SFO-GVA-VIII: ARTICLE VIII MEETING, FEBRUARY 16, 2010

S E C R E T GENEVA 000159 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/26 TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: ARTICLE VIII MEETING, FEBRUARY 16, 2010 REF: 10 GENEVA 139 (SFO-GVA-VIII-048) 10 GENEVA 97 (SFO-GVA-VIII-021) CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-052. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: February 16, 2010 Time: 10:00 A.M. - 12:45 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva ¶3. (S) Amb Ries led a working group discussion of Article VIII to try to resolve the issue of releasability of the initial exchange of data. The U.S. side proposed compromise language in response to Russia's proposed changes to previously agreed and conformed paragraphs 1 and 2 of the text. Agreement was reached at the table on language for paragraphs 1 and 2 and several brackets were removed from the rest of the text. The Russian side remained steadfast in its insistence that only aggregate data for deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs and deployed heavy bombers; as well as aggregate data for deployed and non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs, and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers would be released publicly. End summary. ¶4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: A Database Must be Established; What to Call the Database; and Right to Release Information. -------------- A DATABASE MUST BE ESTABLISHED -------------- ¶5. (S) Ries opened the meeting by saying that the United States was pleased with the discussions the previous day (Reftel A). The United States understood the Russian position that, at the time of signature of the treaty, the database would not contain any data. The database would be created based on the categories and the rules laid out in the Protocol. With this understanding, the United States had reviewed the Russian paper passed during the previous meeting and, therefore, proposed a change to the language in paragraph 1 and 2 of Article VIII; the United States felt this change would not compromise either position. Ries read the following proposal for paragraph 1: A database pertaining to the obligations under this Treaty is provided for in Part Two and Four of the Protocol to this Treaty. ¶6. (S) General Poznikhir reacted by saying that the United States had said it understood the Russian position and now appeared to be walking back the agreement. There was no database; yet the United States was insisting there was one. ¶7. (S) Ries stated the United States did understand and wanted to convey clearly in the Treaty Article that a database would exist under this treaty. Poznikhir stated emphatically that there would be no database at signature, only categories, and asked for a written copy of the U.S. proposal. Poznikhir went on to say that there was a Protocol on Notifications and the Parties would be obliged every 6 months to exchange data. Mr. Lobach interjected that, if the United States wanted to ensure that a database would be established in the future, the U.S. delegation should write the text as such. Poznikhir offered that if the United States insisted, a sentence could be added saying, "The database shall be established in accordance with Part Four of the Protocol to the Treaty." Ries said that would be a good idea, as Part Two provided the rules and Part Four provided the template for the notifications. The sides agreed verbally to the following language: Begin text: ¶1. A database pertaining to the obligations under the Treaty shall be established in accordance with Parts II and IV of the Protocol to this Treaty. The categories of the database are set forth in Part II of the Protocol to the Treaty. ¶2. Each Party shall notify the other Party of changes in such data and shall provide other notifications provided for in Part IV of the Protocol to the Treaty. End text. -------------- WHAT TO CALL THE DATABASE -------------- ¶8. (S) The discussion next turned to the name of the database in Part Two of the Protocol. General Orlov proposed that the Parties agree to identify the database as "Database on Strategic Offensive Arms." This title was the same as the one being used in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Working Group to identify Part Two. Ries offered that since Orlov and Mr. Trout would be chairing a meeting that afternoon, this issue could be raised and agreed at that time. The Parties agreed that there were no further changes to paragraph 4 and 5 of Article VIII. -------------- RIGHT TO RELEASE INFORMATION -------------- ¶9. (S) The discussion next turned to the right of a Party to release information received in the initial exchange of data. Ries stated that the intention was to release information using the rules in Section II of Part Two. There was no data contained in Section II, therefore the phrase "and contained in Section II" was not needed. Moreover, the United States believed the phrase, "except as provided for in this Article" was not needed as paragraph 2, Section I of Part Two had been crafted to specifically exclude any sensitive information. Paragraph 2 now listed only what would be exchanged during the initial exchange of data. ¶10. (S) Poznikhir questioned the reference to Paragraph 2. Mr. Lobner recounted the agreement which had been reached by the Heads of Delegations (HOD) during a MOU Working Group meeting on February 5 (Reftel B). Lobner stated that the HODs had agreed that aggregate numbers for Section II would be provided in the initial exchange, but that no warhead data would be exchanged at that time. In addition, the aggregate numbers for Sections III, IV, and V would be exchanged, but no data by base would be provided. The technical characteristics in Sections VII, VIII, and IX would also be exchanged. Poznikhir confirmed that this was the agreement of what would be exchanged in the initial exchange; however, the Parties were discussing what would be released. Lobach stated the Russian position was that the only numbers to be released from the initial exchange would be two of the three numbers from Section II: the aggregate for deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs and deployed heavy bombers, and the aggregate for deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers and heavy bombers. ¶11. (S) Ries explained that the United States had agreed to make a special case of the first exchange of data by using the July 2009 START Data to populate the database. This data was already in the public domain and should not present a problem for releasability. Poznikhir retorted that the Parties were working on a new treaty and should forget about everything in START. Only the aggregate numbers would be released. The sides agreed that each Party had the right to release its own data, but the Russian side was against publishing Russia's data. ¶12. (S) Ries went on to explain that the United States was entering into a new treaty, which would require the support of the U.S. Senate and the U.S. Government also wanted the support of the public; the U.S. public had a right to know the basis upon which the government was entering into this treaty. As a matter of fact, Ries stated, there was a great deal of public discussion about START Follow-On. ¶13. (S) Mr. Koshelev interjected an example from implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention, recalling under that Treaty the Parties were obliged to transfer certain information. However, after the anthrax poisonings, all the information available on the internet was removed from the public domain. This was only prudent and reflected Russia's concern for strategic information in the public domain. ¶14. (S) Ries said that the United States understood what was on the table and that the Russian delegation had explained it clearly. The proposal to release only some of the aggregate numbers was very different from the U.S. approach. This approach was a completely different concept. Poznikhir countered that the approach depicted in paragraph 8 matched the U.S. approach. The Parties have the right to release the aggregate numbers. Ries reiterated the U.S. view was that everything in the initial exchange of data could be released except geographic coordinates, site diagrams, coastlines and waters diagrams and unique identifiers, as specified in paragraph 2, Section I, of Part Two of the Protocol. The aggregate numbers would always be released. ¶15. (S) Lobach then interjected that during a conforming meeting, the U.S. lawyer, Mr. Brown, had confirmed that the phrase "equipped for nuclear armaments" had been removed from all places in the text since the term "deployed heavy bomber" was an agreed term. In such a case, the use of the defined term was paramount. Ries stated that the term "non-deployed heavy bomber" had not yet been agreed and therefore the phrase must be included until the term was agreed. ¶16. (S) Orlov returned to the initial data exchange saying that the July 2009 START data would not exactly fit the categories of the new treaty and therefore the data in the initial exchange would be slightly different than the July 2009 START MOU update. ¶17. (U) Documents provided: - Russia: -- Revised Article VIII text dated February 16, 2010. ¶18. (U) Participants: UNITED STATES Amb Ries Lt Col Comeau Mr. Dean Dr. Fraley Lt. Lobner Mr. Taylor (RO) Mrs. Zdravecky Ms. Gross (Int) RUSSIA Gen. Poznikhir Mr. Koshelev Mr. Lobach Ms. Melikbekian Gen. Orlov Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) ¶19. (U) Gottemoeller sends. KING