Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10GENEVA75
2010-02-18 15:59:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) DEFINITIONS SUBGROUP MEETING, FEBRUARY 3,

Tags:  PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGV #0075/01 0491604
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O R 181559Z FEB 10
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0164
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0079
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV 0078
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0082
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0078
S E C R E T GENEVA 000075 

SIPDIS
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/18
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) DEFINITIONS SUBGROUP MEETING, FEBRUARY 3,
2010 -- CORRECTED COPY

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)

S E C R E T GENEVA 000075 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/18 TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) DEFINITIONS SUBGROUP MEETING, FEBRUARY 3, 2010 -- CORRECTED COPY CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-014. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: February 3, 2010 Time: 3:30 P.M. - 6:00 P.M. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) At a meeting of the Definitions Subgroup co-chaired by Mr. Siemon and Adm (Ret) Kuznetsov, the sides took stock of the remaining definitions requiring agreement and any new terms requiring definitions. The sides discussed the following definitions: basing area, ICBM base; warhead; launcher of missile defense interceptors; missile defense interceptor; ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs; relocation; transit; new type; and nuclear armaments for heavy bombers. The Russian side provided Russian-proposed definitions for period of inspection activities, missile defense interceptor, and sequential inspection. End summary. ¶4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Definitions Discussed. -------------- DEFINITIONS DISCUSSED -------------- ¶5. (S) Adm (Ret) Kuznetsov stated he believed the major issues still to be resolved after the Mullen-Makarov meeting in Moscow and the latest telephone call between the Presidents were related to missile defense and verification of mobile launchers of ICBMs. Mr. Siemon added the definition of non-deployed heavy bombers, telemetry, and ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs to this list. Kuznetsov provided Russian-proposed text for the terms "sequential inspection" and "period of inspection activities" that he hoped could be discussed at the next meeting. Begin text. The term "sequential inspection" means an inspection, conducted at facilities associated with the same point of entry, by an inspection team which has not departed the territory of the inspected Party following completion of the previo
us inspection. The term "period of inspection activities" means the period of time from the completion of pre-inspection procedures until the commencement of post-inspection procedures. End text. ¶6. (S) Regarding the term "ICBM base," Kuznetsov stated that the Russian side would not accept specific restrictions for mobile launchers of ICBMs. As such, it could not accept the size restriction of 125,000 sq km in the definition of an "ICBM base" or the 5 sq km size restriction in the definition of a "basing area." Siemon understood that the sides had come out of the latest round of discussions in Moscow with the understanding that these size restrictions would be included in both definitions as part of the agreement to delete Article VI from the treaty; the other parts of this agreement included unique identifiers and the notification of the exit of a solid-fuel ICBM or SLBM from a production facility. Kuznetsov commented that he was unaware of the agreement and as such the definition of an ICBM base would remain as currently bracketed. For the same reason the definition of "basing area" would also remain bracketed. ¶7. (S) Kuznetsov stated that the Russian side's definition of "warhead" provided on December 17, 2009, was based on the limits and counting rules outlined in Articles II and III. Siemon said he would study the Russian definition and be prepared to discuss it at the next meeting. Begin text. The term "warhead" means a unit of account used for counting toward the aggregate limit: a) For a deployed ICBM or a deployed SLBM, each warhead emplaced on such an ICBM or SLBM; b) For each deployed heavy bomber, one unit of nuclear armaments for such a heavy bomber. End text. ¶8. (S) Since the sides had agreed on an attribution rule for counting heavy bomber warheads and the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Working Group had subsequently removed the technical data for long-range ALCMs from the database, the sides agreed to delete paragraph (b) from the definition of "variant" because it dealt with long-range nuclear ALCMS. This definition as it presently reads is as follows. Begin text. The term "variant" means: (a) for heavy bombers, a classification, declared by the inspected Party, of airplanes