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10GENEVA59 2010-02-18 13:59:00 SECRET Mission Geneva
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SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP,

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/18
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP,
FEBRUARY 1, 2010 -- CORRECTED COPY

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)



1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-004.





2. (U) Meeting Date: February 1, 2010

Time: 10:00 A.M. - 11:15 A.M.

Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva





--------------------------



SUMMARY



--------------------------







3. (S) The first meeting of the Inspection Protocol Working Group
(IPWG), chaired by Secretary of Defense Representative, Dr. Warner,
and Russian Ministry of Defense Representative, Col Ilin, of the
eighth round of the START Follow-on negotiations took place on
February 1. The sides discussed the work plan for completing Part
Five to the Protocol on Inspection Activities, as well as each of
the nine Parts to the Annex on Inspection Activities. Both chairs
agreed that the immediate priority for the IPWG was to incorporate
how to conduct elimination inspections under the new treaty based
on the discussion and agreements that were made during the
Mullen-Makarov meeting held the previous week in Moscow. Regarding
elimination inspections, it was apparent that the sides were not in
agreement on the approach. The Russian view was that no more than
50 percent of the solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs being eliminated in
a given year would be subject to inspection whereas the U.S. view
was that all such missiles that had been eliminated within a given
year would be inspected during elimination inspections conducted
twice each year. End summary.





4. (S) Subject Summary: Work Plan; Timing of Elimination
Inspections and Failing Memories; Inspect all Missiles or a
Percentage.





--------------------------



WORK PLAN



--------------------------







5. (S) Dr. Warner began the first meeting of the Inspection
Protocol Working Group (IPWG) of the eighth round of the START
Follow-on negotiations by expressing his views on the IPWG work
plan for the weeks ahead. He noted three areas. The first was
conforming the text of Part 5 of the Protocol. He said the
Conforming Group had worked through Sections I - V and Sections IX
and X of Part Five. He observed that some differences were noted
in the text of the sides and that some of these differences might
have to be brought back to the working group for further


discussion. He also made a plea for the participation of a Russian
technical/inspection expert in the Conforming Group as this would
make things easier and the work would go more quickly. Col Ilin
agreed that this would be a good idea and that Col Petrov would
likely participate for their side.





6. (S) Second, Warner said the IPWG needed to discuss the results
of the recent high level meetings in Moscow as they related to the
conduct of elimination inspections. Specifically, he said the
detailed steps in the elimination process must be agreed as well as
how those procedures would be reflected in the text of both Part
Five to the Protocol on Inspection Activities and Part Three to the
Protocol on Conversion or Elimination Procedures.





7. (S) Third, Warner said that work must begin on the key parts of
the Annex to Part Five of the Protocol. The U.S. view was that
Part Four (Site Diagrams), Part Six (Type One Inspections), and
Part Seven (Type Two Inspections) must be agreed prior to Treaty
signature, which he hoped would occur by the end of February. He
added that all of the remaining Parts to the Annex would need to be
completed and available to the national legislatures of each side
for the treaty ratification process.





8. (S) Ilin agreed with Warner's assessment and noted that
particular attention needed to be paid to the process for the
elimination of strategic offensive arms so that those procedures
could be implemented over the life of the Treaty. He explained
that a great deal of attention was focused on the elimination of
Russian mobile ICBMs, but not much was being said about the
elimination of U.S. ICBMs. He emphasized that there must be
symmetry in the elimination procedures applied to both Sides.
Warner agreed, and added that another aspect that had to be taken
into account was the method of elimination. The U.S. methods of
elimination for solid-fueled ICBMs were primarily detonation in the
open, burning in an open pit or reuse of missiles for purposes not
inconsistent with the Treaty.





--------------------------



--------------------------



TIMING OF ELIMINATION INSPECTIONS AND FAILING MEMORIES



--------------------------



--------------------------







9. (S) Ilin pointed out that the sides must reach agreement on
when an elimination inspection would occur. He believed there was
a misunderstanding between him and Dr. Warner following their
discussion in Moscow regarding whether an elimination inspection
would be conducted on all accumulated solid-fueled ICBMs,
solid-fueled SLBMs and mobile launchers of ICBMs every six months
or whether the inspection would be conducted when a specific number
of items had accumulated. Warner agreed that the concentration or
accumulation of such eliminated items was critical to the timing of
an inspection and that the sides needed to agree on a common
approach. Ilin said his recollection from the Moscow discussions


was that an inspection would be conducted when a substantial number
of missiles had accumulated. Warner stated that his impression was
that for eliminated solid-fueled ICBMs, solid-fueled SLBMs and
mobile ICBM launchers, inspections of all accumulated items would
occur every six months. Under this approach, 100 percent of the
items eliminated over a six month period would be available for
inspection twice each year at the CorE facility at Votkinsk for the
missiles and at the CorE facility at Piban'shur for mobile ICBM
launchers.





--------------------------



INSPECT ALL MISSILES OR A PERCENTAGE



--------------------------







10. (S) Given this misunderstanding, Warner asked for Ilin's view
on when an elimination inspection should occur. Ilin explained
that his view was that over the course of a year a percentage
(later revealed to be 50 percent) of the total number of missiles
eliminated would be made available for inspection based on a
specific, agreed to, percentage of accumulated missiles. Warner
stated that the United States would expect to inspect all
eliminated solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs that had accumulated over
the six month period and would have the opportunity every six
months throughout the life of the Treaty. If the United States
were to agree to some percentage of the yearly output of eliminated
missiles, he said the percentage would have to be very significant.
The sides agreed to formulate their proposals on the conduct of
elimination inspections and present them during a joint meeting of
the Conversion or Elimination and Inspections Working Groups the
following day.







11. (U) Documents exchanged: None





12. (S) List of Participants



UNITED STATES



Dr. Warner

Mr. Buttrick

Mr. Smith (RO)

Ms. Geese (Int)



RUSSIA



Col Ilin

Col Petrov

Mr. Shevchenko

Ms. Vodopolova

Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)





13. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS