SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) TELEMETRY WORKING GROUP MEETING, FEBRUARY

S E C R E T GENEVA 000081 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/18 TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) TELEMETRY WORKING GROUP MEETING, FEBRUARY 4, 2010 -- CORRECTED COPY CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-017. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: February 4, 2010 Time: 3:30 P.M. - 5:10 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) At the Telemetry Working Group meeting co-chaired by Mr. Siemon and General Poznikhir, the Russian side gave an opening statement on the U.S.-Russian agreement on the relationship between missile defense and strategic offensive arms (SOA) as it related to Russia's compromise on telemetry and the use of unique identifiers (UIDs). Poznikhir stated that the United States had backed away from its previous position on other issues as well. After the statement the U.S. side asked questions to clarify the Russian position on the most contentious points of its proposal, entitled Basic Approaches of the Russian Side to the Exchange of Telemetric Information, dated February 2. These points included: the launching side determination of telemetry files for exchange; the concept of parity; the elimination of self-contained dispensing mechanism (SCDM) telemetry; the delay in implementation of telemetry exchange; and the suspension of the exchange in the event of a disagreement. The most enlightening clarification was in response to questions about suspending the exchange in the case of disagreement. The Russian side asserted that if it had concerns about the development of a U.S. missile defense system or the use of telemetric data to support missile defense system development, then Russia would be forced to suspend the exchange of telemetric data. The other Russian verbal responses confirmed what was in Russia's written proposal: parity would not be determined by type of flight test, either ICBM or SLBM; the initial exchange of telemetric information would occur after a complete calendar year had expired; choice of which flight tests to be exchanged would be determined solely by the conducting Party; and a Party could not request the exchange of telemetric data for a specific flight test of the other Party. End summary. ¶4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Poznikhir Opening Statement; Siemon Responds to Statement; U.S. Questions on Russian Approach to Telemetry; Flight Test Versus Launch; What Parity Means. -------------- POZNIKHIR OPENING STATEMENT -------------- ¶5. (S) Poznikhir began the meeting with a strong statement on what he described as "the U.S.-Russian agreement on strategic offensive forces and missile defense" as it related to the Russian position on telemetry and the use of UIDs. Poznikhir emphasized that the agreement by the Russian side to include provisions for the exchange of telemetry was only possible if the United States honored its agreement to include provisions in the treaty text on the relationship between strategic offensive forces and missile defense. Acceptance by the Russian side of the use of UIDs was also only possible if the United States honored its commitment to delete specific treaty provisions for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs. The Russian side believed that the United States was now moving away from the agreements reached during the meetings between Admiral Mullen-General Makarov in January in Moscow on the interrelationship between missile defense and SOA and on the requirement to delete treaty provisions that were specific only to ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs. If the United States did not honor its commitments in these two areas, the Russian side would be forced to move away from the inclusion of telemetry and UIDs in the treaty. ¶6. (S) The Russian side noted that it expected to receive a proposal from the U.S. side on Saturday, February 6, updating its position on the relationship between missile defense and SOA. After a review of this proposal the Russian side would determine either that it was ready to move forward or whether it would step back as Russia believed the United States had done. The Russian side emphasized that it would not accept any one-sided provisions or obligations within the new treaty. -------------- SIEMON RESPONDS TO STATEMENT -------------- ¶7. (S) Siemon noted that the relationship between missile defense and SOA was important to discuss, but not within the Telemetry Working Group. It was natural for each side to review its positions and sometimes view the other side as walking back. Each side had ideas on what it had given up. He believed that no one from the U.S. side who had attended the recent Mullen-Makarov Moscow meetings came away with this understanding of the Russian position on either the relationship between telemetry and missile defense or the relationship between UIDs and mobile ICBMs. Siemon commented that there had been no mention of missile defense concerns during the portions of the Mullen-Makarov meetings when he was in the main conference room. Ending the discussion on Poznikhir's statement, Siemon noted that neither side should enter into an agreement if it believed it was placed at a disadvantage. -------------- U.S. QUESTIONS ON RUSSIAN APPROACH TO TELEMETRY -------------- ¶8. (S) After this preliminary discussion, Siemon asked questions related to the Russian proposal on Basic Approaches of the Russian Side to the Exchange of Telemetric Information, dated February 2, ¶2010. Begin text. Proposal by the Russian Federation 2 February 2010 Basic approaches of the Russian side to the exchange of telemetric information ¶1. Parties shall exchange telemetric information, on a parity basis, on no more than five ICBM and SLBM launches per year. The exchange of telemetric information shall be carried out for an equal number of ICBM and SLBM launches conducted by the Parties, and in an agreed amount. ¶2. The launches, for which telemetric information will be provided, shall be determined by the conducting Party. ¶3. As part of the annual exchange of telemetric information, the Parties shall provide the recording media and interpretive data of the telemetric information provided. The recording media should contain the recording of all telemetric information, broadcast during the launch, until the upper stage propulsion unit of the ICBM and SLBM ceases to function. Telemetric information relating to the functionality of the self-contained dispensing mechanism, and produced within the re-entry vehicle and broadcast from it, shall not be exchanged. ¶4. Parties shall not broadcast telemetric information related to the functioning of ICBM and SLBM stages from a re-entry vehicle. ¶5. Each Party shall carry out an initial demonstration of the recording media and playback equipment to be used, and shall provide to the other Party all associated equipment. ¶6. The Party conducting the launch of ICBMs or SLBMs shall independently determine the method for recording telemetric information on the recording media. In connection with this, it shall provide to the other Party the method to playback the telemetric information from the recording media, enabling conversion of the telemetric information contained on the recording media to the format produced on board the missile before it is broadcast. Types of modulation, methods, modes and formats of recording, as well as methods of telemetric information encryption on recording media used by the Parties shall not impede the processing of the telemetric information provided by the other Party. ¶7. Considering that the new agreement does not contain limitations which could be verified with the help of telemetric information, the names of parameters, necessary for determining acceleration and separation times of ICBM and SLBM stages, as well as the times of reentry vehicle separation commands and their location in the telemetry frame shall not be specified in the annual data exchange on ICBM and SLBM launches. ¶8. During ICBM and SLBM launches, the telemetric information of which will not be exchanged, each Party shall have the right to use any method to prevent access to all data as well as to any part of the telemetric information that originates on board the missile and is broadcast or encapsulated. ¶9. The exchange of telemetric information shall be carried out within the first 65 days after the beginning of the calendar year for launches that were conducted in the previous year. ¶10. The provisions on the exchange of telemetric information shall take effect on the first calendar day of the year following the year in which the Treaty entered into force. ¶11. On an annual basis, the Parties shall review the conditions and procedures for future exchange of telemetric information on ICBM and SLBM launches within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission. In the event that one of the Parties raises a question as to the need for changing the amount and volume of the telemetric information provided, the exchange of telemetric information shall be suspended until an agreement on this change can be reached. ¶12. The basic provisions that govern the conditions and method for the exchange of telemetric information shall be set forth within the Protocol to the Treaty. Additional details of telemetric information exchange shall be specified in the Annex on procedures for the exchange of telemetric information. End text. ¶9. (S) Siemon asked what the status was of the three telemetry paragraphs for the Protocol that the sides had agreed on at the last meeting in Moscow. Poznikhir believed the paragraphs in the Protocol needed to be broader. He believed the sides together should decide what belonged in the Protocol and what should be put into the Tier III Annex. In START, the main ideas were placed in the Protocols and the details were placed in the Annexes. He believed the sides should follow this example; however, the Russian side was waiting for the U.S. position on this question. Siemon used START's treatment of the initial demonstration of playback equipment as an example of the U.S. position. The START Telemetry Protocol included the broader concept of the demonstration and the Annexes included the many details. ¶10. (S) Siemon stated the U.S. side would take the agreed language of the three paragraphs and work it into a draft Protocol. The sides could use this draft to determine what should be included in the Protocol and what could be placed into the Tier III Annex. A decision could also be made about which provisions would be recorded in the annex and which would be better resolved through discussion within the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC). ¶11. (S) While on the subject of the initial demonstration of playback equipment, Siemon asked whether it was sufficient to provide information for purchase of commercially-available equipment after carrying out the initial demonstration. Poznikhir replied that a Party should have the ability to procure both the equipment used in START and newly demonstrated equipment. He did not clarify who would be responsible for the purchase. When asked whether it was necessary to conduct demonstrations if the equipment purchased during START was still functioning, Col Ryzhkov indicated that he believed that demonstrations would still be necessary. -------------- FLIGHT TEST VERSUS LAUNCH -------------- ¶12. (S) In reference to the text in the Russian proposal on telemetry language, Siemon asked why the Russian side had changed the agreed language to use the term "launch" versus the term "flight test." Ryzhkov replied that under START the Parties had exchanged telemetry on both test launches and space launches that incorporated a first stage of an accountable item. However, the example that the Russian delegation preferred to follow was the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Soviet Socialist Republics on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles, dated May 31, 1988. This agreement used the term "launch" which was considered broader language and covered all types of launches. Poznikhir noted that with the expiration of START, the 1988 agreement was the only existing agreement outlining launch notification obligations--it had no expiration date and it unambiguously described information related to launches. ¶13. (S) Siemon stated that most launches in START were test launches that used ICBMs or SLBMs that were accountable under the treaty. There also were space launches to place objects into the upper atmosphere or space and these typically used the first stage of accountable ICBMs and SLBMs. These two types of launches were the only test launches that were subject to the START Treaty. Siemon indicated that there were other launches that used accountable first stages that were not test launches--for example, the launch to destruct 40 SS-N-20 SLBMs in the late 1990s. These launches were exempted from the exchange of telemetry since they did not have telemetry packages. Siemon asked whether the Russian side believed this type of launch would also be exempt from telemetry exchange under the new treaty. Poznikhir responded that he believed this would be the case, but added they could add telemetry packages if the U.S. side thought they should. Siemon responded that the United States would prefer that Russia not add a telemetry package and that launches to destruct be excluded from the telemetry exchange. -------------- WHAT PARITY MEANS -------------- ¶14. (S) In reference to the exchange of telemetry, Siemon asked whether "on a parity basis" meant a "one-for-one exchange" for each ICBM and SLBM flight. Poznikhir indicated that parity was based on quantity: an equal number of launches shared; no more than five. Parity would not be determined by type of flight test, either ICBM or SLBM. The Party that conducted the flight test would determine on which test flights telemetric information would be exchanged. The group collectively then went through several hypothetical, numeric examples to describe parity. The Russian side believed neither side should be forced to conduct a flight test if its numbers were disparate. He indicated the receiving Party would have no part in this selection. Poznikhir said this language was a clear and purposeful Russian choice. Following this line of questioning, Siemon asked when a flight test of a prototype was conducted could the receiving Party request that the telemetry from this specific flight test be part of the exchange. Poznikhir responded negatively; the conducting Party solely selected the launches to be exchanged. Ms. Pura asked whether discussions would be conducted throughout a year to determine on which flight tests telemetry would be exchanged. Poznikhir responded that as the Russian text proposed, the exchange of telemetric information would be carried out within the first 65 days after the beginning of the calendar year for launches that were conducted in the previous year. No other discussions were necessary. After being questioned, Poznikhir also indicated that telemetry would be exchanged through Diplomatic Channels. The details of implementing the exchange could be located in the Annex. ¶15. (S) Siemon stated the U.S. side needed to clearly understand the entire process of the selection and exchange of telemetric information prior to the treaty and protocol being sent for signature. This was especially important since the annex would be part of the ratification package. ¶16. (S) Siemon asked about the Russian-proposed provision for the exchange of telemetric information to take effect on the first calendar year following the year when the treaty entered into force. When would the first exchange occur if the treaty entered into force in 2010? Poznikhir responded that the first exchange would be in January 2012. Siemon replied that basing the exchange on the calendar year would result in a time period where the implementation of a treaty requirement would be denied. This would mean that for the START Follow-on Treaty, which was to have a duration of 10 years, there would only be 9 years of implementation. For past treaties, the concept of a treaty year had been used rather than a calendar year chosen by one of the Parties. Poznikhir stated he would take this issue back to his lawyers for discussion. ¶17. (S) Referencing the text on the annual review for further exchange of telemetric information to be held within the framework of the BCC, Siemon stated he was confused by the Russian use of the word "suspended." He understood that after the last Mullen-Makarov meeting that Parties would meet annually to agree on the exchange of telemetric information and if agreement did not occur, the Parties would continue the existing practice. He had expected to see the word "continued" and was surprised to see "suspended" in the Russian-proposed text. Was the Russian use of "suspended" a mistake? Poznikhir replied to this well-developed question with a very short answer: "No, there was no mistake in the Russian proposal." If telemetry was being used to enhance missile defense, this raised a question with regard to Russian national security. ¶18. (S) During this discussion of annual reviews of the proposed exchange of telemetric data, General Venevtsev reiterated that if Russia had concerns about the development of a U.S. missile defense system or the use of telemetric data to support missile defense system development, then Russia would be forced to suspend the exchange of telemetric data. ¶19. (U) Documents provided: None. ¶20. (U) Participants: UNITED STATES Mr. Siemon Mr. Ahlm Mr. Dean Mr. Hanchett (RO) Mr. LaPointe Ms. Pura Ms. Smith (Int) RUSSIA Gen Poznikhir Mr. Luchaninov Mr. Malyugin Col Pischulov Col Ryzhkov Gen Venevtsev Col Voloskov Ms. Komshilova (Int) ¶21. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS