SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) TELEMETRY MEETING, FEBRUARY 1, 2010 --

S E C R E T GENEVA 000063 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/18 TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) TELEMETRY MEETING, FEBRUARY 1, 2010 -- CORRECTED COPY CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-006. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: February 1, 2010 Time: 3:30 P.M. to 5:00 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) This was the first meeting to discuss telemetry provisions for the START Follow-on Treaty (SFO) during the eighth negotiating session. The U.S. side reviewed the purposes for exchange of telemetric data in SFO at the request of the Russian side and answered a number of questions from the Russian delegation. The Russian side walked through its latest view of the way the exchange would be structured and implemented, and committed to provide this view in written form to the U.S. delegation. End summary. ¶4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Let Me Get This Right; Let Us Tell You What You Said; and The Russian View Today. -------------- LET ME GET THIS RIGHT -------------- ¶5. (S) Mr. Siemon welcomed General Poznikhir and explained that following the meetings in Moscow on January 22-23, 2010, the U.S. delegation had taken some time to think through what it considered to be right and wrong about the approach to telemetry for SFO. There had been many proposals considered and advanced. What the U.S. delegation now wanted to do was more fully understand the Russian position, then write a latest version of a proposal for telemetry language for the protocol and annex. ¶6. (S) Poznikhir remarked that the discussions of telemetry for SFO were not starting from zero. There was now a separate team addressing the issues; Admiral Mullen and General Makarov had had substantive discussions advancing the concepts, and the U.S. and Russian Presidents supported the approach taken. The job of the delegations was to identify the details of the approach and put �0A;them into the telemetry protocol. The Russian delegation believed they had replied to the U.S. questions about their views of telemetry and now wanted to better understand the U.S. approach as described in the proposal provided by the United States on January 23, 2010. (Begin comment: The document Poznikhir was referring to was a U.S. summary of a January 22, 2010, small group meeting on telemetry in Moscow that the Russians had seen. End comment.) He suggested that the Russian delegation first ask questions about that proposal, then have the United States describe their proposal, and then have the Russians describe their concerns. ¶7. (S) Poznikhir stated the original Russian position had been that the exchange of telemetric data was not necessary for this treaty but the Russian delegation had moved toward the U.S. position at our request. His first question to Siemon was a request to understand the reason the United States wanted the exchange. Which limits of the treaty required it and which parameters would be verified by the exchange of telemetric data? ¶8. (S) Siemon stated that during START, telemetry had been required to make the verification process work for the treaty's counting rules. Data on launch-weight, throw-weight, and the number of procedures for dispensing of reentry vehicles all required telemetry data to verify compliance with the provisions of the treaty. SFO was different - telemetry was not required for verification. However, the exchange of telemetry data was the accepted practice throughout the entire 15-year duration of the START Treaty. The United States believed that since the attributed number of warheads on the two sides' ICBMs and SLBMs would be 70 percent lower than during START, the sides would continue to want to exchange telemetry as a transparency measure. The Senators who would be providing advice and consent expected both sides to be transparent about the development of ICBMs and SLBMs. Over the life of the SFO, both sides would deploy new and modified systems - Russia would deploy new systems before the United States but over the 10-year period of the treaty, the United States would likely also deploy new or modified systems. A telemetry exchange would be a mark of the new relationship between the United States and Russia with respect to strategic offensive arms. The United States tried in its proposals to create an opportunity for both sides to encrypt a number of flight tests to protect sensitive information. The U.S. side had no intention of encrypting every test but the original proposal allowed encryption on up to seven tests. The United States may at some point elect to encrypt on one or two flight tests each year. With the Russian practice of performing about ten flight tests each year, the proposed number of seven would provide a significant exemption. The Russian delegation appeared surprised the United States wanted to continue the exchange of telemetric data while the U.S. delegation was surprised that the Russian Federation did not want to continue the exchange. ¶9. (S) Poznikhir stated that Russia now agreed with the basic approach to telemetry exchange but did not believe that it should include the same amount of information as under START. Under START, the parameters of acceleration and time of separation