SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) NOTIFICATIONS WORKING GROUP MEETING,

S E C R E T GENEVA 000223 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/28 TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) NOTIFICATIONS WORKING GROUP MEETING, FEBRUARY 24, 2010 REF: 10 GENEVA 185 (SFO-GVA-VIII-073) 10 GENEVA 191 (SFO-GVA-VIII-075) CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-082. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: February 24, 2010 Time: 3:30 P.M. - 6:00 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) At the Notifications Working Group meeting chaired by Mr. Siemon and Col Ryzhkov, the sides continued discussion of the U.S-proposed Joint Draft Text of Part Four to the Protocol to the Treaty - Notifications (REF A). The U.S. side clarified U.S.-proposed changes for which the Russian side provided counter proposals. End summary. ¶4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Section III: Notifications Concerning the Movement of Strategic Offensive Arms; Section IV: Notifications Concerning ((Flight Test))1 ((Launches))2 of ICBMS or SLBMs; Section V: Notifications Concerning Conversion or Elimination; and Section VI: Notifications Concerning Inspections and Exhibitions. -------------- Section III: Notifications Concerning the Movement of Strategic Offensive Arms -------------- ¶5. (S) Ryzhkov recommended the sides defer discussion of Section I: General Provisions and Section II: Notifications Concerning the Database, since he would provide Russian-proposed text the next day. Siemon agreed and moved to discussion of Section III: Notifications Concerning the Movement of Strategic Offensive Arms. He indicated that the brackets remaining in Section III were tied to time periods for specific events. Siemon believed the Russian-bracketed "five days" in paragraph 1 for the notification of the completion of transit was consistent with the notification for an update to the database. Ryzhkov stated that was correct; however, there was more involved. The Russian side proposed a five-day time period because experience under START demonstrated that a 48-hour time period was difficult for Russian Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC) personnel to meet, since data required for the message routinely arrived late from repair and production facilities. It was also a matter of convenience since it was problematic for NRRC personnel to disseminate notifications on weekends and holidays. These could easily be transmitted on a Monday if a longer time period was selected. The sides agreed to leave the text bracketed. There were no brackets in paragraph 2 relating to the movement of solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs from a production facility. Siemon recommended the sides defer discussion of paragraphs 3 and 4 on heavy bomber visits since discussion of the definitions of deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers had not been completed in the Definitions Working Group. ¶6. (S) Ryzhkov took the opportunity to discuss the Russian concept of "basing" versus "locating" as it related to the definition of a deployed and non-deployed heavy bomber. The Russian side believed that "basing" indicated the permanent stationing of a heavy bomber at a base. The deployed heavy bomber was not required to be physically present at the base. It could be temporarily located at other facilities, for example a production or repair facility, and still be deployed. The deployed heavy bomber remained based at its home air base when it went to either of these facilities and then returned to its home base. A non-deployed heavy bomber was a heavy bomber that had a permanent presence at a production or repair facility. Siemon noted that members of the Ad Hoc Group planned to discuss this issue at their meeting the following day, and suggested, the sides defer further discussion. Ryzhkov agreed and the text remained bracketed. ¶7. (S) Siemon stated that the U.S. side could accept the Russian-proposed 48-hour time period in paragraph 5 relating to the notification of the beginning of a major strategic exercise if the Russian side could accept a 48-hour time period for the notification of the completion of a major strategic exercise in paragraph 6. Ryzhkov accepted the U.S.-proposed 48-hour time period in paragraph 5 but could not accept it in paragraph 6. The sides had a discussion of the no less than 14 day advance notification for the beginning of a major strategic exercise required under the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Reciprocal Advance Notification of Major Strategic Exercises, dated September 23, 1989. Siemon noted that with the obligations under the Agreement and the obligations that would exist under the new treaty, the sides would be providing two, similar notifications for the beginning of each major strategic exercise. Ryzhkov agreed and noted that he had addressed this issue at the NRRC-to-NRRC consultations five years earlier. He remarked that his U.S. colleagues suggested that the sides retain the START notification and its time period; therefore, two notifications were required. Ryzhkov offered that the sides' lawyers might be able to resolve the issue. Mr. Dean clarified that the 1989 Agreement only required notification at the beginning of one major strategic exercise per year and the new treaty would require notification of the beginning and completion of all major strategic exercises. Responding to a question from Ryzhkov, Dean said it was not necessary to address the 1989 Agreement in the new treaty. The text remained bracketed in paragraphs 5 and 6. -------------- -------------- Section Iv: Notifications Concerning ((Flight Test))1 ((Launches))2 of ICBMS or SLBMs -------------- -------------- ¶8. (S) Siemon noted that he and Adm (Ret) Kuznetsov had discussed the term "launch" in the Definitions Working Group the previous day (Ref B). Ryzhkov was aware of these discussions and said the Russian side preferred "launch" versus "flight test" since "launch" included both flight tests and launches to place an object into space; whereas "flight test" excluded space launches. ¶9. (S) Siemon noted the definition also was tied to the Telemetry Protocol in which the U.S. side believed telemetry should be exchanged on both flights tests and launches to deliver objects into space. The sides agreed to leave the text bracketed. -------------- Section V: Notifications Concerning Conversion or Elimination -------------- ¶10. (S) Ryzhkov believed the U.S.