SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) AGREED STATEMENTS, FEBRUARY 22, 2010

S E C R E T GENEVA 000169 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/27 TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) AGREED STATEMENTS, FEBRUARY 22, 2010 CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-071. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: February 22, 2010 Time: 3:30 P.M. - 5:00 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) Mr. Elliott and Col Ilin chaired a meeting to discuss proposed Agreed Statements on February 22. Elliott provided copies of U.S.-proposed joint draft texts (JDT) on the First (Converted B1-B Heavy Bombers),Second (U.S. Guided Missile Submarines (SSGNs) Converted from SSBNs),and Third (Joint Basing of Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments and Heavy Bombers Equipped for Non-Nuclear Armaments) Agreed Statements. Following a quick review of remaining issues in the three statements, there was a discussion of the differences in heavy bomber counting rules between the sides. The U.S. response to Russian questions on SLBM launcher conversion or elimination procedures was also provided to the Russian side but discussion was deferred to a future meeting. End summary. ¶4. (U) Subject Summary: Second and Third Agreed Statements; Counting Converted or Eliminated Heavy Bombers; Answers to Russian Questions on SLBM Launcher CorE Procedures. -------------- SECOND AND THIRD AGREED STATEMENTS -------------- ¶5. (S) Elliott gave the Russian side a consolidated U.S.-proposed JDT of the First(Converted B1-B Heavy Bombers),Second (U.S. Guided Missile Submarines (SSGNs) Converted from SSBNs),and Third (Joint Basing of Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments and Heavy Bombers Equipped for Non-Nuclear Armaments),Agreed Statements. ¶6. (S) On the third Agreed Statement (Joint Basing of Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments and Heavy Bombers Equipped for Non-Nuclear Armaments),Ilin agreed to delete the Russian-proposed paragraph 2 on the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC). He stated the only outstanding issue was the number of heavy bombers inspected. Elliott concurred and stated that there was no change in the U.S. position on the number of bombers to be inspected. ¶7. (S) On the second Agreed Statement (U.S. Guided Missile Submarines (SSGNs) Converted from SSBNs),Ilin offered to delete the Russian-proposed "of SLCM" in subparagraph 1(b). He also accepted the U.S.-proposed language "either side" vice "the United States of America" in paragraph 2, acknowledging that if either side converted an SSBN into an SSGN the provisions of the agreed statement would apply. Again, Ilin concluded that the only remaining issue was the number of launchers to be inspected. Elliott concurred and stated there was no change in the U.S. position on the number of launchers to be inspected. -------------- - COunting converted or eliminated heavy bombers -------------- - ¶8. (S) With regard to the first Agreed Statement (Converted B1-B Heavy Bombers),Ilin agreed that the terms "use" and "apply" were equivalent in the two languages and agreed that the English text should read "use" vice "apply," with any further discussion of the wording taking place during the conforming process. In subparagraph 2(c),as in the second Agreed Statement, Ilin agreed to use "either Party" vice "the United States of America" in paragraph 4, acknowledging that if either side converted all heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments of a type into heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, the provisions of the agreed statement wwould apply. The only remaining bracket in the JDT was Russian-proposed text in subparagraph 1(a) on the procedures for an exhibition "to confirm the conversion of a heavy bomber." Ilin stated that this idea needed to remain, although the language could perhaps be reworked. ¶9. (S) Elliott explained the difference between the purpose of an exhibition, which would demonstrate the distinguishing features, and an inspection of the results of conversion, which would remove a heavy bomber from accountability under Part II of the Protocol to the treaty. Elliott stated he believed the two sides understood one another on this issue, but perhaps the text could be clearer. He agreed to rework this paragraph for the next meeting. Dr. Warner and Ilin discussed the difficulties in referencing the Annex on Inspection Activities in this paragraph, as none of the procedures to conduct the heavy bomber exhibition had been written. ¶10. (S) The discussion of heavy bombers led to Russian comments on the fourth Agreed Statement (Basing of Deployed Heavy Bombers at the Conversion or Elimination Facility Located at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona). Adm (ret) Kuznetsov stated that Russia saw two differing interpretations of the last sentence in this agreed statement: "Such heavy bombers shall be considered deployed heavy bombers until such time as they are converted into heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments or are eliminated." The Russian interpretation was that all of a particular type of heavy bomber would count under the treaty's central limits as heavy bombers equipped with nuclear armaments until the last of the type was eliminated or converted. At that time, all bombers of that type would be removed from accountability under the central limits. The U.S. side disagreed with this interpretation, asserting that each individual heavy bomber would be removed from accountability as it was individually converted or eliminated, in accordance with Part III of the Protocol. ¶11. (S) Elliott pointed to agreed text in Part III: Conversion or Elimination Procedures, Section I, paragraph 3, which used the article "an" before ICBM launcher, SLBM launcher, or heavy bomber. Elliott said this text clearly showed the intention to address the bombers one at a time but noted that there was no indefinite article in the Russian text that would equate to "a" or "an." Warner commented that the sides obviously had a different import of the wording, and there would need to be substantive discussion on the issue. Kuznetsov stated that the issue of heavy bombers in Article III, subparagraph 6(c) would be discussed at the Expanded Ad Hoc meeting the next day. -------------- ANSWERS TO RUSSIAN QUESTIONS ON SLBM LAUNCHER C OR E PROCEDURES -------------- ¶12. (S) Elliott gave the Russian side the U.S. response to Russian questions on SLBM launcher conversion or elimination procedures which was also given to the Russian side by A/S Gottemoeller at a Heads of Delegation meeting on February 20. Begin text: SFO-VIII Paper of the U.S. Side February 22, 2010 Response to Russian Delegation Questions On U.S. Plans to Convert Certain Launchers of Trident II SLBMs The following responses to questions of the Russian Delegation are provided to provide clarity for further discussions: Q1: The purpose of conversion of individual launchers of Trident II SLBM launchers. A1: In order to comply with the central limits of 700 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers and 800 deployed and non-deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, the United States will be required to convert or eliminate approximately 80 deployed ICBM or SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers. Should the United States elect to convert a limited number of SLBM launchers on its existing Trident II SSBNs, the tubes will most likely be configured to carry ballast or be used for storage of miscellaneous equipment. Q2: Total number of launchers scheduled for conversion. A2: There are no plans to convert SLBM launchers. However, should the United States elect to convert SLBM launchers, the number of converted launchers could range from 2 to 4 SLBM launchers on each of 14 Trident II SSBNs. Q3: Time frame for conversion activities (beginning and end of the activities). A3: Given the United States has made no decision to convert SLBM launchers, no reasonable estimate of the length of time required to convert these launchers is possible. Several factors will influence the duration of the conversion process, including the intended use of such a launcher, the method of conversion, and other major overhaul or refit activities planned for the Trident II SSBNs. Q4: Technological conversion characteristics, differences between the conducted conversion of SSBNs into SSGNs and the forthcoming conversions. A4: Conversion of SLBM launchers would be accomplished in accordance with Section I, paragraphs 3-6 and Section IV, paragraphs 6 and 7 of Part Three of the Protocol. The principal criterion shall be that the launcher is no longer capable of employing an SLBM. Since the United States Government has not made a decision to convert SLBM launchers, neither has the potential use for such a converted launcher nor the method of conversion has been determined. For this reason, no effective comparison to the past conversion of the Trident I SSBNs can be made, other than to confirm that the procedures selected would be consistent with the criteria established in Part Three of the Protocol. Q5: Functional differences and observable distinguishing features of converted or non-converted launchers. A5: Functionally, any converted SLBM launcher will no longer be capable of employing an SLBM. Because no decision has been made to convert SLBM launchers, no new function can be expressed with certainty at this time. However, the most likely function would be to carry ballast containers. Observation of the functional differences and observable distinguishing features of the first item of a type converted would be made during an exhibition as specified in Section 1, paragraph 5 of Part Three of the Protocol. Q6: Bases for SSBNs with converted launchers, broadening of the functions of SSBNs. A6: SSBNs with converted launchers formerly capable of employing SLBMs will be based at the existing submarine bases located at Silverdale, Washington and Kings Bay, Georgia. The U.S. side notes that this question suggests the functions of SSBNs will be broadened. The U.S. has no plans o broaden the function of its SSBNs. Q7: Counting procedures for converted launchers with the framework of the Treaty: A7: When an SLBM launcher is converted by rendering it incapable of employing an SLBM in a manner that the other Party can confirm the results of the conversion, such a converted strategic offensive arm shall cease to be subject to the aggregate numbers provided for in Article II of the Treaty and may be used for purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty (see Section I, paragraph 3 of Part Three of the Protocol). Q8: Conversion verification measures. A8: The results of conversion of strategic offensive arms subject to the Treaty may be confirmed by inspection in accordance with Articles [XI]1[X]2 and [XII]1[XI]2 of the Treaty (see Section I, paragraph 6 of Part Three of the Protocol). Q9: Inspection regime with regard to converted launchers after the completion of the conversion process. A9: The results of conversion of strategic offensive arms subject to the Treaty may be confirmed in accordance with Articles [XI]1[X]2 and [XII]1[XI]2 of the Treaty (see Section I, paragraph 6 of Part Three of the Protocol). End text. ¶13. (S) The response was not discussed further but rather was taken by the Russian side to study for future discussion. ¶14. (U) Documents provided: - United States: -- U.S.- Proposed Joint Draft Text, First Agreed Statement: Converted Heavy B1-B Heavy Bombers, dated February 22, 2010; -- U.S. Proposed Joint Draft Text, Second Agreed Statement: U.S. Guided Missile Submarines (SSGNs) Converted from SSBNs, dated February 22, 2010; -- U.S. Proposed Joint Draft Text, Third Agreed Statement: Joint Basing of Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments and Heavy Bombers Equipped for Non-Nuclear Armaments, dated February 22, 2010; and -- U.S. Written Response to Russia's Questions on SLBM Launcher Conversion and Elimination Procedures, dated February 22, ¶2010. ¶15. (U) Participants: UNITED STATES Mr. Elliott Mr. Albertson (RO) Lt Col Goodman Mr. Highsmith LTC Litterini Amb Ries Mr. Trout Dr. Warner Mr. French (Interpreter) RUSSIA Col Ilin Mr. Koshelev Adm (Ret) Kuznetsov Mr. Zaitsev Ms. Evarovskaya (Interpreter) ¶16. (U) Gottemoeller sends. KING