SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WORKING GROUP

S E C R E T GENEVA 000165 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/26 TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WORKING GROUP MEETING, FEBRUARY 5, 2010 REF: 10 GENEVA 87 (SFO-GVA-VIII-028); 10 GENEVA 97 (SFO-GVA-VIII-021) 10 GENEVA 135 (SFO-GVA-VIII-027) CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-029. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: February 9, 2010 Time: 3:30 P.M. - 6:00 P.M. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) During a meeting of the Memorandum of Understanding Working Group (MOUWG) the U.S. and Russian chairs, Mr. Trout and Gen Orlov, discussed the outcome of the Expanded Ad Hoc discussion (Ref A) earlier that morning regarding non-deployed heavy bombers. Orlov stressed the sensitivity and importance of the relationship between missile defense and telemetry. Turning to database issues, Trout and Orlov reviewed details, once again, of the initial data exchange for the treaty to ensure each understood the decision made during the previous meeting (Ref B). Bracketed text in Part II was reviewed by the sides. End summary. ¶4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Follow Up on Non-Deployed Heavy Bombers; Agreed Statements; Unpleasant News on BMD and Telemetry; and Database Issues. -------------- FOLLOW UP ON NON-DEPLOYED HEAVY BOMBERS -------------- ¶5. (S) Orlov asked Trout his general view of the outcome of the Expanded Ad Hoc meeting that morning (Ref A). Trout stated he thought little progress was made. Orlov remarked he thought progress was made in understanding each other's positions. He added, however, that he thought having a separate limit for test heavy bombers was redundant and not logical since there was an overall non-deployed limit. Trout argued that the test heavy bomber sublimit was necessary because test heavy bombers were not inspectable, unlike other heavy bombers. He continued, that, from a pure accountability perspective, the United States would probably agree that you would not need a separate limit for test heavy bombers; the non-inspectability aspect is what created this special need for a sublimit. ¶6. (S) Orlov asked whether the United States differentiated between long-term maintenance and long-term repair. Orlov stated that for Russia these were two different concepts. Repair was associated with a long-term cycle, perhaps 1-3 years, and was done at a production facility. Maintenance, however, was done at a different facility and only involved a short period of time. Trout noted that for the United States short-term maintenance was done at the air base while long-term maintenance was done at the production or repair facilities. Orlov asked whether the United States intended to define "long-term." Trout replied that the United States had not decided on this issue but perhaps if this definition was deemed necessary it could be included, to which Orlov stated immediately that he believed this was a bad idea, as it was unreasonable to establish timelines for bombers visiting repair and maintenance facilities. ¶7. (S) Responding to Trout's question regarding when a heavy bomber would change categories from "deployed" to "non-deployed," Orlov answered that the category would immediately change upon arrival at the appropriate facility. Orlov asked what would happen if a deployed heavy bomber flew to another airbase. Trout replied that this was allowed; it was called a visit, and the status of the heavy bomber ("deployed") would not change. ¶8. (S) Continuing on the notification theme, Trout noted that notifications would be very simple if a heavy bomber immediately changed status when it moved from facility to facility. Orlov and Trout both agreed that Section V, Heavy Bombers, would have to be reworked to incorporate non-deployed heavy bombers. -------------- AGREED STATEMENTS -------------- ¶9. (S) Orlov changed topics to ask more about the coastlines and waters diagram in relation to the discussion that took place in the Agreed Statements Working Group earlier that day (Ref C). Orlov expressed his concern that the United States, by using this terminology, was trying to further limit the area that was inspectable during a Type-1 inspection. Trout replied that this language was consistent with an SSBN Type-1 inspection and was well understood by both Parties in START. Furthermore, Trout added that SSGNs, when located at submarine bases, were generally very near the piers of SSBNs and would definitely be well within the 5 km arc as required in the coastlines and waters diagram. LT Lobner added that in practice, SSGNs are frequently at the same pier as SSBNs if moored at a submarine base. ¶10. (S) Orlov asked whether the United States had a chance to look at any of the new agreed statements delivered by Russia earlier that day. Trout responded in the negative. Orlov addressed the rapid reload agreed statement, stating that he was constantly trying to explain to his colleagues what he believed was the U.S. concern on this topic. He explained, as he understood the U.S. concern, the United States thought that Russia was hiding mobile missiles in the field, burying them so they could not be seen. In the event that actual use was required, mobile launchers would go from "buried spot" to "buried spot" reloading, launching, and then moving to the next place. Orlov personally noted that he thought the real rapid reload item was nuclear ALCMs stored on rotary launchers at airbases. But, he continued, this was a personal view only. -------------- UNPLEASANT NEWS ON BMD AND TELEMETRY -------------- ¶11. (S) In a much more somber tone, Orlov explained that he had some more unpleasant news. He commented that the United States has repeatedly said that its ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities were not directed at Russia. Why then, he continued, do you need telemetry? He lamented that these related issues, BMD and telemetry, were going to be addressed in the near future, and most likely would result in a more heated debate. ¶12. (S) Trout thanked him for his candor and commented that telemetry had been an important element for nuclear arms treaties for over 15 years. He pointed out that prior to exchanging telemetry each Party was prone to overestimating the other Party's missile capabilities which led to each Party building missiles in greater numbers, that were of greater capability, and that cost significantly more in order to compensate for what was in reality a fictitious missile. Furthermore he continued, while the United States understood that Russia would be the only Party developing new missiles during the next 10 years, it may not be the case in the decade after that when the positions might be reversed and Russia would be very interested in telemetry. Trout argued that if telemetry were not exchanged in this treaty it was unlikely there would be an exchange of telemetry in a follow-on treaty. ¶13. (S) Trout asked how U.S. limited BMD assets would impact Russian strategic deterrence. Orlov conceded that at this moment it did not. However, he continued, what about in 10 years? He argued that it was very likely that U.S. technology, BMD capability, and number of assets would grow and improve. Oobviously Russia would continue to develop better technology to counter BMD capabilities, but once there were significant numbers of BMD assets the strategic balance could shift. -------------- DATABASE ISSUES -------------- ¶14. (S) Trout and Orlov turned to Section I of the database. Orlov delivered new text for paragraphs 2 and 3. Trout asked to go over, in detail, what data would be included in Sections III, IV, and V during the initial exchange based upon the agreement made at the last meeting (Ref B). After using various categories in these sections as examples, Trout and Orlov confirmed they both had the same idea on what specific data would be exchanged. Regarding the new text, Trout stated the United States would analyze it with the help of their legal staff. ¶15. (S) Moving to Section II, Mr. Pischulov noted that the Russian side had accepted placing the third 800 limit in paragraph 1 but had bracketed the phrase "equipped for nuclear armaments." Lobner replied that he understood this position as it was discussed in both the Expanded Ad Hoc meeting (Ref A) and in the last MOUWG meeting (Ref B). He added that the issue would be resolved once both sides had agreed on the definition of non-deployed heavy bombers. ¶Q. (S) Continuing in Section II, Pischulov asked that a new category, "non-deployed heavy bombers," be added to paragraph 2, stating that it was a logical place for this category. Lobner asked why the Russian side considered this logical as the category was really contained both as an aggregate in paragraph 1 (the 800 limit) and as its own category at the beginning of Section V. Furthermore, he continued, the categories in paragraph 2 are unique to the remainder of the document as they did not appear anywhere else as a combined aggregate, with the exception of test heavy bombers, as this category had a sublimit. After further discussion it was agreed that paragraph 2 should be deleted. ¶17. (S) Orlov brought up the topic of coordinates for ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs, asking whether the United States had changed its position on requiring this data, along with the size of the ICBM base and the size of the basing area. Trout replied that the U.S. position had not changed, nor did he have any new guidance on this topic. He repeated the offer made in the last MOUWG meeting (Ref B) that if Russia was willing to provide the boundary coordinates for the ICBM base, the United States would drop the size requirements. Orlov acknowledged he understood the offer but reiterated the Russian response was that it was unacceptable. ¶18. (S) Addressing Section III, Trout asked that the word "(Returned)" be added for the category of Non-deployed Mobile Launchers of ICBMs under the Production Facility for Mobile Launchers of ICBMs. Orlov agreed. ¶19. (S) Orlov turned to the category "warheads on deployed ICBMs" that was listed in the basing area. He argued that this was a unique category as it asked Russia to declare the number of warheads for each launcher regiment. He pointed out information of this nature would be provided at pre-inspection, as well as the individual warhead data by missile. Trout said he would think about this issue. ¶20. (S) Pischulov asked if there was any change to bracketed language in Section VI regarding the nomenclature for launchers at space launch facilities. Trout replied there was not. ¶21. (S) In Section VII, Pischulov engaged Lobner in a discussion over the term "version" versus "variant." Specifically, Pischulov argued that "variant" was the correct term when referring to mobile launchers because the nomenclature of the "types" declared was the same as missiles. Lobner pointed out that this issue was confusing because the Russian side, in practice under START, referred to the name of mobile launchers using the same nomenclature as its missiles. However, he continued, in reality they were actually referring to an item and any versions of that item. Trout added that for some time there were two versions of the launcher for RS-12M, versions A and B, which were different due to the location of the cab. Trout added, however, that he believed one of these versions no longer existed. ¶22. (S) Lobner pointed out that the definition for "version" had been agreed upon at the end of the last session in December, and read aloud the agreed definition. Pischulov and Orlov both stated they were unaware that this definition had been agreed, and that they would consult their Definitions Working Group members to understand this issue. ¶23. (S) With respect to Section VIII, Lobner informed Orlov that he had spoken with the Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG) about the issue of what technical characteristics should be included in the section. Lobner recommended, based on the recommendations of the IPWG, that the discussion on this be put on hold until the IPWG was able to discuss the Annex that would deal with heavy bomber inspections. At that time, he continued, both sides would have a better understanding of what characteristics were required in Section VIII to support inspections. Orlov agreed. ¶24. (S) Trout raised the question of bases overlapping since no coordinates would be provided and no size requirement would exist. Orlov assured Trout bases would not "walk away," and that the United States was very aware of where Russia's bases were located and their approximate size under START. Additionally, no bases overlapped in START and not that much would change in this treaty, he argued. He added that he viewed this as a U.S. "control issue," in that the United States wanted to control the movements of Russian mobile launchers by confining them to certain locations. ¶25. (S) Trout and Orlov agreed to discuss the new Russian-proposed text for Section I during the next meeting. ¶26. (S) Documents provided: - Russia: -- Section I, General Provisions, paragraphs 1 through 5. ¶27. (U) Participants: UNITED STATES Mr. Trout LT Lobner (RO) Ms. Gesse (Int) RUSSIA Gen Orlov Mr. Pischulov Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) ¶28. (U) Gottemoeller sends. KING