of one type and one category that are distinguishable from other airplanes of the same type and the same category; [and]1 (b) for ICBMs and SLBMs, a classification, declared by the inspected Party, of ICBMs or SLBMs for the same type that are distinguishable from other ICBMs or SLBMs of the same type. [An ICBM or SLBM of a type, a dimension of which differs from that of another ICBM or SLBM of the same type by more than three percent, but by less than the appropriate new type criteria, shall be considered to be a variant. In addition, a Party may declare an ICBM or SLBM to be a variant if its dimensions differ by less than three percent from those of another ICBM or SLBM of the same type.]1 End text. ¶9. (S) As the definition of "variant" was related to the "new type" definition, Kuznetsov stated he believed photographs of the external design differences would be more useful to inspectors than utilizing measurements and the three percent rule. Inspectors could quickly conduct the inspection and be off the inspection site. Mrs. Zdravecky contended that size, just as differences in external design, was an external difference that could be used to distinguish a variant. Mr. Taylor added that definitive measurements left no room for misunderstanding. Mr. Connell pointed out that during inspections of exiting ICBMs at the continuous monitoring site at Votkinsk, the external appearance of canisters had changed since the MOU photos were first generated. He said the Russian approach to deal with this had been to have U.S. monitors rely on length and diameter measurements instead. This was in contradiction to Kuznetsov's stated position that inspectors should rely on the MOU photo for determining the type. Kuznetsov stated he would discuss the three percent rule with the inspectors on his delegation. ¶10. (S) Kuznetsov remarked that since the Russian side did not differentiate ICBMs as a type for silo launchers or a type for mobile launchers of ICBMs, there was no need for the definition of "ICBM for mobile launcher of ICBMs." Siemon stated that since the phrase only appeared once in the treaty within a draft U.S.-proposed notification that had not been accepted, he believed that the definition could be deleted and would confirm this with the U.S. delegation. ¶11. (S) In relation to the term "new type," Siemon reiterated the U.S. proposal that if the Russian side would accept the U.S. proposals for 10 percent in length and 5 percent in diameter within this definition, the U.S. side would agree to delete its proposed text in sub-paragraphs c(i) and (ii). Kuznetsov could not agree to this proposal, so the definition was not accepted. ¶12. (S) Siemon noted that the definition of "relocation" appeared in Part Four of the Protocol of the treaty and in Article VI. For this reason, the term required a definition. However, if Article VI was removed from the treaty, this definition could be deleted. Kuznetsov remarked that the definition of both "relocation" and "transit" referred to one-sided restrictions against the Russian side and as such should be deleted. Both definitions remained unchanged. ¶13. (S) Kuznetsov then provided a revision to the Russian-proposed definition for a missile defense interceptor. Siemon stated that since the issue of missile defense was being handled by the Heads of Delegation (HOD),he would refrain from any comment on the definitions of "missile defense interceptor" and "launcher of missile defense interceptor" that was provided by the Russian side during the last session. The new Russian definition of "missile defense interceptor" provided was as follows. Begin text. The term "missile defense interceptor" means a missile which was developed, tested and deployed in order to intercept ICBMs, SLBMs and their reentry vehicles. End text. ¶14. (S) Siemon also recommended that both the terms "ICBM base" and "basing area" be given to the HODs for discussion since both dealt with mobile launchers of ICBMs. The definition of "basing area" remained unchanged. ¶15. (S) After Kuznetsov introduced the term "nuclear armaments for heavy bombers," Siemon stated the he had a proposed definition for the term that he hoped to provide at the next subgroup meeting and recommended the sides postpone discussion until then. Kuznetsov agreed. The sides also agreed to defer discussion on the terms "encryption," "flight test," and "telemetry" until the HODs had resolved the issue of telemetry. ¶16. (U) Documents provided: - Russia: -- Russian Federation proposal on language for the term "period of inspection activities," dated February 3, 2010. -- Russian Federation proposal on language for the term "sequential inspection," dated February 3, 2010. -- Russian Federation proposal on new language for the term "missile defense interceptor," dated February 3, 2010. ¶17. (U) Participants: UNITED STATES Mr. Siemon Mr. Connell Lt Col Comeau Mr. Dean Dr. Dreicer Mr. Dwyer Mr. Hanchett (RO) Mr. Taylor Ms. Smith (Int) RUSSIA Adm (Ret) Kuznetsov Ms. Fuzhenkova Mr. Luchaninov Ms. Komshilova (Int) ¶18. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS

Share this cable

 facebook -  bluesky -