SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) TELEMETRY WORKING GROUP MEETING, FEBRUARY

S E C R E T GENEVA 000231 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXPQTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/28 TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) TELEMETRY WORKING GROUP MEETING, FEBRUARY 25, 2010 REF: 10 GENEVA 145 (SFO-GVA-VIII-072) CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-088. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: February 25, 2010 Time: 4:30 P.M. - 6:10 P.M. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) At the Telemetry Working Group meeting co-chaired by Mr. Siemon and General Poznikhir, the Russian side provided comments on the U.S.-proposed draft text ((Annex to the))1 Protocol ((Part Seven))2 - Telemetric Information, dated February 24, 2010. The Russian side offered a generally negative review of paragraphs 1 through 4 of Section I: General Provisions. For the most part, the Russian side emphasized the differences in the positions of the sides and a lack of understanding of the U.S. approach. End summary. ¶4. (U) Subject Summary: General Comments; and Section I: General Provisions. -------------- general comments -------------- ¶5. (S) Siemon had provided the U.S.-proposed draft text ((Annex to the))1 Protocol ((Part Seven))2 - Telemetric Information, dated February 24, 2010, to the Russian side the day before. The meeting focused on the Russian delegation's reaction to this draft text. Begin text: SFO-VIII Proposal of the U.S. Side February 24, 2010 ((Annex to the))1 Protocol ((Part Seven))2 - Telemetric Information Section 1. General Provisions ¶1. The Parties shall exchange telemetric information on an equal number of launches of ICBMs and SLBMs, but on no more than five launches of ICBMs and SLBMs per calendar year. (COMMENT: This text parallels paragraphs 1 and 2 of the U.S.-proposed protocol text.) ¶2. The launches of ICBMs or SLBMs, on which telemetric information is provided, shall be determined by the conducting Party ((in consultation with the monitoring Party. At the annual BCC exchange review meeting, the Parties shall discuss selection of launches on which telemetric information would be exchanged to ensure that parity is maintained))1. ¶3. Telemetric information shall be exchanged on ((five))1 ((the))2 launches of ICBMs and SLBMs conducted ((in the previous calendar year))2 ((unless one of the Parties launches fewer than five ICBMs and SLBMs in that year))1. The number of launches of ICBMs and SLBMs, about which telemetric information is exchanged, shall be ((discussed))1 ((agreed upon))2 at the first ((annual))2 session of the BCC of ((each))1 ((the current))2 year. ¶4. Each Party shall provide telemetric information to the other Party via diplomatic channels no later than ((__))1((30))2 days after a decision ((to exchange telemetry on a flight test))1 ((regarding this issue))2 has been made((by the BCC))2. ¶5. The conditions and guideline for the exchange of telemetric information on the launches of ICBMs and SLBMs shall be considered within the framework of the BCC. (COMMENT: This text parallels paragraph 3 of the U.S.-proposed protocol text.) ((The Bilateral Consultative Commission shall meet within 65 days after entry into force of the Treaty to discuss exchange of telemetric information on flight tests of ICBMs and SLBMs planned for that year. Thereafter, the Bilateral Consultative Commission shall meet within the first 65 days of each calendar year to discuss exchange of telemetric information on flight tests of ICBMs and SLBMs planned for that year, and to review the conditions and methods of further telemetric information exchange on flight tests of ICBMs and SLBMs.))1 In the event that one of the Parties raises a question concerning the need to change the ((conditions and methods of the exchange))1((quaQity and amount))2 of telemetric information ((transferred))2, the exchange of telemetric information shall be ((continued))1 ((suspended))2 until the Parties reach an agreement on the given change. ¶6. ((The number of flight tests on which telemetric information shall be exchanged in the remainder of the year in which the Treaty enters into force will be determined on a proportional basis.))1 Telemetric information shall ((not))2 be exchanged during the calendar year in which the Treaty expires ((on a proportional basis))1. Section II. Access to telemetric information ¶1. The Party conducting launches of ICBMs and SLBMs, on which telemetric information is provided, shall not take any measures to deny access to ((the telemetry signal))1 ((telemetric information))2 broadcast, including ((encryption,))2 jamming, encapsulation, and use of directional beaming. ((If encryption methods are used, the means to obtain the decrypted data shall be provided to the monitoring Party.))1 ¶2. In relation to launches of ICBMs and SLBMs on which telemetric information is not exchanged, each Party shall have the right to use any method of denying access to telemetric information which originates on board the missile and is broadcast. The Party conducting the launch shall notify the other Party, in accordance with Part Four of this Protocol, of the intention to take measures to deny access to telemetric information. ((3. For each launch for which telemetric information is exchanged, no less than 24 hours in advance of any flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, including a prototype ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test shall notify the other Party of all frequencies and associated modulation methods to be used to broadcast telemetric information during the flight test.))1 Section III. Guideline for the exchange of telemetric information ¶1. In the exchange of telemetric information, the Parties shall provide the recording media containing the recording of telemetric information broadcast during the ((flight test))1 ((launch, until the propulsion unit of the upper stage of ICBMs or SLBMs ceases to function,))2 as well as the interpretive data for the telemetric information provided, in accordance with the ((Section of the))1 Annex on Telemetric Information to this Protocol. ((The interpretive data provided shall be that necessary to permit the monitoring Party to extract independently the full representation of each data element contained in the telemetric information described in Paragraph 2 of this Section, including information to decrypt the telemetric information if encrypted.))1 ¶2. The Parties shall ((not))2 exchange ((all))1 telemetric information ((originating from the stages and self-contained dispensing mechanism, if so equipped, irrespective of broadcast or recovery method))1 ((broadcast after the propulsion unit of the upper stage of ICBMs or SLBMs ceases to function, as well as telemetric information that originated in (a) re-entry vehicle(s) or in other equipment, installed in the missile as payload))2. ¶3. During each launch of ICBMs or SLBMs, the Party conducting the launch shall not broadcast telemetric information via a re-entry vehicle pertaining to the function of stages ((and self-contained dispensing mechanism, if so equipped))1 of ICBMs or SLBMs. ¶4. The Party conducting a launch shall independently determine the method for recording telemetric information on recording media. ¶5. Each Party, in order to make it possible for the other Party to play back the recording of the telemetric information provided, shall: Qa) use those types of modulation, methods, modes and formats for recording, as well as methods for encoding telemetric information on recording media that will enable the conversion of the telemetric information to the form (format) originated on board the missile before broadcast, using telemetry playback equipment for which a demonstration has been conducted; b) conduct an initial demonstration ((, unless otherwise agreed or previously demonstrated))1 of the applicable recording media and telemetry playback equipment to be used, in accordance with the ((Section of the))1 Annex on Telemetric Information to this Protocol; c) conduct demonstrations of the recording media and (((or)))2 telemetry playback equipment that are different from those for which a demonstration has been previously conducted, in accordance with the ((Section of the))1 Annex on Telemetric Information to this Protocol; d) provide the other Party with the opportunity to acquire the telemetry playback equipment and spare parts for such equipment, ((if requested))1 in accordance with the ((Section of the))1 Annex on Telemetric Information to this Protocol; e) provide timely training in the operation and maintenance of the telemetry playback equipment to technical personnel of the other Party, ((if requested))1 in accordance with the ((Section of the))1 Annex on Telemetric Information to this Protocol; ¶6. If a Party that has received the media containing the recording of telemetric information, determines that the media does not contain the recording of the telemetric information in the amount specified in paragraph 1 of Section III of this Part, or that the quality of the telemetric information recorded on the media is insufficient to convert it to the form (format) originated on board the missile before broadcast, that Party shall provide notification in accordance with Part Four of ((the))1 ((this))2 Protocol. No later than 30 days after receiving such notification, the Party that has provided the media containing the recording of the telemetric information, shall provide notification in accordance with Part Four of ((the))1 ((this))2 Protocol explaining the reasons fQ the incompleteness or insufficient quality of the recording of telemetric information, or shall provide via diplomatic channels new media containing the recording of telemetric information. ((7. If a Party that has received the interpretative data for the telemetric information provided, determines that such data does not meet the requirements set forth in the Annex on Telemetric Information to this Protocol, or that the data received is insufficient to convert the recorded telemetric information to the form (format) originated on board the missile before broadcast, that Party shall provide notification in accordance with Part Four of this Protocol. No later than 30 days after receiving such notification, the Party that has provided the interpretative data for the telemetric information shall provide notification in accordance with Part Four of this Protocol specifying the procedure for using the interpretative data for telemetric information previously provided, or shall provide via diplomatic channels the revised interpretative data for telemetric information.))2 End text. ¶6. (S) Poznikhir stated the Russian side did not understand why the U.S. side had rejected the Russian-proposed Protocol. The Russian-proposed Protocol reflected the concept that obligations should be contained in the Protocol and technical details to implement the Treaty and Protocol should be contained in the Annexes. The U.S.-proposed Annex repeated language from its Protocol that Pozhikhir opined did not make sense, legally or logically. He said the U.S. approach of using brief protocol language would not speed up the work. ¶7. (S) As he had done in the previous meeting (Reftel),Siemon explained that the U.S. approach reflected agreements made by the Presidents during the January 27 phone call and the letter exchanged by the Presidents. The U.S. approach reflected Treaty and Protocol language that could be agreed rapidly to allow signature. The three paragraphs of the U.S.