SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) JOINT DRAFT TREATY TEXT, FEBRUARY 27, 2010

S E C R E T GENEVA 000229 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/28 TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) JOINT DRAFT TREATY TEXT, FEBRUARY 27, 2010 CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-099. ¶2. (U) The text at paragraph 3 is the joint draft text of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms dated February 27, 2010. ¶3. (S) Begin text: SFO-VIII Joint Draft Text February 27, 2010 TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON MEASURES FOR THE FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS The United States of America and the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Believing that global challenges and threats require new approaches to interaction across the whole range of their strategic relations, Working therefore to forge a new strategic relationship based on mutual trust, openness, predictability, and cooperation, Desiring to bring their respective nuclear postures into alignment with this new relationship, and endeavoring to reduce further the role and importance of nuclear weapons, Committed to the fulfillment of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968, and to the achievement of the historic goal of freeing humanity from the nuclear threat, Expressing strong support for on-going global efforts in non-proliferation, Seeking to preserve continuity in, and provide new impetus to, the step-by-step process of reducing and limiting nuclear arms while maintaining the safety and security of their nuclear arsenals, and with a view to expanding this process in the future, including to a multilateral approach, Guided by the principle of indivisible security and convinced that measures for the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms and the other obligations set forth in this Treaty will enhance predictability and stability, and thus the security of both Parties, Recognizing the existence of the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms and that this interrelationship will become more important as strategic nuclear arms are reduced, Mindful of the impact of conventionally armed ICBMs and SLBMs on strategic stability, Taking into account the positive effect on the world situation of the significant, verifiable reduction in nuclear arsenals at the turn of the 21st century, Desiring to create a mechanism for verifying compliance with the obligations under this Treaty, adapted, simplified, and made less costly in comparison to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the START Treaty, Recognizing that the START Treaty has been implemented by the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the United States of America, and that the reduction levels envisaged by the START Treaty were achieved, Deeply appreciating the contribution of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to nuclear disarmament and to strengthening international peace and security as non-nuclear-weapon states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968, Welcoming the implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions of May 24, 2002, Have agreed as follows: Article I ¶1. Each Party shall reduce and limit its strategic offensive arms in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty and shall carry out the other obligations set forth in this Treaty and its Protocol. ¶2. Definitions of terms used in this Treaty and its Protocol are provided in Part One of the Protocol. Article II ¶1. Each Party shall reduce and limit its ICBMs and ICBM launchers, SLBMs and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, and heavy bomber nuclear armaments, so that seven years after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, the aggregate numbers, as counted in accordance with Article III of this Treaty, do not exceed: (a) 700, for deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers; (b) 1550, for warheads on deployed ICBMs, warheads on deployed SLBMs, and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers; (c) 800, for deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed SLBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers. ¶2. Each Party shall have the right to determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms. Article III ¶1. For the purposes of counting toward the aggregate limit provided for in subparagraph 1(a) of Article II of this Treaty: (a) Each deployed ICBM shall be counted as one. (b) Each deployed SLBM shall be counted as one. (c) Each deployed heavy bomber shall be counted as one. ¶2. For the purposes of counting toward the aggregate limit provided for in subparagraph 1(b) of Article II of this Treaty: (a) For ICBMs and SLBMs, the number of warheads shall be the number of reentry vehicles emplaced on deployed ICBMs and on deployed SLBMs. (b) One nuclear warhead shall be counted for each deployed heavy bomber. ¶3. For purposes of counting toward the aggregate limit provided for in subparagraph 1(c) of Article II of this Treaty: (a) Each deployed launcher of ICBMs shall be counted as one. (b) Each non-deployed launcher of ICBMs shall be counted as one. (c) Each deployed launcher of SLBMs shall be counted as one. (d) Each non-deployed launcher of SLBMs shall be counted as one. (e) Each deployed heavy bomber shall be counted as one. (f) Each non-deployed heavy bomber shall be counted as one. ¶4. For the purposes of this Treaty, including counting ICBMs and SLBMs: (a) For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages, the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM of a particular type shall be considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of that type. (b) For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles without launch canisters, an assembled