Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10GENEVA83
2010-02-18 16:25:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) EXPANDED AD HOC WORKING GROUP MEETING,

Tags:  PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US 
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FM USMISSION GENEVA
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S E C R E T GENEVA 000083 

SIPDIS
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/18
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) EXPANDED AD HOC WORKING GROUP MEETING,
FEBRUARY 5, 2010 -- CORRECTED COPY

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)

S E C R E T GENEVA 000083

SIPDIS
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/18
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) EXPANDED AD HOC WORKING GROUP MEETING,
FEBRUARY 5, 2010 -- CORRECTED COPY

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-020.




2. (U) Meeting Date: February 5, 2010

Time: 12:00 P.M. - 12:40 P.M.

Place: Russian Mission, Geneva



--------------

SUMMARY

--------------




3. (S) The Ad Hoc Working Group met in expanded format (with
experts) to discuss new U.S. proposals for the "third limit" on
deployed and non-deployed launchers and heavy bombers that had been
agreed in Moscow, and for the release of data received from the
initial data exchange following treaty signature and subsequent
exchanges during implementation of the treaty. The Russian side
asked a few questions and agreed to respond to both proposals in
the near future.




4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Capturing the Third Limit; What to
Release to the Public and When; and What to Release Versus What to
Exchange.



--------------

CAPTURING THE THIRD LIMIT

--------------




5. (S) Ambassador Ries began the meeting of the Expanded Ad Hoc
Group by turning the sides' attention to an item of unfinished
business from the January meetings in Moscow between U.S. Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mullen and Chief of the
Russian General Staff General Makarov. At that meeting, the two
had agreed on a third limit in the treaty on deployed and
non-deployed launchers and bombers. All that remained, Ries
stated, was to capture their agreement in writing for placement in
Article IV of the treaty. Ries provided a U.S. working paper with
proposed wording for the limit.



Begin text:



Article IV, paragraph 3: Each party shall limit deployed and
non-deployed launchers of ICBMs, deployed and non-deployed


launchers of SLBMs and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers
equipped for nuclear armaments so that seven years after entry into
force of this Treaty and thereafter, the aggregate number does not
exceed 800.



End text.




6. (S) Admiral Kuznetsov observed that the new text contained a
term for which there was no definition: "non-deployed heavy bomber
equipped for nuclear armaments." He asked what the U.S. delegation

had in mind for the meaning of the term. Mr. Elliott responded
that the definition for "deployed heavy bomber" included the
concept of "equipped for nuclear armaments," and therefore the
definition of non-deployed should as well. The U.S. side agreed
that the definition would need to be worked out. Elliott continued
that the definition certainly would include test heavy bombers, but
he noted that the Russian delegation had earlier suggested that
heavy bombers in long-term storage or long-term maintenance might
also be included. In response to an inquiry from Kuznetsov,
Elliott and Ries indicated that the meaning of the term would be
discussed in the Definitions Working Group, possibly as early as
the following week.



--------------

WHAT TO RELEASE TO THE PUBLIC AND WHEN

--------------




7. (S) Turning to the subject of release of data received from the
implementation of the treaty, Ries reviewed the U.S. position which
included three elements. First, everything from the initial
exchange of data 45 days after treaty signature, except certain
sensitive data, would be released to the public. Second, data
obtained during the implementation of the treaty would be released
only if the Parties agreed; the United States proposed adding a
clarification that each Party could release its own data without
seeking agreement. Third, the aggregate data that corresponded to
the central limits could also be released to the public; the United
States believed this should include the third limit, from Article
IV, that had been agreed in Moscow.




8. (S) Ries provided a U.S. working paper for paragraphs in
Article VIII dealing with data release, noting that the text was
actually quite close to the last Russian proposal received earlier
in the week. Poznikhir asked what the U.S. delegation meant by
"released to the public." Ries explained that the phrase meant the
data would be made available to the public. Data and information
were either protected or not. If the data were released, it would
be because a decision had been made that it should not be
classified or protected. There would be an exception for certain
sensitive information such as geographic coordinates or site
diagrams, which would not be released.


--------------

WHAT TO RELEASE VERSUS WHAT TO EXCHANGE

--------------




9. (S) Poznikhir noted that the U.S. proposal seemed to align with
the Russian position that the initial release would only include
the data in Section II of Part Two of the Protocol. But, he asked,
was there agreement in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
Working Group on what would be in the initial exchange? Would the
third limit be included? Ries agreed this was a crucial point:
the sides needed to understand what would be exchanged initially to
reach agreement on what would be released from that first data
exchange. She stated that the sides had discussed the content of
the initial exchange during the previous round of talks in both the
MOU Working Group and between Heads of Delegation. The U.S.
delegation understood that the sides had agreed to base the initial
database information on the July 2009 START exchange of data.




10. (S) Mr. Trout explained one way to include the newly agreed
third limit on deployed and non-deployed items into the initial
data exchange. He said that paragraph 1 of Section II of the
database could list the limits set forth in Article II and the
third limit from Article IV could be listed in paragraph 2 of
Section II of the database. Poznikhir countered that the data for
all three limits could be included in paragraph 1 of the Section.
Trout indicated that was also possible.




11. (S) Gen Venevtsev asked whether the U.S. proposal would allow
either side to release data after the expiration of the treaty.
Ries and Trout said it would. Poznikhir asked for clarification as
to whether each side would have the right to release its own data
without the agreement of the other side. Ries replied, "Yes."
Poznikhir ended the discussion by saying that the U.S. proposal
appeared logical, that the U.S. side seemed to have taken the
Russian views into account, and that the text was generally
acceptable. He confirmed the Russian delegation would consider the
U.S. language and respond soon.




12. (S) Ries noted in closing that the MOU Working Group would be
meeting later that day, with the Heads of Delegation in attendance,
and she hoped they would clarify the contents of the initial
exchange. Orlov and Trout both added that, while it was clear what
data would be subject to initial release, it was not clear what
would be initially exchanged (that is, any additional information
to be exchanged that would not be subject to release).




13. (U) Documents provided:


- United States:



-- U.S. Working Paper, Article IV, paragraph 3, dated February 5,
2010, in English and unofficial Russian; and



-- U.S. Working Paper, Article VIII, paragraphs 5 through 8, dated
February 5, 2010, in English and unofficial Russian.




14. (U) Participants:



UNITED STATES



Amb Ries

Mr. Elliott

Mr. Trout

Lt Col Comeau

Mr. Dean

Dr. Fraley

LTC Litterini

LT Lobner

Mr. Taylor

Mrs. Zdravecky (RO)

Ms. Gesse (Int)



RUSSIA



Gen Poznikhir

Col Ilin

Mr. Koshelev

Mr. Luchaninov

Gen Orlov

Col Ryzhkov

Gen Venevtsev


Adm (Ret) Kuznetsov

Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)




15. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS

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