-proposed ProtQol were those agreed during the Admiral Mullen-General Makarov meetings in Moscow. Guidance from Washington directed the delegation to provide a simple, direct Protocol based on agreed language, which it had done. The U.S. proposal for the Annex took the Protocols of the two sides and merged them into one document that reflected the positions of both within brackets. It was meant to be a work in progress; the purpose was to stimulate discussion on similarities and differences in positions and to resolve bracketed text. ¶8. (S) As an example, Siemon noted the U.S.Qroposed title of the document that reflected both the Russian intent for a Protocol and the U.S. intent for an Annex. He also noted paragraph 1 and the first sentence of paragraph 5 of Section I: General Provisions, where the U.S. side included the Russian-proposed text without brackets. The U.S. side had instead included a comment at the end of each to show that they were parallel to the U.S.-proposed Protocol and also to indicate that discussion was necessary to decide where the two paragraphs should go. ¶9. (S) Poznikhir stated that Siemon's explanation still did not answer his question of why the U.S. side had chosen this approach since the parts of the Protocol that addressed conversion or elimination, notifications and inspection activities all used the approach that placed obligations in the Protocol and details in the Annex. Poznikhir stated that the Russian side would provide its proposal for the Annexes the next day. If each side would accommodate the other's positions an agreement could be reached quickly. He recommended the U.S. side use the Russian-proposed Annexes as a starting point for its proposed Annexes. Q -------------- Section I: General Provisions -------------- ¶10. (S) Poznikhir questioned the use of "parity" in the text of paragraph 2. How did this relate to the term "equal number" in paragraph 1? Siemon said that parity meant more than one thing; it reflected on which flights telemetry would be exchanged, as well as the kinds of information that would be exchanged. The Russian side had stated several times that its position was that telemetry would be exchanged only on launches from the previous calendar year. The conducting Party determined on which launches the telemetry would be exchanged and the number exchanged would be discussed in the annual reviews conducted in the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC). This was the fundamental position of the Russian side and it would not accept any other process. ¶11. (S) Siemon noted that it was the position of the U.S. side to discuss in the BCC launches of the current year on which telemetry would be exchanged. It was the U.S. view that the receiving Party had a role in the decision on which launches telemetry would be exchanged. Poznikhir dismissed the U.S. approach because it was not possible for the Russian side to discuss future launches. A schedule could change due to force majeure or technical issues. In addition a schedule of this type contained sensitive information that the Russian side would not release. He reemphasized the fundamental Russian position that it was the sole right of the conducting Party to determine on which launches telemetry would be exchanged. ¶12. (S) Poznikhir moved to the discussion of paragraph 3 which he believed conflicted with the obligations of both paragraph 1 of this document and paragraph 1 of the U.S-proposed Protocol. The U.S.-bracketed text in paragraph 3 obligated the sides to exchange telemetric information on five launches of ICBMs and SLBMs conducted in theQrevious calendar year unless one of the Parties launches fewer than five ICBMs and SLBMs in that year. The obligation appeared to conflict with the obligation in paragraph 1 in this document and with paragraph 1 of the U.S.-proposed Protocol since both used the formulation "no more than 5 launches." The Russian interpretation of "no more than five launches" meant that if a Party conducted 8 launches in the previous year the sides could decide in the BCC to exchange telemetry on 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 launches; but no more than 5 launches. Poznikhir believed the U.S.-proposed text in this example did not permit this decision but mandated that telemetry be exchanged on 5 launches. A lengthy discussion ensued in which Mr. Dean explained the legal consistency between the paragraphs. This did nothing to convince Poznikhir to change his view that the U.S. language was not internally consistent. ¶13. (S) Regarding paragraph 4 that addressed the provision of telemetric information through diplomatic channels, Siemon noted the United States included brackets that indicated that the U.S. side had not decided the number of days for when the exchange would occur after the decision was made to exchange telemetry on a Qight test. ¶14. (S) Poznikhir recommended the group conclude discussions for the day and pick up with paragraph 5 of Section I at the meeting the following day. Looking ahead to these discussions, Siemon stated that the U.S. side disagreed with Russian text on the suspension of telemetry exchange and on the lack of a role for the receiving Party in the decision on which launches telemetry would be exchanged. ¶15. (U) Documents provided: None. ¶16. (U) Participants: UNITED STATES Mr. Siemon Mr. Connell Mr. Dean Lt Col Goodman Mr. Hanchett (RO) Ms. Pura Dr. Ringenberg Ms. Smith (Int) RUSSIA Gen Poznikhir Ms. Fuzhenkova Col Ryzhkov Mr. Shevchenko Mr. Smirnov Mr. Voloskov Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) ¶17. (U) Gottemoeller sends. KING