SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) AGREED STATEMENTS MEETING, FEBRUARY 26,

S E C R E T GENEVA 000237 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/28 TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) AGREED STATEMENTS MEETING, FEBRUARY 26, 2010 REF: 10 GENEVA 169 (SFO-GVA-VIII-071) CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-094. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: February 26, 2010 Time: 12:00 P.M. - 12:30 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) Mr. Elliott met with Col Ilin to discuss the status of the agreed statements and to ensure agreement and understanding on the first four negotiated statements. Three statements (B-1B conversion, SSGN conversion, joint basing) were ready for conforming while a fourth (Davis-Monthan) was very close. An intense discussion followed on the Russian side's proposed agreed statement on the use of telemetric information to enhance missile defense. End summary. ¶4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Fourth Agreed Statement: Heavy Bombers at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base (AFB); Conforming?; First Agreed Statement: Conversion of B-1B; and Eighth Agreed Statement: Use of Telemetric Information. -------------- FOURTH AGREED STATEMENT: HEAVY BOMBERS BASED AT DAVIS-MONTHAN AIR FORCE BASE (AFB) -------------- ¶5. (S) Elliot discussed the agreed statement on Deployed Heavy Bombers located at Davis-Monthan AFB. Taking into account the comments provided by ADM (Ret) Kuznetsov during the last meeting(Reftel),the U.S. side provided a revised copy of the agreed statement deleting the last sentence which stated, "Such heavy bombers shall be considered deployed heavy bombers until such time as they are converted into heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments or are eliminated." Elliott explained that the U.S. side removed this sentence because the details of when a heavy bomber which is converted or eliminated leaves accountability were covered very clearly in Part III of the protocol. He said repeating the concept in the last sentence of the agreed statement was redundant. He also stated that the purpose of the agreed statement was to address the treaty inconsistency of basing deployed heavy bombers at the conversion or elimination facility. ¶6. (S) Ilin responded by asking whether the United States would count heavy bombers based at Davis-Monthan as deployed or non-deployed. Elliot responded that they would be counted as deployed. Ilin stated the Russian side saw the last sentence of the agreed statement as clarifying that point and without the sentence, there would be an ambiguity as to how the heavy bombers should be counted. Elliott proposed modifying the last sentence. He proposed the following sentence, "Each such heavy bomber shall be considered a deployed heavy bomber until such time as it is converted or eliminated in accordance with Part III of this Protocol." Elliott said he would provide a new version of the agreed statement later that day. -------------- CONFORMING? -------------- ¶7. (S) Elliott stated he was surprised to learn the Russian Side was not ready to conform the second and third agreed statements when both sides had agreed on the text and to send them to conforming during the previous meeting (Reftel). Ilin responded that he did not have enough time to speak with his delegation prior to yesterday afternoon's conforming meeting but had discussed the statements with his delegation last evening and was ready to send the first, second, and third statements (B-1B conversion, SSGN conversion, joint basing) to conforming. -------------- FIRST AGREED STATEMENT: CONVERSION OF B-1B -------------- ¶8. (S) Elliott agreed all three statements could go to conforming but he wanted to clarify that brackets still remained in subparagraph 1(a) of the first agreed statement (conversion of B-1B) regarding the purpose of the exhibition. Ilin stated that in his version the U.S. side had agreed to the Russian language and there, therefore, were no brackets in subparagraph 1(a). Elliott showed Ilin the documents the U.S. side had provided and explained the U.S position that the purpose of the exhibition was to demonstrate the distinguishing features of a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments as compared to heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments and not to confirm the conversion process as the Russian side suggested. Elliott proposed adding the U.S. wording in brackets to help the Russian side better understand the U.S. position and added he would provide a new version of the agreed statement to the Russian delegation later that day. Elliott stated that beyond the bracket in subparagraph 1(a) there was complete agreement on the rest of the document and that it should go to conforming. Ilin agreed to send the statement to conforming. -------------- -------------- EIGHTH AGREED STATEMENT: USE OF TELEMETRIC INFORMATION -------------- -------------- ¶9. (S) Ilin asked if the United States had a response to the Russian-proposed agreed statement on the use of telemetric information. Elliott responded that Under Secretary Tauscher and Ambassador Antonov were discussing this in the context of the offense-defense relationship. He went on to say he did not understand the utility of the agreed statement since neither side could ever prove that the other side was using telemetric information to enhance its missile defense capabilities. General Poznikhir stated that neither side had to prove anything. The sides were simply undertaking the obligation under international law not to use telemetric information to enhance missile defenses, he said. ¶10. (S) Elliott asked why, if the sides did not exchange telemetric data from the self-contained dispensing mechanism (SCDM) as was proposed by the Russian side, there was a need for the agreed statement, since the data resulting from the SCDM was of primary importance for missile defense. Poznikhir postulated that this agreed statement was not tied to the offense-defense discussion by the heads of delegation but was rather about the amount of data being exchanged. He could not understand why the U.S. side could not make such a statement unless the United States did, indeed, plan to use the telemetric information to update missile defense. He continued that Mr. Siemon was unwilling and unable to discuss this issue in the Telemetry Working Group. ¶11. (S) Dr. Warner answered that U.S. concerns over this proposed agreed statement were in part about missile defense, which was under negotiation by the heads of delegation, and in part about sensitivities the U.S. Senate had about missile defense restrictions being included in the treaty, a point which the U.S. Delegation had explained many times. Warner went on to note the U.S. side had already agreed to include language on missile defense in the treaty and the treaty needed to focus on strategic offensive arms. ¶12. (S) ADM Kuznetsov stated the Russian side had been opposed to the transfer of telemetric information because of the chance that the data provided by the Russian Federation could be used for testing missile defense. He was not accusing the United States of having used telemetric information to enhance missile defense in the past but rather stating the concern that telemetry could be used to enhance missile defense in the future. He emphasized that this was particularly a concern given the fact that the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty was no longer in force. He added that the Russian leadership had agreed to exchange telemetry but the link to missile defense was still a big worry. This was why the Russian Federation was insisting on this agreed statement so that the United States cannot use telemetric data to enhance missile defense. ¶13. (S) Kuznetsov continued that the agreed statement did not deal with the aspect of missile defense under negotiation by the Heads of Delegation but was tied to the amount of data being exchanged and the concern about that data being used to enhance missile defense, noting that this was particularly the case for the U.S. position on telemetry from the SCDM. He reiterated that telemetry is not tied to the larger missile defense issues. Elliott responded it was the last 5 words of this proposed agreed statement "modernization of missile defense systems" that would meet very strong opposition in the U.S. Senate and that we must not discuss missile defense in this treaty. Warner added that this phrase would be seen as a constraint on missile defense which would not survive Senate scrutiny. In response to Warner's comments, Kuznetsov stated that if the wording bothered the U.S. side, the U.S. side should work on it. The Russian side, however, would insist on keeping the substance of the agreed statement. ¶14. (S) Poznikhir stated the Russian side had heard no reason why the U.S. side needed SCDM data despite asking multiple times. The U.S. side had also asked for annual launch plans, and Poznikhir added that he had asked for the reason for that request as well. The reasons he was given - that it was for U.S. political reasons - caused him to recall that the Russian legislature was also very concerned about how telemetry could undermine Russian national security and very well understood that SCDM data can be used to update missile defense. Poznikhir proposed that "we should both calm down our respective legislatures." Warner inquired as to whether or not the Russian Federation would exchange telemetric information on the SCDM if the U.S. side signed the agreed statement. Poznikhir's immediate response was "no." ¶15. (S) Kuznetsov again asked why the U.S. side could not accept this agreed statement and said the statement would not limit what the United States was doing on missile defense. A problem would arise if the U.S. side used Russian data from the SCDM or other parameters to enhance missile defense. Elliott again asked if the U.S. side agreed SCDM data would not be exchanged, did the Russian side believe that there was still a need for this agreed statement. Ilin immediately responded "yes." ¶16. (U) Documents provided: None ¶17. (U) Participants: UNITED STATES Mr. Elliott Dr. Warner Mr. Brown Lt Col Goodman (RO) Mr. Taylor Mr. Sobchenko (Int) RUSSIA Col Ilin ADM Kuznetsov Gen Poznihir Col Zaitsev Ms. Komshilova (Int) ¶18. (U) Gottemoeller sends. KING