SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP MEETING,

S E C R E T GENEVA 000239

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/28
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP MEETING,
FEBRUARY 19, 2010

REF: 10 GENEVA 227 (SFO-GVA-VIII-062)

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-069.




2. (U) Meeting Date: February 19, 2010

Time: 3:30 P.M. - 18:10 P.M.

Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva



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SUMMARY

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3. (S) At the Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG) meeting on
February 19, chaired by Dr. Warner and Colonel Ilin, the sides
discussed the U.S.-proposed Annex on Inspection Activities, Part
Six, related to procedures for conducting Type-1 inspections. The
sides reviewed the proposed text line-by-line, accepted several
paragraphs and agreed to re-write others. End summary.




4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Homework First; U.S.-Proposed Part Six of
the Annex, Continued.



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homework first

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5. (S) Warner stated the U.S. delegation was expecting to receive
guidance from Washington concerning a possible compromise solution
regarding the conduct of Type-2 conversion or elimination
inspections. Once that guidance was received, the Working Group
could return to the review of Section VII of Part Five of the
Protocol and finish the drafting of a Joint Draft Text (JDT) that
would incorporate the changes. Ilin stated the Russian side was
planning on returning to Moscow on February 27, and that it might
be impossible to finish work on both Section VII and Part Six of
the Annex prior to their departure. Warner recommended that the
sides continue with Part Six of the Annex where the working group
left off at the last meeting (Reftel). Ilin said he was ready to
work on Part Six of the Annex and he understood that the Annex was
important to the U.S. side.




6. (S) Ilin stated he had two homework items from the last meeting
that he wanted to review. The first was a re-drafted paragraph
proposed by the Russian side combining paragraphs 3 and 4 of
Section II of Part Six of the Annex. The merged paragraph would
cover movement of both road mobile launchers and submarines during
the nuclear warhead portion of a Type-1 inspection. The paragraphs
were similar so one paragraph would be sufficient. Ilin read the
draft aloud and Warner agreed that it seemed correct.



Begin text.


((3. At the discretion of the inspected Side, a designated deployed
mobile launcher of ICBMs or a submarine on which designated a
deployed launcher of SLBMs is located, may proceed to a specially
allocated site, where the viewing of the front section of such
ICBMs or SLBMs will be conducted, or where the front section will
be separated from an ICBM or SLBM. The inspection team shall have
the right to maintain uninterrupted visual contact, while in
transit, with such deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs or with such
submarine, which shall proceed to a specially allocated site, while
surfaced.))2



End text.




7. (S) Ilin stated that the paragraph did not include mention of
the SSGNs; Warner explained it was because SSGNs could be viewed at
the pier without having to move them to the explosive handling
wharf. Warner stated that regardless of that fact, the Second
Agreed Statement on SSGNs was still in draft and the sides should
assess the content of that document before deciding whether to make
any mention of SSGNs in the Annex. In addition, further procedures
for inspecting the SSGNs might have to wait until after the
exhibition following entry-into-force of the Treaty and be worked
out in the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC),because the
United States had not determined what they might be yet. Warner
stated that final agreement with Russia's combined paragraph 3 and
4 would come following the U.S. delegation's review of the official
translation.




8. (S) Concerning his second point, Ilin stated that following a
review of subparagraph 2(f) of Section II of Part Six of the Annex,
the Russian side had agreed with the draft text, as presented by
the United States, with the exception that Russia did not agree to
permit the inspection of vehicles. (Note: Subparagraph 2(f) deals
with the inspecting Party's right to inspect vehicles, containers
or objects that enter or leave the vicinity of the ICBM or SLBM
launcher during the preparation of the front section while the
launcher door is open. End note.) Ilin emphasized that inspectors
had the opportunity to view, and could inspect, any containers or
objects during front section preparation, and therefore, vehicles
would not be subject to inspection. Warner noted the contradiction
that any containers or objects leaving the area probably would be
in or on a vehicle, but stated the U.S. Delegation would discuss
this point further and get back to the Russian delegation. Ilin
commented that vehicles were always prepositioned at the site and
it did not matter what they might contain, since inspectors could
observe the entire front section removal process.



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U.S.-proposed Part Six OF the Annex, continued

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9. (S) Ilin explained that the Russian side would prefer to remove
the statements of purpose for each individual step in the
paragraphs detailing the rights granted to inspectors during the
preparation of a missile front section for viewing. The purpose
for each step was the same in that inspectors were ensuring that no
additional front sections or RVs were present. Restating the
purpose in each paragraph was redundant. The ultimate purpose of
the steps was to get to the point of inspecting the warheads.
Warner agreed and proposed stating the overall purpose in a
paragraph at the beginning of Section II so that the purpose did
not have to be repeated for each individual step.



10. (S) Warner continued to paragraph 6, where agreement was
reached to remove one sentence which concerned a partial front
section separation step relevant only to a type of missile retired
during START (the SS-24).




