SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WORKING GROUP

S E C R E T GENEVA 000167

SIPDIS
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/26
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WORKING GROUP
MEETING, FEBRUARY 11, 2010

REF: 10 GENEVA 149 (SFO-GVA-VIII-038)
10 GENEVA 165 (SFO-GVA-VIII-029); 10 GENEVA 147 (SFO-GVA-VIII-037)

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-040.




2. (U) Meeting Date: February 11, 2010

Time: 3:30 P.M. - 6:00 P.M.

Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva



--------------

SUMMARY

--------------




3. (S) During the Memorandum of Understanding Working Group
(MOUWG) meeting on February 11, Mr. Trout and General Orlov
discussed issues addressed earlier in the day at the Expanded Ad
Hoc meeting (Ref A) concerning conversion and elimination of
individual SLBM launchers, conversion of heavy bombers, and
transfer of Trident II SLBMs to the United Kingdom. With respect
to issues in Part Two of the Protocol, Section I was reviewed and
some brackets were resolved. However, during the discussion it
became clear there was significant misunderstanding regarding use
of the word "database." The U.S. side delivered Part Four of the
Annex on Inspection Activities dealing with site diagrams and had a
quick discussion on the U.S. approach. End summary.




4. (S) Subject Summary: Follow Up on Conversion of Individual
SLBM Launchers; Converted Heavy Bombers; UK Trident Missiles;
Non-Deployed Heavy Bombers; Part Two Issues; and Site Diagrams.



-------------- --------------

FOLLOW UP ON CONVERSION OF INDIVIDUAL SLBM LAUNCHERS

-------------- --------------




5. (S) Orlov made a few points regarding the Expanded Ad Hoc
meeting earlier in the day (Ref A). He mused that while he
understood the military benefits of having multi-mission capable
submarines that could launch both SLBMs and cruise missiles the
requirements of the treaty would severely restrict the operations
of these submarines. Trout pointed out that the U.S. decision to
convert single launchers on SSBNs had to do with political reality.
He compared it to the decision of the United States not to develop
mobile ICBM systems in the early 1990s, and pointed out that
political willpower, based on the desires of the people, often
carries the most weight when making major decisions in the United


States. He stated there was a large coalition of Senators that did
not want to see any ICBM bases closed. Mr. Colby added there was a
desire by the U.S. Government not to make too severe a cut in any
one leg of the nuclear triad. Trout argued that it was reasonable
for the United States to look for the most inexpensive, convenient
way to lower their number of deployed and non-deployed launchers,
and conversion of single SSBN tubes accomplished exactly that.
Additionally, he continued, the number of SSBNs would not likely
change due to operational requirements and the U.S. view that a
survivable submarine force is stabilizing.




6. (S) Orlov stated the Russian Federation faced similar military
and political problems and concerns, although with regard to the
military, this applied more to the Air Force.




7. (S) Trout added the concept of "detubing," or rendering
individual SLBM launchers on SSBNs incapable of launching an SLBM,
was not new and was presented as a concept during preliminary
discussions concerning START-III as a way to reach the low delivery
vehicle limits. Trout said the U.S. Government was not sure what
the tubes would be converted to, but in his opinion it seemed
unlikely they would be converted into cruise missile launchers.



--------------

CONVERTED HEAVY BOMBERS

--------------




8. (S) Orlov stated the United States was unlikely to ever prove
satisfactorily to him the conversion process of the B-1B produced a
bomber incapable of carrying nuclear armaments. Nuclear heavy
bombers are designed from the beginning to carry nuclear armaments,
he said. The electronics and unique equipment needed for the
nuclear mission are intrinsic to that class of bomber.
Consequently, the argument the United States had made for several
years only addressed the "capping" of the connectors at the
location where they attach to the nuclear armament; all the
internal connections and equipment still remain. Orlov added that
he often wondered how the Russian Federation would try to present
its case for a converted heavy bomber should it decide to pursue
that capability. He often wondered if the Russian Federation would
have any more success in convincing the U.S. side than the U.S.
side had with its arguments. This, despite years of discussion in
the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC),he
commented.




9. (S) Trout pointed out it was difficult for the other side to
fully understand a foreign technical system. Trout noted that one
of the provisions in the agreed statement on B-1Bs included a
continuation of periodic viewing of B-1Bs to instill confidence
that the U.S. side was not circumventing treaty requirements.


--------------

UK TRIDENT MISSILES

--------------




10. (S) Orlov asked about the U.S. practice of transferring
Trident II missiles to the United Kingdom (UK) in reference to the
Russian-proposed agreed statement on the subject. Trout pointed
out that most of the provisions contained in the proposed agreed
statement were already covered by other sections of the treaty. He
noted that notifications existed for the transfer and return of
missiles to and from a third party. Additionally, he pointed out,
the Russian Federation will receive unique identifiers for each of
the missiles transferred to the UK, which was more information than
was disclosed under START. Trout acknowledged that the proposal to
send a notification of a UK flight test was not covered under START
nor had it been included as part of this treaty but argued that
this was the flight test of a missile owned by a third country. He
said the United States had no legal responsibility for such a
notification. Trout said he assumed the UK would send a notice to
mariners and airmen prior to any flight test.