missile of a particular type shall be considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of that type. (c) For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters, an assembled missile of a particular type, in its launch canister, shall be considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of that type. (d) Each launch canister shall be considered to contain an ICBM or SLBM from the time it first leaves a facility at which an ICBM or SLBM is installed in it, until an ICBM or SLBM has been launched from it, or until an ICBM or SLBM has been removed from it for elimination. A launch canister shall not be considered to contain an ICBM or SLBM if it contains a training model of a missile or has been placed on static display. Launch canisters for ICBMs or SLBMs of a particular type shall be distinguishable from launch canisters for ICBMs or SLBMs of a different type. ¶5. Newly constructed strategic offensive arms shall begin to be subject to this Treaty as follows: (a) an ICBM, when it first leaves a production facility; (b) a mobile launcher of ICBMs, when it first leaves a production facility; (c) a silo launcher of ICBMs, when the silo door is first installed and closed; (d) an SLBM, when it first leaves a production facility; (e) an SLBM launcher, when the submarine on which that launcher is installed is first launched; (f) a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments, when its airframe is first brought out of the shop, plant, or building in which components of such a heavy bomber are assembled to produce complete airframes; or when its airframe is first brought out of the shop, plant, or building in which existing bomber airframes are converted to such heavy bomber airframes. ¶6. ICBMs, SLBMs, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers shall cease to be subject to this Treaty in accordance with Parts Three and Four of the Protocol to this Treaty. ICBMs or SLBMs of an existing type shall cease to be subject to this Treaty if all ICBM or SLBM launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs of that type have been eliminated or converted in accordance with Part Three of the Protocol to this Treaty. ¶7. For the purposes of this Treaty: (a) A ballistic missile of a type developed and tested solely to intercept and counter objects not located on the surface of the Earth shall not be considered to be a ballistic missile to which the provisions of this Treaty apply. (b) Within the same type, a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments shall be distinguishable from a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments. (c) Heavy bombers of the same type shall cease to be subject to this Treaty ((or to the limitations thereof))2 when the last heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments of that type is eliminated or converted((, as appropriate,))2 to a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments in accordance with Part Three of the Protocol to this Treaty. ¶8. As of the date of signature of this Treaty: (a) Existing types of ICBMs are: (i) for the United States of America, the Minuteman II, Minuteman III, and Peacekeeper; (ii) for the Russian Federation, the RS-12M, RS-12M2, RS-18, RS-20, and RS-24. (b) Existing types of SLBMs are: (i) for the Russian Federation, the RSM-50, RSM-52, RSM-54, and RSM-56; (ii) for the United States of America, the Trident II. (c) Existing types of heavy bombers are: (i) for the United States of America, the B-52G, B-52H, B-1B, and B-2A; (ii) for the Russian Federation, the Tu-95MS and Tu-160. (d) Existing types of ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers are: (i) for the Russian Federation, ICBM launchers RS-12M, RS-12M2, RS-18, RS-20, RS-24; SLBM launchers RSM-50, RSM-52, RSM-54, and RSM-56; (ii) for the United States of America, ICBM launchers Minuteman II, Minuteman III, and Peacekeeper; the SLBM launchers Trident II. Article IV ¶1. Each Party shall locate: (a) deployed launchers of ICBMs only at ICBM bases; (b) deployed launchers of SLBMs only on ballistic missile submarines. ¶2. Each Party shall base deployed heavy bombers only at air bases. ¶3. Each Party shall locate: (a) non-deployed launchers of ICBMs only at ICBM bases, production facilities, ICBM loading facilities, repair facilities, storage facilities, conversion or elimination facilities, training facilities, test ranges, and space launch facilities. Mobile launchers of prototype ICBMs shall not be located at maintenance facilities of ICBM bases; (b) non-deployed ICBMs and non-deployed SLBMs only at ICBM bases, submarine bases, ICBM or SLBM loading facilities, ((maintenance facilities of ICBM bases,))1 repair facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs, storage facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs, conversion or elimination facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs, training facilities, test ranges, space launch facilities, and production facilities. Prototype ICBMs and prototype SLBMs, however, shall not be located at maintenance facilities of ICBM bases or at submarine bases. ¶4. Non-deployed ICBMs and non-deployed SLBMs as well as non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs may be in transit. Each Party shall limit the duration of each transit between facilities to no more than 30 days. ¶5. Test launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs may be located only at test ranges. ¶6. Training launchers may be located only at ICBM bases, training facilities, and test ranges. The number of silo training launchers located at each ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs shall not exceed one for each type of ICBM specified for that ICBM base. ¶7. Each Party shall limit the number of test heavy bombers to no more than ten. ¶8. Each Party shall base test heavy bombers only at heavy bomber flight test centers. Non-deployed heavy bombers other than test heavy bombers shall be located only at repair facilities or production facilities for heavy bombers. ¶9. Each Party shall not carry out at an air base joint basing of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments and heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, unless otherwise agreed by the Parties. ¶10. Strategic offensive arms shall not be located at eliminated facilities except during their movement through such facilities and during visits of heavy bombers at such facilities. ¶11. Strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty shall not be based outside the national territory of each Party. The obligations provided for in this paragraph shall not affect the Parties' rights in accordance with generally recognized principles and rules of international law relating to the passage of submarines or flights of aircraft, or relating to visits of submarines to ports of third States. Heavy bombers may be temporarily located outside the national territory, notification of which shall be provided in accordance with Part Four of the Protocol to this Treaty. Article V ¶1. Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried out. ¶2. When a Party believes that a new kind of strategic offensive arm is emerging, that Party shall have the right to raise the question of such a strategic offensive arm for consideration in the Bilateral Consultative Commission. ((3. Each Party undertakes not to convert and not to use ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers for placement of missile defense interceptors therein. Each Party further undertakes not to convert and not to use launchers of missile defense interceptors for placement of ICBMs and SLBMs therein. This provision shall not apply to ICBM launchers that were converted prior to signature of this Treaty for placement of missile defense interceptors therein.))3 Article VI ¶1. Conversion, elimination, or other means of removal from accountability of strategic offensive arms and facilities shall be carried out in accordance with Part Three of the Protocol to this Treaty. ¶2. Notifications related to conversion, elimination, or other means of removal from accountability shall be provided in accordance with Parts Three and Four of the Protocol to this Treaty. ¶3. Verification of conversion or elimination in accordance with this Treaty shall be carried out by: (a) national technical means of verification in accordance with Article X of this Treaty; and (b) inspection activities as provided for in Article XI of this Treaty. Article VII ¶1. A database pertaining to the obligations under this Treaty shall be created in accordance with Parts Two and Four of the Protocol to this Treaty. Categories for this database shall be included in Part Two of the Protocol to this Treaty. ¶2. Each Party shall notify the other Party about changes in data and shall provide other notifications in a manner provided for in Part Four of the Protocol to this Treaty. ¶3. Each Party shall use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in order to provide and receive notifications unless otherwise provided for in this Treaty. ¶4. Each Party may provide additional notifications on a voluntary basis, in addition to the notifications specified in paragraph 2 of this Article, if it deems this necessary to ensure confidence in the fulfillment of obligations assumed under this Treaty. ¶5. The Parties shall hold consultations within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission on releasing to the public data and information obtained during the implementation of this Treaty. The Parties shall have the right to release to the public such data and information following agreement thereon within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission. Each Party shall have the right to release to the public data related to their respective strategic offensive arms. ¶6. Geographic coordinates relating to data provided in Part Two of the Protocol to this Treaty, unique identifiers, site diagrams of facilities provided by the Parties pursuant to this Treaty, as well as coastlines and waters diagrams provided by the Parties pursuant to this Treaty shall not be released to the public unless otherwise agreed by the Parties within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission. ¶7. Notwithstanding paragraph 5 of this Article, the aggregate number of deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers; the aggregate number of warheads on deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers; and the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed SLBM launchers, as well as deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers, may be released to the public by the Parties. Article VIII In those cases in which one of the Parties determines that its actions may lead to ambiguous situations, that Party shall take measures to ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty and to enhance confidence, openness, and predictability concerning the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. Such measures may include, among other things, providing information in advance on activities of that Party associated with deployment or increased readiness of strategic offensive arms, to preclude the possibility of misinterpretation of its actions by the other Party. This information shall be provided through diplomatic or other channels. ((Article IX By mutual agreement of the Parties, telemetric information on ((flight tests))1 ((launches))2 of ICBMs and SLBMs shall be exchanged on a parity basis. The Parties shall agree on the amount of exchange of such telemetric information.))3 Article X ¶1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party undertakes: (a) to