(SFO-GVA-VIII): (U) Inspection Protocol Working Group

S E C R E T GENEVA 000195 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/27 TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US SUBJECT: (SFO-GVA-VIII): (U) Inspection Protocol Working Group Meeting, February 16, 2010 CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-055 ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: February 16, 2010 Time: 3:30 P.M. - 17:15 P.M. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) At the Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG) meeting, chaired by Dr. Warner and Colonel Ilin, the sides discussed the U.S.-proposed Annex on Inspection Activities, Part Six, related to the procedures for conducting Type-1 inspections. The sides agreed to review the proposed text line-by-line; accepted several paragraphs and agreed to re-write others for clarity. End summary. ¶4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: U.S.-proposed Annex on Inspection Activities; Focusing on Part Six. -------------- U.S.-Proposed Annex on Inspection Activities -------------- ¶5. (S) Warner stated the priority of the Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG,) in order to complete selected parts of the Annex on Inspection Activities prior to signature of the START Follow-on Treaty, needed to be Part Six, related to the procedures for the conduct of Type-1 inspections, and Part Seven, related to the procedures for the conduct of both Type-1 and Type-2 inQctions. Part Four, procedures for the submission of site diagrams, was also a priority but the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Working Group, led by Mr. Trout and General Orlov, would be responsible for drafting that part. ¶6. (S) Warner proposed to begin discussion of Part Six by focusing on pre-inspection restrictions and the conduct of warhead inspections. He noted the Annex on Inspection Activities was an important "handbook of agreed procedures" to be used by inspectors. While many of the procedures in the Annex would be the same as those used in START, it was important for this working group to verify the validity of the procedures, he said. Ilin concurred, stating the priority should be placed on setting forth the procedures for Type-1 and Type-2 inspections. Warner clarified that Part Seven dealt largely with Type-2 inspections, but some portions would apply to Type-1 inspections as well because it had been agreed to inspect both deployed and non-deployed items during Type-1 inspections. In order to ensure clarity, Ilin proposed referencing in Part Six the provisions from Part Seven that were applicable to Type-1 inspections. Warner agreed. -------------- focusing on part six -------------- ¶7. (S) Ilin explained that current provisions in Part Six did not contain procedures for inspecting structures that do not contain mobile launchers of ICBMs and recommended those procedures be added. Warner agreed to add them if they were missing. Ilin stated that Part Six did not describe the actions of the inspecting party if a non-declared item of inspection was discovered. Warner countered that it was clear in the Protocol, but agreed to review the matter. Ilin pointed out that Part Six did not include guidance if objects other than warheads were discovered on an inspected missile and recommended wording from START be included with consideration being given to the presence of both nuclear and non-nuclear warheads. Warner reminded Ilin that both nuclear-armed and conventionally-armed warheads would be counted against the 1550 aggregate limit on warheads. Ilin continued that new provisions for the inspection on SSGNs during Type-1 inspections had also not been included. Warner stated the Second Agreed Statement on the SSGNs was adequate to cover this situation since it outlined the principle of using an empty tube inspection to inspect the converted launchers. In any case, Warner noted, such an inspection would be a Type-1 rather then a Type-2 inspection. Ilin replied that the Agreed Statement did not specify the order of inspection and reiterated the need for detailed instructions somewhere in the Annex since this Annex provided guidance for execution of the inspections. ¶8. (S) In paragraph 1, the sides agreed to change paragraph 1(a)(i) to the active voice and remove the words "launch canisters." Ilin requested the phrase "closed vehicles" be placed in brackets and the last portion of the paragraph be rewritten to specify that covered objects large enough to contain items of inspection should not be removed from the inspection site. Warner agreed to the rewriting of the paragraph. Paragraph 1(a)(ii) was agreed and changed to read: "Heavy bombers shall not leave the inspection site." ¶9. (S) Ilin asked if the pre-inspection restrictions imposed by paragraph 1(b) were in place prior to the declaration of the launcher. Warner explained it was a two step process. First, the restrictions were put in place on the whole base until completion of the pre-inspection procedures which included the declaration of the launchers or bombers for Type-1 inspection. Following designation of the launcher or bombers for inspection, certain pre-inspection restrictions on the remainder of the base would no longer be in effect, but the pre-inspection restrictions on the selected launchers or bombers would remain in effect until the inspecting party arrived at the location of the designated launchers or bombers. Both parties agreed to revise paragraph 1(b) to better specify which pre-inspection restrictions were applicable during each period of the inspection to eliminate confusion on the matter. ¶10. (S) Ilin questioned whether the pre-inspection restrictions (PIR) were applicable to SSGNs located at SSBN bases and Warner reiterated that SSGN pre-inspection restrictions were covered in the Second Agreed Statement. Ilin disagreed and requested a reference in the Annex to the Second Agreed Statement on SSGNs. Warner agreed to review the matter. Ilin demonstrated his unfamiliarity with START inspection procedural concepts, raising questions on test heavy bombers and "water trucks" which are captured under PIRs. With reference to test heavy bombers, Ilin questioned why test heavy bombers would be permitted to leave during PIRs. Warner explained that these were not inspectable, but Ilin countered that because the inspecting party had no way of distinguishing a test bomber from a normal heavy bomber, the test heavy bomber should be required to remain at the base. Warner agreed. ¶11. (S) Ilin commented that it was not reasonable that a water truck which was large enough to contain an item of inspection would get captured under PIRs. He implied that it should be apparent to an inspector that a missile could not be hidden in the back of a water truck, and that the idea of having to inspect a water truck undermined altogether the basis of trust in the treaty. ¶12. (U) Documents provided: - United States -- U.S.-proposed text for Part Six of the Annex to Part V of the Protocol, dated February 15, 2010 ¶13. (U) Participants: UNITED STATES Dr. Warner Mr. Ahlm (RO) Mr. Albertson Mr. Buttrick MAJ Johnson LTC Litterini(RO) Mr. McConnell Ms. Purcell Mr. Rust Mr. Smith Ms. Gesse (Int) RUSSIA Col Ilin Col Petrov Mr. Shevchenko Ms. Vodopolova Col Zaitsev Ms. Shustiva (Int) ¶14. (U) Gottemoeller sends. KING