-bracketed word "planned" in subparagraph 1(a) relating to advance notification of the intent to initiate a conversion or elimination could be deleted since it was self evident that when a side "intended to initiate" a conversion or elimination it "planned to initiate" the conversion or elimination. Siemon agreed to delete "planned." Ryzhkov believed that U.S.-bracketed subparagraph 1(d) that referenced a notification concerning the inspection of batched items was not needed if the sides included remarks on batching in the notification required by subparagraph 1(c) that required a notification after the completion of conversion or elimination. Siemon agreed and subparagraph 1(d) was deleted. The sides removed all brackets in paragraph 2 which resulted in agreement of all text in Section V. The agreed Section is as follows: Begin text: Section V. Notifications Concerning Conversion or Elimination ¶1. For conversion or elimination of ICBMs or SLBMs, launch canisters for ICBMs and SLBMs, ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and facilities: (a) Notification, no less than 30 days in advance of the initiation of conversion or elimination, of intent to conduct a conversion or elimination (b) Notification, no later than five days after the initiation of a conversion or elimination. (c) Notification, no later than five days after the completion of conversion or elimination procedures. ¶2. Notification, no later than 20 days after each calendar year, of the number and types of strategic offensive arms scheduled for conversion or elimination during the year. End text. -------------- Section VI: Notifications Concerning inspections and exhibitions -------------- ¶11. (S) Siemon remarked that the sides agreed on text in paragraphs 1 through 6. Bracketed language in paragraph 7 that referenced objection to individuals on the initial and amended list of inspectors and aircrew members was fundamentally the same. Ryzhkov agreed and believed the sides' lawyers could resolve any differences in the language. ¶12. (S) Ryzhkov accepted U.S.-bracketed text in paragraph 8 and the agreed paragraph was as follows: Begin text: ¶8. Notification containing the agreed list of inspectors and aircrew members shall be provided in conjunction with the six-month database update of Part Two of this Protocol. End text. ¶13. (S) Ryzhkov believed paragraph 9 which referenced the objection of an inspector or aircrew member on the agreed list could be deleted since paragraph 7 covered this situation. Siemon indicated paragraph 9 was needed to remove an individual from the agreed list without waiting for the submission of an amended list. Siemon agreed to delete paragraph 9 with the understanding that the sides could return to it if necessary after the sides' lawyers had resolved the text in paragraph 7. Ryzhkov agreed. ¶14. (S) Siemon stated that after discussing the issue of the time period for the declaration of the intent to conduct an inspection with Dr. Warner, he believed the issue required work in the Inspection Protocol Working Group. Ryzhkov noted that this declaration was not as important as the site declaration time since the site declaration time drove the beginning of pre-inspection procedures and the time to transport inspectors to the declared facility. Ryzhkov repeated his complaint about the logistical burden placed on the Russian side by a 16-hour time period. In addition, the manner in which the U.S. side notified its intent to conduct an inspection also placed a burden on the Russian side. The Russian side consistently received the notification on a weekend for a team arriving on a Monday. This required Ryzhkov, as Head of the Russian NRRC, to call in personnel to make logistical arrangements for the incoming team. Siemon believed there was room for compromise but the text would remain bracketed until a decision was made outside of the Notifications Working Group. ¶15. (S) The sides agreed on the Russian-proposed text in paragraph 11 with the additional change to replace "messages" with "notifications" in the last sentence of the text. The text was as follows: Begin text: Notification, provided by the inspected Party no later than 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty of the determination of agreed geographic coordinates of reference points, used at the point of entry. Subsequently, the inspected Party shall provide supplementary notifications on changes to these reference points. End text. ¶16. (S) No movement was made on paragraph 12 regarding the notification of a change to the boundaries of the inspection and coastlines and waters diagrams. The Russian side deleted its bracketed text in paragraphs 13 and 14. The agreed text was as follows: Begin text: ¶13. Notification of intent to conduct an exhibition shall be provided no less than 30 days in advance of the planned date of the exhibition. ¶14. Notification of intention to participate in an exhibition shall be provided no less than 72 hours in advance of the planned date of the exhibition End text. ¶17. (S) The sides agreed on the following text in paragraph 15 which addressed notifications provided by the inspection team during inspections: Begin text: ¶15. Notification provided by the inspection team chief in writing to a member of the in-country escort during inspection. End text. ¶18. (S) Maj Johnson walked Ryzhkov through a time line for declaration of a sequential inspection which occurred after the return of the inspection team to the point of entry. Ryzhkov stated that this clarified the U.S.-proposed text and he would provide Russian-proposed text for the paragraph at a later date. ¶19. (U) Documents provided: None. ¶20. (U) Participants: UNITED STATES Mr. Siemon Mr. Albertson Mr. Dean Mr. Dwyer Dr. Fraley Mr. Hanchett(RO) Maj Johnson LTC Litterini Mr. Stickney Ms. Gross (Int) RUSSIA Col Ryzhkov Mr. Ivanov Mr. Smirnov Mr. Voloskov Ms. Komshilova (Int) ¶21. (U) Gottemoeller sends. KING