use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law; (b) not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with this Article; and (c) not to use concealment measures that impede verification, by national technical means of verification, of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty. ¶2. The obligation not to use concealment measures includes the obligation not to use them at test ranges, including measures that result in the concealment of ICBMs, SLBMs, ICBM launchers, or the association between ICBMs or SLBMs and their launchers during testing. The obligation not to use concealment measures shall not apply to cover or concealment practices at ICBM bases or to the use of environmental shelters for strategic offensive arms. Article XI ¶1. For the purpose of confirming the accuracy of declared data on strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty and ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct inspection activities in accordance with this Article and Part Five of the Protocol to this Treaty. ¶2. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections at ICBM bases, submarine bases, and air bases. The purpose of such inspections shall be to confirm the accuracy of declared data on the numbers and types of deployed and non-deployed strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty; the number of warheads located on deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs; and the number of nuclear armaments located on deployed heavy bombers. Such inspections shall hereinafter be referred to as Type One inspections. ¶3. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections at facilities identified as facilities subject to inspection in Part Two of the Protocol to this Treaty except for the facilities specified in paragraph 2 of this Article. The purpose of such inspections shall be to confirm the accuracy of declared data on the numbers, types, and technical characteristics of non-deployed strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty and to confirm that strategic offensive arms have been converted or eliminated. In addition, each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections at formerly declared facilities, which are listed in Part Two of the Protocol to this Treaty, to confirm that such facilities are not being used for purposes inconsistent with this Treaty. The inspections provided for in this paragraph shall hereinafter be referred to as Type Two inspections. ¶4. Each Party shall conduct exhibitions and have the right to participate in exhibitions conducted by the other Party. The purpose of such exhibitions shall be to demonstrate distinguishing features and to confirm technical characteristics of new types, to demonstrate the results of conversion of the first item of each type of strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty. Article XII To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties hereby establish the Bilateral Consultative Commission, procedures for the operation of which are set forth in Part Six of the Protocol to this Treaty, to: (a) resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed; (b) agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty; and (c) resolve questions related to the applicability of provisions of this Treaty to a new kind of strategic offensive arm. Article XIII To ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party shall not assume any international obligations or undertakings that would conflict with its provisions. The Parties undertake not to transfer strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty to third parties. The Parties shall hold consultations in accordance with Article XII of this Treaty in order to resolve any ambiguities that may arise in this regard. This provision shall not apply to any patterns of cooperation, including obligations, in the area of strategic offensive arms, existing at the time of signature of this Treaty, between a Party and a third State. Article XIV ¶1. This Treaty, including its Protocol, which is an integral part thereof, shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification. ¶2. This Treaty shall remain in force for 10 years unless superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. If either Party raises the issue of extension of this Treaty, the Parties shall jointly consider the matter. If the Parties decide to extend this Treaty, it will be extended for a period of no more than five years unless it is superseded before the expiration of that period by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. ¶3. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party. Such notice shall contain a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. This Treaty shall terminate three months from the date of receipt by the other Party of the aforementioned notice, unless the notice specifies a later date. ¶4. As of the date of its entry into force, this Treaty shall supersede the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions of May 24, 2002, which shall terminate as of that date. Article XV ¶1. Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing entry into force of this Treaty. ¶2. If it becomes necessary to make changes in the Protocol to this Treaty that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under this Treaty, the Parties shall use the Bilateral Consultative Commission to reach agreement on such changes, without resorting to the procedure for making amendments that is set forth in paragraph 1 of this Article. Article XVI This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. Done at (location and date),in two originals, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION: (( ))1 Proposed by the United States (( ))2 Proposed by the Russian Federation (( ))3 For Discussion by the Heads of Delegation End text. ¶4. (U) Gottemoeller sends. KING