were important to verify treaty limits. The requirements would be different now justifying a change in the approach. ¶10. (S) Poznikhir's second question concerned test launchers. In the Moscow meetings, the United States spoke of exchanging data on flights associated with launches of SLBMs and ICBMs while now the United States also referred to test launches. Poznikhir asked whether this was a mistake or whether something else was meant by this reference. Siemon replied there was no difference from START in what would be exchanged - it was telemetric information on flight tests of ICBMs and SLBMs, and, flight tests of prototype ICBMs and SLBMs. The provisions would not apply to space launch activities because the treaty was about strategic offensive arms and not space activities. Poznikhir replied that any launch from a submarine or ICBM launcher was considered an SLBM or ICBM flight and that the draft treaty language he had seen would consider an ICBM used to launch an item into space to be a missile covered by the treaty. -------------- LET US TELL YOU WHAT YOU SAID -------------- ¶11. (S) Poznikhir's next question concerned the provision for exchange of data on no more than five SLBM and ICBM launches. His understanding had been that the exchange would be for five launches, no more and no less. He asked whether this was to be a mandatory requirement. After some discussion of the source of the text Poznikhir was referring to, it was determined the text was a January 23, 2010, U.S. summary of the January 22, 2010, small group meeting in Moscow, which Poznikhir referred to as the U.S. proposal. He pointed to a particular paragraph in the summary that referred to a schedule of projected launches within the first 65 days of each calendar year. Ryzhkov asked how the proposed approach would handle the issue of parity if one side conducted five launches while the other party had conducted only three launches. On what basis would the Parties exchange data? Siemon replied that it was the same question he had for the Russian delegation. The parity concept made it appear as if the exchange would only occur for three flight tests. It also seemed as if the Russian delegation had used the term parity in different ways - for total numbers of flight tests on each side, for subtotals of ICBM and SLBM flight tests, and for the categories and type of telemetric data to be exchanged. Poznikhir replied parity could also refer to quality of information and on which launches data would be exchanged. ¶12. (S) Siemon stated that it was necessary to clarify on which test launches exchanges would be made, the number of flight tests involved, and how data would be exchanged. The United States typically conducted about 5 flight tests each year while Russia conducted 10 to 12 flight tests. If we exchanged flight schedules at the beginning of each year, would we flip a coin at the beginning of each year to determine on which ones we exchange data? Ryzhkov asked what was meant by the flight test schedule to which Siemon had referred. When Siemon said he understood that there would be an exchange of flight schedules within the first 65 days of each new year, Poznikhir replied that while the United States might have such a schedule, Russia did not. He further stated that the Russian industry did not work in such a way that it would produce an annual schedule. Instead, he viewed the exchange taking place in the first 65 days of each year to be a meeting for the exchange of telemetry that the testing side had selected from the previous year for exchange. Siemon responded that neither he nor the other U.S. participant in the Moscow small group meeting had understood the interpreter to say that provision applied to the previous year. ¶13. (S) Shevchenko stated that in Russia, a portion of the ICBM and SLBM launches were conducted by the Ministry of Defense and a portion were conducted by the space agency. He asked whether the terms launch, test launch, and flight test, as used by the United States were equivalent. Siemon responded that he used the terms as interchangeable, and that while the ballistic missile launch notification agreement used the term "launch," the START provisions referred to "test flights." Poznikhir stated that launches could be performed to test new types, to test existing types, to eliminate ICBMs or SLBMs, and to put payloads in the upper atmosphere - all were considered to be launches. In Russia, there was no distinction between launches for different purposes. When a launch was performed for elimination, the same launch and control system was used as for a test launch; there was no need to distinguish between them and encryption could be used on any launch. Siemon stated he understood the Russian viewpoint. ¶14. (S) Poznikhir's third question concerned how changes in the data exchange agreement would be resolved in the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC). For example, how would the agreement be changed if one side suggested the other had used information from a flight test for missile defense purposes? If it was believed the data was used in a manner inconsistent with the national security interests of one of the Parties, how would the Parties resolve the disagreement? Siemon replied this had not been a concern under START and that he did not understand why it would become a concern under SFO. Poznikhir commented the annual review of telemetry exchange proposed by the United States could lead to a review of national security concerns by both Parties and an opportunity to change the agreement accordingly. He clarified the original Russian proposal had been for a review every 3 years while the United States had proposed yearly reviews. ¶15. (S) Venevtsev gave the example of the United States concluding that flight test data had been used to the effect of its national security, bringing the issue for discussion to the BCC, and Russia denying there had been any such detriment. During the discussions in Moscow it had been stated that any changes in the nature of the exchange would be based on mutual agreement, so how would the BCC settle such an issue? Siemon opined that neither Party would likely raise this issue in the BCC. If the Parties agreed on the type and quantity of data to be exchanged, both Parties would have to consider what data would actually be exchanged. Venevtsev stated that if he understood correctly, each Party would identify parameters that would not damage its national security. Siemon commented that Russia was probably more concerned than the United States but that the volume and scope of the exchange would be agreed upon in the BCC. Venevtsev asked whether the U.S. position was to structure the exchange in such a way as not to get into a deadlock in the BCC. ¶16. (S) Siemon explained that the treaty would provide the basic position on the exchange of data, the protocol would describe how the exchange would work, the annex would provide the basic technical details, and the BCC would resolve issues on topics such as playback equipment, costs and spare parts. Agreement between the Parties on Article 10 was close and in the small group meetings in Moscow on January 22, 2010, additional text for the protocol was discussed and agreed. Based on the Moscow discussions, Siemon had expected during the current meeting a paper from Russia on what would be included in the protocol. He had expected to receive text reflecting the ten points that had been presented during the Moscow meeting. Once the proposed Russian text was received, the United States would be able to have discussion on the text in draft form and decide what specifically should be in the protocol and in the annex. After the Parties agreed on the substance, they could identify what would be deferred to the BCC for further discussion. The Presidents would sign the treaty and protocol. When the United States submits the treaty and protocol to the Senate, the text of the annex will be included. For the ratification process, both documents will need to be clearly written. Poznikhir stated he agreed completely that the treaty and protocol must answer all key questions. -------------- THE RUSSIAN VIEW TODAY -------------- ¶17. (S) Siemon stated the U.S. position had evolved in response to what it believed the Russian position was as presented over the course of several meetings. The text in the treaty, protocol, and annex must reflect the views of both Parties - the United States wanted to understand and reflect the Russian position. ¶18. (S) After a long break and extensive internal discussion, Poznikhir laid out the Russian view of telemetry exchange. The United States and Russia have agreed that the Parties would exchange telemetry data on a parity basis on up to 5 launches each year. In addition, the Russian Federation proposed that: - The exchange of telemetric information would be carried out within 65 days of the beginning of each calendar year for the previous calendar year. - The SLBM and ICBM launches for which telemetric information would be determined by the Party conducting the launches. - During the annual exchange of telemetric information, the Parties would provide recording media and interpretive data for the chosen flights. - Recording media would be provided for all information broadcast prior to the time when propulsion of the upper stage ends. Data associated with the SCDM broadcast from within the reentry vehicle will not be exchanged. Each Party will conduct for the other Party an initial display of the recording media to be used and will provide appropriate playback equipment to the other Party. - The Party conducting the flight test can decide the method of recording telemetric information by recorded media. - During SLBM or ICBM launches, each Party can use whatever data denial techniques or encapsulation that it chooses. - The provision for exchange of data will be first exercised at the beginning of the second full year after entry-into-force (EIF); e.g., January 2012 for 2011 launches after a May 2010 EIF. - On an annual basis, the Parties will reconsider the conditions and procedures of the exchange in the BCC. ¶19. (S) Poznikhir said the next step was for both Parties to agree and record the conceptual approach for the telemetry exchange in the protocol and the details in the annex. Siemon asked Poznihir to provide the Russian proposal in writing prior to the next meeting. Poznikhir agreed. ¶20. (U) Documents exchanged: None. ¶21. (U) Participants: UNITED STATES Mr. Siemon Ms. Pura (RO) Ms. C. Smith (Int) RUSSIA Gen Poznikhir Mr. Luchaninov Mr. Malyugin Mr. Pischulov Col Ryzhkov Mr. Shevchenko Gen Venevtsev Ms. Komshilova (Int) ¶22. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS