SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) NOTIFICATIONS WORKING GROUP MEETING,

S E C R E T GENEVA 000185 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/27 TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) NOTIFICATIONS WORKING GROUP MEETING, FEBRUARY 22, 2010 CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-073. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: February 22, 2010 Time: 3:30 P.M. to 5:00 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) During a meeting of the Notifications Working Group held at the U.S. Mission on February 22, issues concerning Section IQ General Provisions paragraphs 2 and 3, and Section II, Notifications Concerning the Database paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 were discussed. The major issues were the effective date of a notification as opposed to the date of its provision, notifications regarding the transfer of items to or from a third state and notifications related to the development of a new kind of strategic offensive arm (SOA). End summary. ¶4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Section I: General Provisions; Section II: Notifications Concerning the Database; and Development of New Kinds of SOA. -------------- SECTION I: GENERAL PROVISIONS -------------- ¶5. (S) Mr. Siemon stated that it had been difficult to track changes in the documents the Russian side provided during the last meeting and that he had asked Mr. Dwyer to put together a single joint draft text (JDT) that included the agreed text and all brackets of both sides. Col Ryzhkov agreed and proposed that he and Siemon go through the text together. Before reviewing the text, Siemon clarified that his objective was to have conformed text for the Notifications section of the Protocol before the session ended. Additionally, Siemon planned to provide the Russian side with a U.S.-proposed concept for an Annex document to support the Protocol text. Ryzhkov indicated that receiving the U.S.-proposed Tier Three Annex before the break would be helpful and he reminded Siemon that his team had also been thinking about the structure of the Annex document for the past several months. ¶6. (S) Siemon noted that the first sentence in paragraph 2 was cleared per discussion with Mr. Stickney and that the United States had bracketed the second sentence for clarification. Ryzhkov clarified that the first bracketed sentence indicated that the date of provision of a notification would be the date of its transmission or receipt. He conceded that at the end of a 24-hour period this date could be different, but in most cases, it would be the same. The second sentence was acceptable, but should remain bracketed until the Russian delegation could discuss further. ¶7. (S) Siemon explained that the text in paragraph 3 was an attempt to provide a link to the Annex. Begin text: The PartiesQhall agree to an Annex containing additional information regarding the content and format of Notifications. End text. Ryzhkov acknowledged the need for a link, but wanted to ensure the text was consistent with the approach implemented in the treaty text and other parts of the Protocol. Siemon replied this text was requested by the U.S. lawyers but agreed to verify its consistency. -------------- SECTION II: NOTIFICATION CONCERNING THE MOVEMENT OF NEW ITEMS -------------- ¶8. (S) Ryzhkov recommended replacing "but shall not be limited to" with "inter alia" in the last sentence in the chapeau of paragraph ¶3. Siemon agreed and he recommended deletion of the Russian-proposed text "the notification shall include the place at which an exhibition or exhibitions occur" in subparagraph (b) of this paragraph since such details would be in the Annex document. Ryzhkov agreed. ¶9. (S) Siemon reminded Ryzhkov that the notification in paragraph 4, "Notification pertaining to transfer of items to a third state in conjunction with an existing Pattern of Cooperation," was applicable only to the U.S. side because it referred to the pattern of cooperation between the United States and United Kingdom. Additionally, he noted that the notification concerning movement of items to the territory of a third state contained in paragraph 5 was applicable only to the Russian side. ¶10. (S) Ryzhkov agreed but believed the concepts were quite different. He compared the transfer of items to Kazakhstan to the movement of U.S. heavy bombers to the territory of another country. Siemon acknowledged the difference between the U.S. side's transfer to the United Kingdom and the Russian side's transfer to Kazakhstan, and he proposed accepting the Russian-proposed language in paragraph 5 if the Russian side accepted the U.S.-proposed language in paragraph 4. ¶11. (S) Ryzhkov did not respond to Siemon's proposal. Instead, he asked Siemon to clarify the meaning of "items" in paragraph 4. Siemon replied that many items were covered by the agreement, but that typically only SLBMs would be transferred to the United Kingdom. Ryzhkov recommended that, in that case, "items" be replaced with "SLBMs." He recalled a special agreed statement under START that specified that SLBMs were the item of transfer under the existing Pattern of Cooperation. Siemon accepted Ryzhkov's proposal pending agreement with the rest of the U.S. delegation. ¶12. (S) The Russian side then proposed additional changes to paragraph 5. Begin text: "5. Notification no later than five days after the completion of the movement of ICBMs to the territory of a third State." End text. ¶13. (S) Ryzhkov proposed that the remaining text regarding flight tests and return of ICBMs to Russia could be captured by other existing notifications; they included the flight test notification in Section IV and the transit of SOA notification in Section III. Siemon acknowledged the Russian concept but reminded Ryzhkov discussions were ongoing regarding the Leninsk Agreed Statement. A final decision concerning the notification could not be made until those discussions resolved the issue. Ryzhkov agreed that this notification may not be needed if the issue was resolved through an Agreed Statement. He then reiterated the similarity between Russia's movement of ICBMs to Leninsk to the United States' moving heavy bombers to other countries. -------------- DEVELOPMENT OF NEW KINDS OF SOA -------------- ¶14. (S) Siemon explained the U.S. position regarding development of new kinds of SOA was to include two notifications. The first was a notification to discuss the topic in the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC). This was a Russian-proposed notification that tracked the agreed language in Article V of the treaty. The second notification was needed when one side was preparing to deploy a new kind of SOA for which the BCC should resolve issues relating to the applicability of treaty provisions for that new kind of SOA. This was a U.S.-proposed notification that corresponded to the agreed language in Article XIV, subparagraph (c) of the treaty. ¶15. (S) Ryzhkov acknowledged the U.S. concept and countered with a single notification, "Notification on the development of a new kind of SOA." He stated the first notification to discuss the new SOA in the BCC should be handled as it was under the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) process of START. The notification would contain all issues proposed for discussion. He said that this language would be simpler and would capture the proposed texts of both sides. Each Party would have the right to raise the new kinds issue using this language. ¶16. (S) Siemon noted that much discussion had occurred at the Head of Delegation level regarding this topic and that the language in Articles V and XIV were attempts to address the new kinds issue. He said the U.S. approach was to separate the steps covered by these two Articles. He then reiterated the need for two distinct notifications. He further noted that it was unclear under START when an item became a treaty accountable SOA--when the SOA was flight tested or when said SOA was deployed? The intention of this text was to provide more openness and transparency on each side and to avoid confusion. ¶17. (S) Ryzhkov pointed out that it was unlikely either side would have a new kind of SOA during this treaty and said significant time should not be expended on this issue. He also said the text in Articles V and XIV was adequate, and text should not be repeated in this part of the Protocol or elsewhere in the treaty. He stated the U.S. side's concerns could be addressed in the Annex. Siemon indicated he understood Ryzhkov's point and said he would take it to the U.S. delegation for consideration. ¶18. (U) Documents provided: None ¶19. (U) Participants: UNITED STATES Mr. Siemon Mr. Dean Mr. Dwyer Dr. Fraley Mr. Hanchett Maj Johnson LT Sicks Mr. Stickney (RO) Ms. Smith (Int) RUSSIA Col Ryzhkov Mr. Ivanov Mr. Smirnov Mr. Voloskov Ms. Komshilova (Int) ¶20. (U) Gottemoeller sends. KING