SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) Inspection Protocol Working Group Meeting,

S E C R E T GENEVA 000227 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/28 TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) Inspection Protocol Working Group Meeting, February 18, 2010 REF: 10 GENEVA 199 (SFO-GVA-VIII-059) CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-062. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: February 18, 2010 Time: 3:30 P.M. - 6:00 P.M. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) At the Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG) meeting chaired by Dr. Warner and Col Ilin, the sides continued work on Part Six of the Annex on Inspection Activities (Procedures for Type-1 Inspections) including changes needed to Section I (Pre-Inspection Procedures) and a paragraph-by-paragraph review of Section II (Procedures for Inspection of Warheads Located on Deployed ICBMs and SLBMs). The Russian side proposed text on the issue of additional objects contained on the front sections of ICBMs and SLBMs that are declared not to be re-entry vehicles (RVs) with nuclear or non-nuclear warheads. End summary. ¶4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Wrapping up Homework on Section I; Paragraph-by-Paragraph, Blow-By-Blow on Section II; Fifteen Minutes Remain; and Time to Talk About RVs and Additional Objects. -------------- WRAPPING UP HOMEWORK ON SECTION I -------------- ¶5. (S) Ilin proposed the sides continue discussion on Part Six of the Annex on Inspection Activities that was started in the previous meeting (REFTEL). Ilin explained the Russian position on subparagraph 1(f) of Section I and agreed to drop the brackets from around the term "basing areas." He stated, however, that the brackets in paragraph 3 of Section I around the term "basing areas" would remain. After Warner agreed to continue through this annex point-by-point, Ilin asked if the U.S. side had considered Russia's inputs to paragraphs 2, 3, and 5 of Section I. ¶6. (S) Warner proposed to delete paragraph 5 of Section I dealing with items of inspection located along non-contiguous parts of an inspection site connected by roads depicted on site diagrams. He explained that the United States had not been able to develop a workable solution regarding non-contiguous parts of an inspection site connected by roads. Zaitsev commented that when an inspection team arrived, the in-country escort would brief the location of all items of inspection and nothing would depart the inspection site. Ilin agreed to the deletion. ¶7. (S) Warner offered to make a change to paragraph 6 of Section VI of Part Five of the Protocol (Inspection Activities) regarding the issue of providing a reason when items of inspection were absent during inspections. This change would replace the term "the inspection site" with the language "the designated ICBM base, submarine base, or air base." Ilin agreed. -------------- -------------- PARAGRAPH-BY-PARAGRAPH, BLOW-BY-BLOW ON SECTION II -------------- -------------- ¶8. (S) Moving on to Section II on Procedures for Inspection of Warheads Located on Deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, Warner began by reading the U.S.-proposed text paragraph-by-paragraph of this Section, with Ilin providing comments or suggestions throughout. The term "deployed" and "designated" were added in front of the terms ICBM or SLBM throughout the text, where appropriate. ¶9. (S) On subparagraph 1(a),referencing the geographic coordinates specified for that silo launcher, Ilin proposed to add the phrase "in Part II of the Protocol" since the coordinates would be listed in the treaty database. Warner agreed. ¶10. (S) On subparagraph 1(b),referencing the observation of the silo from no more than 50 meters, Ilin proposed to add the phrase "or more than 50 meters if agreed to by both the in-country escort and member of the inspecting party." Warner agreed. ¶11. (S) On subparagraph 1(c),referencing the opportunity to familiarize inspectors with the vicinity of the ICBM or SLBM launcher upon arrival, Ilin queried why this description of the orientation process was needed. Having never himself been on an inspection, Ilin asked why there was no time limit associated with this process and why an unspecified term like "vicinity" was used. Following some discussion on this section, Warner proposed to leave this section in brackets, adding that the U.S. side could perhaps rework the language to a more palatable rendition. ¶12. (S) On subparagraph 1(d),referencing continuous observation of the designated launcher, Ilin inquired why the purpose of this observation needed to be stated in the paragraph. He observed that identification of the purpose for a particular procedure was present in some paragraphs and not in others and that the purpose of the steps in the procedures to ensure that no additional RVs were present was obvious. Warner agreed to consider standardization of the purpose statement, and the two agreed to keep this text in brackets. ¶13. (S) On subparagraph 1(e),referencing the provision associated with informing the inspection team of the opening of the launcher door or hatch, Ilin asked that the text be changed to reflect that the time of opening be "determined by" vice "at the discretion of" the inspected Party. Warner agreed. ¶14. (S) On subparagraph 1(f),referencing inspection of vehicles arriving or leaving the vicinity of the launcher once the launcher door or hatch was open; Ilin again queried as to the need for this paragraph, as he was told, this had never been an issue during START inspections. He pointed out that the inspectors could see all of the vehicles and would be able to tell if objects were placed into any of these vehicles. Warner replied that this type of issue may not have arisen in the past precisely because this provision existed; one could not know. Ilin continued down his own line of argument, resulting in the text remaining in brackets. ¶15. (S) Warner jumped ahead to paragraph 5, referencing a prohibition on removal of RVs between designation of the launcher for warhead inspection and completion of the viewing of the front section. Warner proposed to rework this text to cover the necessary time periods and move this text forward in the section. Warner offered that this solution would solve the earlier concerns with standardization of purpose statements. Ilin agreed, although he stated that the text should remain in brackets as it may be revisited following later discussions on the issues of additional objects contained on the front sections of ICBMs and SLBMs that are declared not to be RVs with nuclear or non-nuclear warheads. ¶16. (S) Returning to subparagraph 1(f),Warner provided examples of items - such as the Trident II closure cap, SS-18 upper tube extension, and silo-based SS-27 launch canister extension - that are removed from the missiles, placed in a vehicle and driven away from the inspection site. If this provision was not retained, inspectors could not confirm whether or not RVs were also being removed. Ilin retorted that as all of these items remained on site; none of this was an issue for vehicles. Maj Johnson countered by noting that the SS-18 upper tube extension was, in fact, taken away by vehicle. ¶17. (S) Proceeding to paragraph 4, referencing movement of a designated submarine to a specially allocated site, Ilin proposed that this language should be combined with that of the mobile launchers. He volunteered that the Russian side would prepare this text for the next meeting. Ilin also asked about SSGNs, and Warner said that he would see about the language. Warner cautioned that the SSGN issue may have to wait until later discussion on non-deployed launchers. ¶18. (S) On paragraph 6, referencing the viewing of the ICBM or SLBM front section directly in or on the ICBM or SLBM launcher, Ilin asked about whether language on partial separation was still needed. Warner agreed to look into it, stating that it could certainly be deleted if it was found to no longer apply. Discussion followed on the specifics regarding temporary structures and vehicles used during these procedures. -------------- FIFTEEN MINUTES REMAIN, TIME TO TALK ABOUT RVS AND ADDITIONAL OBJECTS -------------- ¶19. (S) As in the previous meeting (REFTEL),Ilin noted there was fifteen minutes remaining and requested to skip ahead to paragraph 13 on the issue of additional objects contained on the front sections of ICBMs and SLBMs that are declared not to be RVs with nuclear or non-nuclear warheads. Ilin stated that the Russian side had prepared two texts on this matter and handed over copies of a proposed Agreed Statement on Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Objects as well as draft text that would replace the U.S.-proposed text for paragraph 13. ¶20. (S) Begin text: Proposal of the Russian Side February 18, 2010 Agreed Statement: "The Parties agree, that only RVs with nuclear warheads that are subject to counting towards the aggregate limit under the Treaty, and other objects, that are not RVs with nuclear warheads that are not subject to counting towards the aggregate limit under the Treaty may be placed on ICBMs or SLBMs at the same time." Proposal of the Russian Side for Part Six Section II of the Annex on Inspection Activities: ¶13. "If a member of the in-country escort declares that objects, contained in the front section simultaneously with RVS with nuclear warheads, are not RVs with nuclear warheads, the inspecting Party shall have the right to designate one of these objects for inspection. The inspected Party shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of the inspectors that such designated objects are not RVs- with nuclear warheads. Radiation detection equipment, provided for in Part Five of the Annex on Inspection Activities to this Protocol, may be used, at the discretion of the inspected Party, in order to demonstrate to the inspectors, that the object, contained in the front section and declared by the in-country escort not to be a nuclear warhead, is in fact not a nuclear warhead. The use of radiation detection equipment shall be conducted in accordance with Part Five of the Annex on Inspection Activities to this Protocol." End text. ¶21. (S) Warner agreed to review these statements and pass them to the necessary people. ¶22. (S) Warner thanked Ilin for the constructive work on the Annex during the last two meetings. He offered that, given the deadlines and the amount of work remaining, the United States was prepared to meet every day to get the necessary Protocol and Annex documents ready for signature and eventual ratification. Ilin deferred, replying that Ambassador Antonov had given him no orders on the need to finish annexes. ¶23. (U) Documents provided: - Russia -- Proposed Agreed Statement on Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Objects, dated February 18, 2010 -- Proposal for Part Six Section II Paragraph 13 of the Annex on Inspection Activities, dated February 18, 2010 ¶24. (U) Participants: UNITED STATES Dr. Warner Mr. Ahlm Mr. Albertson (RO) Mr. Buttrick Mr. Couch Maj Johnson LTC Litterini Mr. Rust Mr. Smith Ms. Gesse (Int) RUSSIA Col Ilin Ms. Vodopolova Col Zaitsev Ms. Shustova (Int) ¶25. (U) Gottemoeller sends. KING