SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) NOTIFICATIONS WORKING GROUP MEETING,

S E C R E T GENEVA 000223

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/28
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SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) NOTIFICATIONS WORKING GROUP MEETING,
FEBRUARY 24, 2010

REF: 10 GENEVA 185 (SFO-GVA-VIII-073)
10 GENEVA 191 (SFO-GVA-VIII-075)

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-082.




2. (U) Meeting Date: February 24, 2010

Time: 3:30 P.M. - 6:00 P.M.

Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva



--------------

SUMMARY

--------------




3. (S) At the Notifications Working Group meeting chaired by Mr.
Siemon and Col Ryzhkov, the sides continued discussion of the
U.S-proposed Joint Draft Text of Part Four to the Protocol to the
Treaty - Notifications (REF A). The U.S. side clarified
U.S.-proposed changes for which the Russian side provided counter
proposals. End summary.




4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Section III: Notifications Concerning
the Movement of Strategic Offensive Arms; Section IV: Notifications
Concerning ((Flight Test))1 ((Launches))2 of ICBMS or SLBMs;
Section V: Notifications Concerning Conversion or Elimination; and
Section VI: Notifications Concerning Inspections and Exhibitions.



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Section III: Notifications Concerning

the Movement of Strategic Offensive Arms

--------------




5. (S) Ryzhkov recommended the sides defer discussion of Section
I: General Provisions and Section II: Notifications Concerning
the Database, since he would provide Russian-proposed text the next
day. Siemon agreed and moved to discussion of Section III:
Notifications Concerning the Movement of Strategic Offensive Arms.
He indicated that the brackets remaining in Section III were tied
to time periods for specific events. Siemon believed the
Russian-bracketed "five days" in paragraph 1 for the notification
of the completion of transit was consistent with the notification
for an update to the database. Ryzhkov stated that was correct;
however, there was more involved. The Russian side proposed a
five-day time period because experience under START demonstrated
that a 48-hour time period was difficult for Russian Nuclear Risk
Reduction Center (NRRC) personnel to meet, since data required for
the message routinely arrived late from repair and production


facilities. It was also a matter of convenience since it was
problematic for NRRC personnel to disseminate notifications on
weekends and holidays. These could easily be transmitted on a
Monday if a longer time period was selected. The sides agreed to
leave the text bracketed. There were no brackets in paragraph 2
relating to the movement of solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs from a
production facility. Siemon recommended the sides defer discussion
of paragraphs 3 and 4 on heavy bomber visits since discussion of
the definitions of deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers had not
been completed in the Definitions Working Group.




6. (S) Ryzhkov took the opportunity to discuss the Russian concept
of "basing" versus "locating" as it related to the definition of a
deployed and non-deployed heavy bomber. The Russian side believed
that "basing" indicated the permanent stationing of a heavy bomber
at a base. The deployed heavy bomber was not required to be
physically present at the base. It could be temporarily located at
other facilities, for example a production or repair facility, and
still be deployed. The deployed heavy bomber remained based at its
home air base when it went to either of these facilities and then
returned to its home base. A non-deployed heavy bomber was a heavy
bomber that had a permanent presence at a production or repair
facility. Siemon noted that members of the Ad Hoc Group planned to
discuss this issue at their meeting the following day, and
suggested, the sides defer further discussion. Ryzhkov agreed and
the text remained bracketed.




7. (S) Siemon stated that the U.S. side could accept the
Russian-proposed 48-hour time period in paragraph 5 relating to the
notification of the beginning of a major strategic exercise if the
Russian side could accept a 48-hour time period for the
notification of the completion of a major strategic exercise in
paragraph 6. Ryzhkov accepted the U.S.-proposed 48-hour time
period in paragraph 5 but could not accept it in paragraph 6. The
sides had a discussion of the no less than 14 day advance
notification for the beginning of a major strategic exercise
required under the Agreement Between the Government of the United
States of America and The Government of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on Reciprocal Advance Notification of Major
Strategic Exercises, dated September 23, 1989. Siemon noted that
with the obligations under the Agreement and the obligations that
would exist under the new treaty, the sides would be providing two,
similar notifications for the beginning of each major strategic
exercise. Ryzhkov agreed and noted that he had addressed this
issue at the NRRC-to-NRRC consultations five years earlier. He
remarked that his U.S. colleagues suggested that the sides retain
the START notification and its time period; therefore, two
notifications were required. Ryzhkov offered that the sides'
lawyers might be able to resolve the issue. Mr. Dean clarified
that the 1989 Agreement only required notification at the beginning
of one major strategic exercise per year and the new treaty would
require notification of the beginning and completion of all major
strategic exercises. Responding to a question from Ryzhkov, Dean
said it was not necessary to address the 1989 Agreement in the new
treaty. The text remained bracketed in paragraphs 5 and 6.



-------------- --------------

Section Iv: Notifications Concerning ((Flight Test))1


((Launches))2 of ICBMS or SLBMs

-------------- --------------




8. (S) Siemon noted that he and Adm (Ret) Kuznetsov had discussed
the term "launch" in the Definitions Working Group the previous day
(Ref B). Ryzhkov was aware of these discussions and said the
Russian side preferred "launch" versus "flight test" since "launch"
included both flight tests and launches to place an object into
space; whereas "flight test" excluded space launches.




9. (S) Siemon noted the definition also was tied to the Telemetry
Protocol in which the U.S. side believed telemetry should be
exchanged on both flights tests and launches to deliver objects
into space. The sides agreed to leave the text bracketed.



--------------

Section V: Notifications

Concerning Conversion or Elimination

--------------




10. (S) Ryzhkov believed the U.S.-bracketed word "planned" in
subparagraph 1(a) relating to advance notification of the intent to
initiate a conversion or elimination could be deleted since it was
self evident that when a side "intended to initiate" a conversion
or elimination it "planned to initiate" the conversion or
elimination. Siemon agreed to delete "planned." Ryzhkov believed
that U.S.-bracketed subparagraph 1(d) that referenced a
notification concerning the inspection of batched items was not
needed if the sides included remarks on batching in the
notification required by subparagraph 1(c) that required a
notification after the completion of conversion or elimination.
Siemon agreed and subparagraph 1(d) was deleted. The sides removed
all brackets in paragraph 2 which resulted in agreement of all text
in Section V. The agreed Section is as follows:



Begin text:



Section V. Notifications Concerning Conversion or Elimination




1. For conversion or elimination of ICBMs or SLBMs, launch
canisters for ICBMs and SLBMs, ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers,
heavy bombers, and facilities:



(a) Notification, no less than 30 days in advance of the initiation


of conversion or elimination, of intent to conduct a conversion or
elimination



(b) Notification, no later than five days after the initiation of a
conversion or elimination.



(c) Notification, no later than five days after the completion of
conversion or elimination procedures.




2. Notification, no later than 20 days after each calendar year,
of the number and types of strategic offensive arms scheduled for
conversion or elimination during the year.



End text.



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Section VI: Notifications

Concerning inspections and exhibitions

--------------




11. (S) Siemon remarked that the sides agreed on text in
paragraphs 1 through 6. Bracketed language in paragraph 7 that
referenced objection to individuals on the initial and amended list
of inspectors and aircrew members was fundamentally the same.
Ryzhkov agreed and believed the sides' lawyers could resolve any
differences in the language.




12. (S) Ryzhkov accepted U.S.-bracketed text in paragraph 8 and
the agreed paragraph was as follows:



Begin text:




8. Notification containing the agreed list of inspectors and
aircrew members shall be provided in conjunction with the six-month
database update of Part Two of this Protocol.



End text.




13. (S) Ryzhkov believed paragraph 9 which referenced the
objection of an inspector or aircrew member on the agreed list


could be deleted since paragraph 7 covered this situation. Siemon
indicated paragraph 9 was needed to remove an individual from the
agreed list without waiting for the submission of an amended list.
Siemon agreed to delete paragraph 9 with the understanding that the
sides could return to it if necessary after the sides' lawyers had
resolved the text in paragraph 7. Ryzhkov agreed.




14. (S) Siemon stated that after discussing the issue of the time
period for the declaration of the intent to conduct an inspection
with Dr. Warner, he believed the issue required work in the
Inspection Protocol Working Group. Ryzhkov noted that this
declaration was not as important as the site declaration time since
the site declaration time drove the beginning of pre-inspection
procedures and the time to transport inspectors to the declared
facility. Ryzhkov repeated his complaint about the logistical
burden placed on the Russian side by a 16-hour time period. In
addition, the manner in which the U.S. side notified its intent to
conduct an inspection also placed a burden on the Russian side.
The Russian side consistently received the notification on a
weekend for a team arriving on a Monday. This required Ryzhkov, as
Head of the Russian NRRC, to call in personnel to make logistical
arrangements for the incoming team. Siemon believed there was room
for compromise but the text would remain bracketed until a decision
was made outside of the Notifications Working Group.




15. (S) The sides agreed on the Russian-proposed text in paragraph
11 with the additional change to replace "messages" with
"notifications" in the last sentence of the text. The text was as
follows:



Begin text:



Notification, provided by the inspected Party no later than 30 days
after entry into force of the Treaty of the determination of agreed
geographic coordinates of reference points, used at the point of
entry. Subsequently, the inspected Party shall provide
supplementary notifications on changes to these reference points.



End text.




16. (S) No movement was made on paragraph 12 regarding the
notification of a change to the boundaries of the inspection and
coastlines and waters diagrams. The Russian side deleted its
bracketed text in paragraphs 13 and 14. The agreed text was as
follows:



Begin text:




13. Notification of intent to conduct an exhibition shall be


provided no less than 30 days in advance of the planned date of the
exhibition.




14. Notification of intention to participate in an exhibition
shall be provided no less than 72 hours in advance of the planned
date of the exhibition



End text.




17. (S) The sides agreed on the following text in paragraph 15
which addressed notifications provided by the inspection team
during inspections:



Begin text:




15. Notification provided by the inspection team chief in writing
to a member of the in-country escort during inspection.



End text.




18. (S) Maj Johnson walked Ryzhkov through a time line for
declaration of a sequential inspection which occurred after the
return of the inspection team to the point of entry. Ryzhkov
stated that this clarified the U.S.-proposed text and he would
provide Russian-proposed text for the paragraph at a later date.




19. (U) Documents provided: None.




20. (U) Participants:



UNITED STATES



Mr. Siemon

Mr. Albertson

Mr. Dean

Mr. Dwyer

Dr. Fraley

Mr. Hanchett(RO)



Maj Johnson

LTC Litterini

Mr. Stickney

Ms. Gross (Int)



RUSSIA



Col Ryzhkov

Mr. Ivanov

Mr. Smirnov

Mr. Voloskov

Ms. Komshilova (Int)




21. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
KING