11. (S) Ilin asked Warner to explain his proposal to add in
subparagraph 7(c) the requirement for inspectors to view the upper
missile airframe edge in the launcher following front section
separation. Petrov added that during START it was nearly
impossible to view the upper edge of a Minuteman III in a silo
because of the payload transporter (PT) van sitting over the top of
the silo. Petrov suggested that additional text could be added to
require the in-country escort to provide a drawing prior to the one
minute viewing to explain what the inspectors would see. This
would help inspectors by giving them an idea of what they were
looking for prior to viewing. Warner agreed to put the requirement
in U.S. brackets and return to the subject at a later date
following internal discussion within the U.S. working group and the
Russian delegation's own internal discussion. Warner added that,
if the Russian side would draft text to incorporate the diagram
requirement, the concept could be discussed later.




12. (S) Ilin questioned subparagraph 10(a) concerning the right to
inspect the specially allocated site (SAS) where a front section is
prepared for viewing; a location that is some distance from the
launcher or fixed structure where the missile designated for
inspection is located. Ilin asked what the text's reference to a
"portion of the site" actually meant. Warner explained that it
meant an interior area or room within the SAS used for the
preparation of the front section of the missile. It was agreed to
change "portion of a site" to "portion of a room". Warner
suggested that the term "enclosed space" could be used instead of
"room."




13. (S) Ilin asked how inspectors could secure the SAS. Warner
replied this could be done either by sealing the entrances with
tamper-evident seals or positioning inspectors at each entry point
to verify no re-entry vehicles were removed from the site. Ilin
inquired why it was at the discretion of the inspecting Party
whether to seal the doors or post observers and not at the
discretion of the inspected Party. Ilin suggested it should be an
agreed decision between both parties whether to seal or post
observers at the SAS. Warner disagreed and stated that the
decision on whether to seal or observe exits to/from the SAS is the
right of the inspecting Party. Ilin bracketed the U.S. text and
offered alternative Russian-proposed text that the decision to seal
the SAS would be based "upon agreement of the in-country escort."




14. (S) Ilin raised the question why there was no time limit set
for the inspection and the sealing of the SAS. Warner countered
that each case was different and allowing the inspection team chief
to decide the issue would be the best course of action. If the
Russians had specific ideas they should present their proposal in
writing. Ilin requested that the United States insert, as Russia's
proposal, a time limit of ten minutes for viewing the SAS. Warner
made clear that the United States had no interest in such a time
limit.




15. (S) Ilin backtracked to paragraph 9. He suggested that where
the paragraph stated that the viewing of the front section could
take place within a vehicle, the vehicle should be referred to as a
"special" vehicle. Warner agreed to the suggestion, acknowledging


that the United States always used a special vehicle for viewing a
front section. Petrov said Russia might do so too.




16. (S) Returning to subparagraph 10(b) concerning the SAS, Ilin
inquired why there was no distance specified from which inspectors
would observe the SAS during the preparation process. Warner
stated that it was common practice for inspectors to remain just
outside of the SAS while front section preparation was taking
place. Warner asked Ilin what he suggested for a distance. Ilin
said not so far that binoculars would be required; perhaps 500m.
Warner countered that any distance separating inspectors from the
front section measured in hundreds of meters was far too great.
Ilin said setting a distance requirement was necessary in cases
where the SAS was not inside a building. Warner commented that, at
least in the U.S. case, a structure or vehicle was always placed
over the launcher, thereby obstructing the inspectors' view. Ilin
said the front section preparation of a mobile system might be
outdoors, and it would not be possible to prepare the front section
for viewing outside the view of the inspectors unless there was a
distance requirement.




17. (S) Warner reminded Ilin that past Russian practice was to
bring SS-25 mobile launchers into the maintenance facility, where
inspectors would be placed so they could not see the preparation of
the front section, but could see that nothing was brought to or
removed from the area by positioning inspectors to the left and
right aft portion of the launcher. Petrov asked whether the
inspectors could remain outside the structure. Warner replied that
if inspectors remained outside during the front section
preparation, they would have to inspect the boxes on the sides of
the mobile launcher upon their return, in order to ensure RVs had
not been hidden in spaces on the launcher that were large enough to
contain an RV. Petrov argued that the mobile launcher was not
subject to inspection, and the boxes on it had other purposes.
Moreover, he said silos had a great deal of extra space, but Russia
did not believe RVs could be hidden in silo spaces. Warner asked
the Russian side to provide their suggestion in draft text
regarding the positioning of inspectors during the preparation of
the front section.




18. (U) Documents provided:



- Russia:



-- Proposal for paragraph 3 of Section II of Part Six of Annex on
Inspection Activities, dated February 19, 2010.




19. (U) Participants:



UNITED STATES



Dr. Warner

Mr. Albertson

Mr. Buttrick

Maj Johnson


LTC Litterini (RO)

Mr. McConnell

Ms. Purcell

Mr. Rust

Mr. Smith

Ms. Gross (Int)



RUSSIA



Col Ilin

Col Petrov

Ms. Vodopolova

Col Zaitsev

Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)




20. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
KING