SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WORKING GROUP

S E C R E T GENEVA 000061 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/18 TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WORKING GROUP MEETING, FEBRUARY 1, 2010 -- CORRECTED COPY CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-005. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: February 1, 2010 Time: 3:30 P.M. - 6:00 P.M. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Working Group met with their Russian counterparts as a small group at the Russian Mission on February 1 to establish a way forward during the new session. The two sides worked through the entire Database and agreed on a substantial number of bracketed areas. Remaining areas of disagreement included: exchange of site diagrams; treatment of mobile ICBMs and their launchers; retaining data on heavy bomber recognition features; and use of the term "version" to refer to mobile launchers of ICBMs. End summary. ¶4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Implementing Moscow Decisions; Sections I and II; Discussion of Mobiles; and Sections IV Through V. -------------- IMPLEMENTING MOSCOW DECISIONS -------------- ¶5. (S) General Orlov noted that although many issues had been resolved in Moscow, the "particularly thorny problem" of the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defenses remained. Mr. Trout noted the problem of unique identifiers (UIDs) and a discussion of options for emplacing UIDs ensued. Orlov commented that the UID concession was a very difficult one for Russia and emphasized that such acceptance was directly linked to the United States agreeing to drop any special focus on mobile systems. Trout replied that the United States was willing to drop its proposed Article VI on mobiles if the Russian side agreed to UIDs, notification of the departure of a missile from a production facility, and several other points. Trout and Orlov agreed to defer the issue to the Treaty Text and Definitions Working Group (TTDWG). -------------- SECTIONS I AND II -------------- ¶6. (S) Turning to Section I of Part Two, Trout signaled, without committing, a U.S. inclination to move toward the Russian preference to be more explicit that geographic coordinates and aggregate data would not be exchanged 45 days after signature. The chairmen agreed that UID information would not be exchanged until entry-into-force (EIF). ¶7. (S) The chairmen then turned to site diagrams. Orlov agreed to U.S.-proposed language in various places that included "coastlines and waters diagrams." Regarding submission and discussion of site diagrams, Orlov explained that the Russian position was that new diagrams submitted 45 days after signature would not have to be agreed in the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC). Trout pointed out that this was the U.S. position as well and explained that site diagrams exchanged 45 days after signature would be used to facilitate ratification by supporting arguments on the effectiveness of the inspection regime. It was the U.S. view, however, that any changes to the boundary of a site diagram after EIF would have to be submitted to the BCC for agreement. Orlov asked what would happen if one Party were to withhold its consent to such a change. Trout replied that there was ample precedent for such a process under START. He said many new site diagrams were agreed to in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC), though some were not. The site diagrams that were not agreed were ones that decreased the boundary of inspection sites by excluding areas that one Party believed potentially could contain items of inspection. Orlov stated that he had a better understanding of the U.S. position regarding changes to site diagrams after EIF and the requirement for such changes to be approved in the BCC and he agreed to discuss the issue further with his delegation. ¶8. (S) The chairmen considered the possibility of forming a spinoff subgroup to the MOU Working Group in which site diagrams would be discussed further. Orlov mentioned that the Russian side had its new site diagrams ready and that Colonel Ryzhkov was in charge of preparing the documents. Orlov stated that they would be ready for exchange immediately after signature. Trout asked if the diagrams would be available before signature. Orlov demurred and said he would need to consult with Russian Head of Delegation, Ambassador Antonov. ¶9. (S) The sides agreed to several minor changes in Section I. Orlov proposed to change the Russian text on the date for the exchange of photographs from "the inspection activities begin" to "60 days." Trout made the point that photographs needed to be exchanged far enough ahead of the first inspection in order to assist the inspectors. After some discussion, Trout agreed to consult internally regarding setting 45 days after EIF as opposed to the current U.S. position of 30 days. ¶10. (S) Turning to Section II, Trout asked how the Russian side proposed incorporating numbers of heavy bombers under the aggregate deployed and non-deployed limit agreed to in Moscow. Neither side expressed a firm opinion as to how to integrate heavy bombers and the discussion concluded with an agreement to consult with the respective delegations. ¶11. (S) The sides also agreed to follow the determination of the TTDWG regarding the placement of the data for the recently agreed third limit in the Database. Specifically, if the limit was placed in Article II, Central Limits, the data would be declared in Paragraph 1 of Section II. If the limit was placed in another article, the data would be declared in Paragraph 2 of Section II. -------------- DISCUSSION OF MOBILES -------------- ¶12. (S) Trout raised the question of Russia providing four boundary geographic coordinates for its mobile ICBM bases. Orlov made very clear that Russia would not agree to provide anything other than a single geographic point for its mobile ICBM bases and for their deployment areas. Pressed by Trout that this would imply that bases could be the size of Russia itself, Orlov agreed that this was a logical inference but did not change his position. Orlov explained that while he personally perceived the logic of the U.S. position on verification of mobiles, the decision to exclude any special provisions had been a political one. He stated that President Medvedev had taken this line with the delegation and with President Obama. Orlov also reminded Trout that the Russian minutes of the Presidents' discussion reflected that the Russian concession on UIDs was linked to U.S. agreement to fall off special verification provisions for mobile systems. Orlov advised that the United States had two options: to either accept the Russian position or, to develop its own mobile ICBMs. -------------- SECTIONS III THROUGH V -------------- ¶13. (S) Trout agreed to remove the category of number of warheads for each launcher at a deployed ICBM and SLBM base. Orlov agreed to drop Russia's brackets on all U.S. text on UIDs for ICBM and SLBM missiles. They further agreed to drop the term "returned" with reference to non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs at production facilities. The chairmen also discussed the naming convention for submarines, and provisionally agreed to exchange the names of the boats. Orlov stated that he would need to discuss this further with his delegation. ¶14. (S) For Section V, the chairmen discussed UIDs for heavy bombers, and provisionally agreed to use tail numbers. The United States also agreed to the Russian-proposed inclusion of a category for "nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers" under each airbase. -------------- SECTIONS VI THROUGH IX -------------- ¶15. (S) Orlov raised the issue of the nomenclature for launchers located at space launch facilities in Section VI. Trout stated that this language was linked to soft site launchers and needed to be discussed in the Definitions Subgroup before it could be resolved in the Database. The chairmen agreed to defer the issue until later. ¶16. (S) Discussion of retaining the term "version" ensued with respect to Section VII. LT Lobner explained that this was a definitions issue, since the word "version" referred to different types of launchers, while "variant" applied to missiles. Orlov agreed to consider the issue further. ¶17. (S) With regard to Section VIII, Trout asked why Russia needed to retain START-type recognition features for heavy bombers when we were not using maximum warhead capability for heavy bombers. Orlov agreed to review the issue with his delegation and discuss the issue in a subsequent meeting. ¶18. (S) The sides agreed to drop Section IX on Heavy Bomber Nuclear Armaments Technical Data since both sides agreed that heavy bombers would have a warhead attribution number of one irrespective of the number or type of nuclear armaments aboard such heavy bombers. ¶19. (S) Orlov proposed deleting the portion of Paragraph 2 of Section X on nuclear armaments for heavy bombers, and including the category on non-nuclear ALCMs. Trout said he would provide an answer to the proposal later. ¶20. Documents provided: None. ¶21. (U) Participants: UNITED STATES Mr. Trout Mr. Colby (RO) LT Lobner Ms. Gesse (Int) RUSSIA Gen Orlov Col Pischulov Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) ¶22. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS