SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WORKING GROUP

S E C R E T GENEVA 000247 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/28 TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WORKING GROUP MEETING, FEBRUARY 25, 2010 REF: 10 GENEVA 245 (SFO-GVA-VIII-086) CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-086. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: February 25, 2010 Time: 3:30 P.M. - 6:15 P.M. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) During a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Working Group meeting held at the Russian Mission on February 25, the two sides discussed Part Four to the Annex on Inspection Activities, specifically, the provisions and requirements for site diagrams and references to Part Two of the Protocol. End summary. ¶4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: The First Data Exchange; Problematic Data Categories; The Chicken or the Egg; and Brass Tacks. -------------- THE FIRST DATA EXCHANGE -------------- ¶5. (S) The meeting began with Gen Orlov briefly discussing two issues with Part Two that had been raised recently in his delegation. The first issue concerned an apparent textual problem regarding the release of geographic coordinates, and the second issue concerned how the initial data exchange would occur. ¶6. (S) Regarding the first issue, Col Pischulov pointed out that 45 days after signature of the treaty, the Parties would exchange site diagrams that included geographic coordinates, as required by paragraph 3 of Section I of Part Two of the Protocol. However, in paragraph 2, the text specifically stated that geographic coordinates would not be exchanged in the initial exchange of data. ¶7. (S) Orlov offered two solutions. The first solution would be to change the text in paragraph 2 to modify subparagraph (a) by specifying that geographic coordinates for silo launchers would not be provided, thus allowing the Parties to exchange geographic coordinates for facilities. The second solution, which he said was his personal preference, was to change the requirements of paragraph 3 by changing the timeline for the exchange of site diagrams from the currently-agreed 45 days after signature to 45 days after entry into force (EIF). ¶8. (S) Trout stated immediately that the first option was much more reasonable than the second option. He also noted that should Russia formally change their position on the date of exchange for site diagrams to after EIF, this would represent a significant walking back from the agreed position. Trout suggested another solution would be to include all geographic coordinates in the initial exchange since the data will be the same data that was already exchanged during START. This was possible because neither Party had built new silos and the exchange would be secret, since neither Party could make such information public. He suggested that the words "geographic coordinates" could be expunged from Part Two of the Protocol, so that no circular references would have to be made. ¶9. (S) Orlov appeared to be struggling to understand, and again suggested that site diagrams be exchanged 45 days after EIF. Trout said this would be a bad idea, and reminded Orlov that in the Fall, both Parties had agreed to exchange site diagrams at signature. Orlov envisioned a situation in which the U.S. Senate ratified the treaty, but the Federation Council did not. In this possible scenario, site diagrams would have been exchanged for a treaty which would never enter into force. When questioned by Trout, Orlov stated that none of this discussion was official, but rather his own opinion about what should be exchanged and when. ¶10. (S) Trout reiterated that the timeline for the site diagram exchange was agreed, but that the U.S. side would examine the Russian side's concern with the provisions in paragraph 2 and how they would affect the requirement to exchange site diagrams in paragraph 3. ¶11. (S) Turning to the second issue regarding the method of exchange of the initial exchange of data, Col Petrov asked Trout how he envisioned the first data exchange occurring, specifically asking if a new notification should be introduced. Trout explained that the answer to that question depended on the requirements written into the text for provisional application of the treaty. If certain notifications were provisionally applied, then Petrov's solution could work. Another solution, Trout suggested, was that the text in paragraph 2 be modified to specifically state how the exchange would take place, such as via diplomatic channels. Both sides agreed to look harder at this issue and think of a good solution. -------------- PROBLEMATIC DATA CATEGORIES -------------- ¶12. (S) Trout moved onto the category of ICBM Loading Facilities in Part Two, Section III. Orlov admitted to Trout that he was confounded by the handling of some categories of data required in Part Two of the Protocol, including ICBM Loading Facilities. He noted that Russia had none, neither did the United States. Trout said he failed to understand why this category was included, and that if neither party was going to have such facilities, the category should be deleted. Orlov commented on the possibility that such a facility could exist sometime during the life of the treaty. Therefore, it seemed there should be a category to accommodate it. ¶13. (S) Turning to Section V, Trout sought to clarify a conversation of earlier that day regarding "based" versus "located" with reference to heavy bombers. Orlov stated that in his opinion, where a bomber was "located" was all that mattered for treaty purposes. He asked Trout whether the data for a non-deployed heavy bomber should be included in the data for a repair facility where it was located, or in the data for its assigned base for counting purposes. ¶14. (S) Trout stated that the definitions of deployed heavy bomber, non-deployed heavy bomber, and test heavy bomber had all been agreed between the sides that very morning. Trout then read the agreed definitions to Orlov and explained the significance of "located" versus "based." Trout convinced Orlov that "based" was an important treaty provision, and that each heavy bomber or test heavy bomber had a dual nature in regard to its actual location and its home base. Orlov again voiced his dissatisfaction at some of the definitions and understandings the sides had reached, saying these made no sense to him. -------------- THE CHICKEN OR THE EGG -------------- ¶15. (S) For the second consecutive day, the sides discussed the nuanced nature of Part Two of the Protocol. Trout stated that as Part Two was the Categories for the Database Pertaining to Strategic Offensive Arms, it had no data. Therefore, it could not be used as a reference within the treaty to identify where the data exchanged was located. Orlov complained that the United States requested Part Two of the Protocol first be called "the Database," then called "Categories of Data for the Database," but either way, he agreed in concept that Part Two could not be used as a reference elsewhere in the treaty if the reference was to "data listed in". Petrov also acknowledged this issue, and stated that the Russian legal team was working on it. He recommended that the sides leave references to Part Two in brackets until a logical solution could be agreed. Trout agreed to allow the lawyers to conform the reference in a manner that suited both Parties. -------------- BRASS TACKS -------------- ¶16. (S) Orlov then asked Trout if he would continue leading the MOU Working Group until the entire "third tier" was completed. (Begin comment: Annexes are often referred to as the third tier. End comment.) Trout said he would be in Geneva leading the working group at least until the treaty was signed. Orlov pressed Trout about his plans after treaty signature. Trout stated those plans had not yet been developed. ¶17. Orlov then deferred to Petrov to work with Trout and LT Lobner, clearing several brackets in paragraphs 2(c) through 2 (j). While some brackets remained, Trout promised to examine these issues with his staff and respond quickly in order to clear as many brackets prior to the break as possible. ¶18. (S) The major bracketed issue remaining after the discussion was the Russian side's proposal to exclude language that stated that all structures would be depicted within the inspection site that "are intended for, and are large enough to be used for, items declared at that facility shall be shown within the boundary of that facility, except those structures the entrances of which are not large enough to permit passage of such items." Both sides acknowledged the bracketed text and noted a significant conceptual difference; however, the sides deferred discussion of the topic to another meeting. ¶19. (S) The salient issues remaining for discussion included codifying language to describe which buildings must be depicted on site diagrams, mechanisms and processes for making changes to site diagrams, and the role of the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) in the approval of changed site diagrams. ¶20. (U) Documents provided: None. ¶21. (U) Participants: UNITED STATES Mr. Trout LTC Litterini (RO) LT Lobner Mr. French(Int) RUSSIA Gen Orlov Col Petrov Col Pischulov Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) ¶22. (U) Gottemoeller sends. KING