11. (S) Orlov complained that Russia did not have an agreement
with the UK to provide a notification when the UK performed a
flight test. Trout responded that perhaps Russia should consider
establishing an agreement to do just that. Orlov observed it was a
political issue. He noted that he could not answer a simple
question that was raised by his politicians: "Wouldn't the United
States just continue to transfer missiles to the UK and have the UK
perform flight tests for the United States?" Trout reiterated his
point that the United States had no legal method to control a
Trident II once it had been transferred to the UK. Orlov said he
understood the legal position, but unlike the Russian Federation
selling an anti-tank missile to another country, the United States
was selling and transferring strategic offensive arms, which was
another matter entirely.



--------------

NON-DEPLOYED HEAVY BOMBERS

--------------




12. (S) Orlov asked whether the U.S. side had finalized its
position on the status of bombers at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base.
Trout replied the U.S. delegation was still discussing the issue.



--------------

PART TWO ISSUES

--------------



13. (S) Trout delivered the U.S.-proposed joint draft text of
Section I, General Provisions, that incorporated decisions from the
previous meeting (Ref B).




14. (S) In paragraph 1, the sides debated the term "database."
Mr. Pischulov argued that "database" referred to the categories of
data, while Trout argued that it referred to this Part of the
protocol. With help from the interpreters, both sides attempted to
understand the rationale behind the other side's position. The
interpreters realized that the Russian side was translating the
word "database" as "initial data," similar to the way it was
translated in START. With this realization, both sides noted a
significant difference in the text. The U.S. side believed that
Section I contained provisions that would apply throughout the life
of the treaty and others that only applied to the initial exchange
of data. Both sides agreed to consult with their lawyers and
members of the Conforming Group.




15. (S) Pischulov agreed to delete Russian-proposed text in
paragraph 2, subparagraph (d),leaving the subparagraph
unbracketed.




16. (S) Trout informed the Russian side that the United States was
dropping the bracketed text "warheads on deployed ICBMs" in Section
III under the basing area for ICBM bases for mobile launchers of
ICBMs.



--------------

SITE DIAGRAMS, FINALLY

--------------




17. (S) Trout delivered the U.S.-proposed joint draft text for
Part Four of the Annex on Inspection Activities, Site Diagrams. He
noted the Untied States had tried to bracket the text based on
documents exchanged in November but that it was likely positions
had changed somewhat since then.




18. (S) Trout turned to paragraph 2, subparagraph (b)(i) which
listed the requirement that SSBNs and SSGNs be shown on the
coastlines and waters diagram. This related to a discussion on
SSGN inspections at submarine bases that took place during the
Agreed Statements meeting (Ref C) earlier in the day. Trout noted
the U.S.-proposed text required U.S. SSGNs within five kilometers
of the center of the coastline of a submarine base be included on
the coastlines and waters diagram provided to the Russian
inspection team during a Type-1 inspection.



19. (S) Orlov drew several pictures of site diagrams to clarify
the U.S. position on coastlines and waters diagrams. LT Lobner
pointed out that all SSBNs and SSGNs that were located within the
5-kilometer radius would be shown on the diagram. When probed
about submarines being located at different piers, Lobner noted it
was U.S. practice generally to locate SSBNs and SSGNs at the same
pier should an SSGN be at a submarine base. After the third
drawing, Orlov stated that he believed he understood the U.S.
position and would attempt to explain it to his colleagues.




20. (S) Trout called specific attention to paragraph 5 that dealt
with changes to boundaries of diagrams. Trout noted that this
idea, which was from START and which was formerly located in
Section I, General Provisions, required that there must be
agreement within the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) in
order to change a boundary for a diagram. Orlov brought up the
point that the BCC would not always agree. Trout acknowledged the
point admitting that some changes to diagrams were never approved
in the JCIC under START, but noted that a majority of changes were
agreed upon and approved. Orlov stated he personally understood
why this provision was important and needed but stated it could be
more difficult to convince his colleagues.




21. (S) Trout and Orlov agreed to discuss the issue of the
translation difference for "database" during the next meeting.




22. (S) Documents provided:



- U.S.:



-- U.S.-Proposed Joint Draft Text, Part Two, Section I dated
February 11, 2009; and



-- U.S.-Proposed Joint Draft Text, Part Four of the Annex on
Inspection Activities, Site Diagrams, dated February 11, 2009.




23. (U) Participants:



UNITED STATES



Mr. Trout

Mr. Colby


LT Lobner (RO)

Ms. Gesse (Int)



RUSSIA



Gen. Orlov

Mr. Pischulov

Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)




24. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
KING