Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
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10GENEVA59 | 2010-02-18 13:59:00 | SECRET | Mission Geneva |
VZCZCXYZ0000 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHGV #0059/01 0491424 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O R 181359Z FEB 10 FM USMISSION GENEVA TO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHMFISS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHMFISS/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0118 RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0033 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE INFO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV 0032 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0036 RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0032 |
S E C R E T GENEVA 000059 |
1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-004. 2. (U) Meeting Date: February 1, 2010 Time: 10:00 A.M. - 11:15 A.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva -------------------------- SUMMARY -------------------------- 3. (S) The first meeting of the Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG), chaired by Secretary of Defense Representative, Dr. Warner, and Russian Ministry of Defense Representative, Col Ilin, of the eighth round of the START Follow-on negotiations took place on February 1. The sides discussed the work plan for completing Part Five to the Protocol on Inspection Activities, as well as each of the nine Parts to the Annex on Inspection Activities. Both chairs agreed that the immediate priority for the IPWG was to incorporate how to conduct elimination inspections under the new treaty based on the discussion and agreements that were made during the Mullen-Makarov meeting held the previous week in Moscow. Regarding elimination inspections, it was apparent that the sides were not in agreement on the approach. The Russian view was that no more than 50 percent of the solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs being eliminated in a given year would be subject to inspection whereas the U.S. view was that all such missiles that had been eliminated within a given year would be inspected during elimination inspections conducted twice each year. End summary. 4. (S) Subject Summary: Work Plan; Timing of Elimination Inspections and Failing Memories; Inspect all Missiles or a Percentage. -------------------------- WORK PLAN -------------------------- 5. (S) Dr. Warner began the first meeting of the Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG) of the eighth round of the START Follow-on negotiations by expressing his views on the IPWG work plan for the weeks ahead. He noted three areas. The first was conforming the text of Part 5 of the Protocol. He said the Conforming Group had worked through Sections I - V and Sections IX and X of Part Five. He observed that some differences were noted in the text of the sides and that some of these differences might have to be brought back to the working group for further discussion. He also made a plea for the participation of a Russian technical/inspection expert in the Conforming Group as this would make things easier and the work would go more quickly. Col Ilin agreed that this would be a good idea and that Col Petrov would likely participate for their side. 6. (S) Second, Warner said the IPWG needed to discuss the results of the recent high level meetings in Moscow as they related to the conduct of elimination inspections. Specifically, he said the detailed steps in the elimination process must be agreed as well as how those procedures would be reflected in the text of both Part Five to the Protocol on Inspection Activities and Part Three to the Protocol on Conversion or Elimination Procedures. 7. (S) Third, Warner said that work must begin on the key parts of the Annex to Part Five of the Protocol. The U.S. view was that Part Four (Site Diagrams), Part Six (Type One Inspections), and Part Seven (Type Two Inspections) must be agreed prior to Treaty signature, which he hoped would occur by the end of February. He added that all of the remaining Parts to the Annex would need to be completed and available to the national legislatures of each side for the treaty ratification process. 8. (S) Ilin agreed with Warner's assessment and noted that particular attention needed to be paid to the process for the elimination of strategic offensive arms so that those procedures could be implemented over the life of the Treaty. He explained that a great deal of attention was focused on the elimination of Russian mobile ICBMs, but not much was being said about the elimination of U.S. ICBMs. He emphasized that there must be symmetry in the elimination procedures applied to both Sides. Warner agreed, and added that another aspect that had to be taken into account was the method of elimination. The U.S. methods of elimination for solid-fueled ICBMs were primarily detonation in the open, burning in an open pit or reuse of missiles for purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty. -------------------------- -------------------------- TIMING OF ELIMINATION INSPECTIONS AND FAILING MEMORIES -------------------------- -------------------------- 9. (S) Ilin pointed out that the sides must reach agreement on when an elimination inspection would occur. He believed there was a misunderstanding between him and Dr. Warner following their discussion in Moscow regarding whether an elimination inspection would be conducted on all accumulated solid-fueled ICBMs, solid-fueled SLBMs and mobile launchers of ICBMs every six months or whether the inspection would be conducted when a specific number of items had accumulated. Warner agreed that the concentration or accumulation of such eliminated items was critical to the timing of an inspection and that the sides needed to agree on a common approach. Ilin said his recollection from the Moscow discussions was that an inspection would be conducted when a substantial number of missiles had accumulated. Warner stated that his impression was that for eliminated solid-fueled ICBMs, solid-fueled SLBMs and mobile ICBM launchers, inspections of all accumulated items would occur every six months. Under this approach, 100 percent of the items eliminated over a six month period would be available for inspection twice each year at the CorE facility at Votkinsk for the missiles and at the CorE facility at Piban'shur for mobile ICBM launchers. -------------------------- INSPECT ALL MISSILES OR A PERCENTAGE -------------------------- 10. (S) Given this misunderstanding, Warner asked for Ilin's view on when an elimination inspection should occur. Ilin explained that his view was that over the course of a year a percentage (later revealed to be 50 percent) of the total number of missiles eliminated would be made available for inspection based on a specific, agreed to, percentage of accumulated missiles. Warner stated that the United States would expect to inspect all eliminated solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs that had accumulated over the six month period and would have the opportunity every six months throughout the life of the Treaty. If the United States were to agree to some percentage of the yearly output of eliminated missiles, he said the percentage would have to be very significant. The sides agreed to formulate their proposals on the conduct of elimination inspections and present them during a joint meeting of the Conversion or Elimination and Inspections Working Groups the following day. 11. (U) Documents exchanged: None 12. (S) List of Participants UNITED STATES Dr. Warner Mr. Buttrick Mr. Smith (RO) Ms. Geese (Int) RUSSIA Col Ilin Col Petrov Mr. Shevchenko Ms. Vodopolova Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) 13. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS |