration of the inspection and reducing the number of inspectors. While Ilin agreed conceptually with the right to read UIDs, the methods to apply and read them had not yet been agreed, therefore the Russian side would leave all references to UIDs in brackets. Furthermore, Ilin said he would have to check with Amb Antonov on the results of the Heads of Delegation (HODs) meeting which addressed this issue, as he did not want the IPWG to get ahead of the work of the HODs. ¶15. (S) In closing, Warner emphasized that only three or four major substantive issues remained to be resolved before the treaty could be completed; batched inspections of eliminated solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs and mobile launchers of ICBMs was one of these major issues and the only one within the purview of the IPWG. Ilin noted that other such major differences had been overcome in the past, and said he was confident that this issue, too, could be resolved once the issue of how to treat missile defense issues in the treaty was resolved. Warner noted that matters regarding the treatment of missile defense issues in the treaty were being addressed by the HODs. ¶16. (U) Documents provided: - United States: -- Section V of Part Five of the Protocol, U.S.-Proposed JDT, dated February 5, 2010; and -- Section VII of Part Five of the Protocol, U.S.-Proposed JDT, dated February 5, 2010. ¶17. (U) Participants: UNITED STATES Dr. Warner Mr. Albertson Mr. Ahlm Mr. Brown Mr. Buttrick MAJ Johnson LTC Leyde (RO) LTC Litterini Mr. McConnell Ms. Pura Ms. Purcell Mr. Rust LT Sicks Mr. Smith Ms. Gesse (Int) RUSSIA Col Ilin Col Petrov Mr. G. Shevchenko Mr. Smirnov Ms. Vodolopova Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) ¶18. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS