SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP,

S E C R E T GENEVA 000155 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/26 TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP, FEBRUARY 12, 2010 REF: MOSCOW 000225 (SFO-MOS-007); 10 GENEVA 153 (SFO-GVA-VIII-034) 10 GENEVA 148 (SFO-GVA-VIII-038); 10 GENEVA 147 (SFO-GVA-VIII-037) CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-043. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: February 12, 2010 Time: 3:30 P.M. - 6:10 P.M. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) At the Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG) meeting on February 12 chaired by Dr. Warner and Col Ilin, the sides discussed an unofficial U.S. delegation proposal regarding a new approach to batching and the inspection of eliminated solid-fueled missile motor cases and mobile ICBM launchers. The sides also discussed unique identifiers (UIDs),conduct of Type-2 inspections at operational bases, and a new Russian-proposed Joint Draft Text (JDT) for Section VII of Part Five of the Protocol. ¶4. (S) The Russian-proposed JDT introduced inspection of ICBM silos converted to launch missile defense interceptors and added a provision to restrict the purpose of Type-2 inspections at conversion or elimination (CorE) facilities to only the confirmation of the results of eliminations. It also included a provision to allow inspectors to read UIDs, but only on eliminated ICBMs and SLBMs at CorE facilities during an inspection. End Summary. ¶5. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: U.S. Unofficial Proposal; Russian-proposed JDT; Inspecting ICBM Silos Converted to Launch Missile Defense Interceptors; Conduct of Type-2 Inspections at Type-1 Facilities; Concepts for Batching; and Unique Identifiers. -------------- U.S. UNOFFICIAL PROPOSAL FOR SECTION VII -------------- ¶6. (S) Ilin handed over a Russian-proposed draft JDT for Section VII of Part Five of the Protocol, but suggested the group work on the U.S. text first. Warner noted the United States did not have an official proposal, as the text could not be cleared by Washington because of the recent weather-related closures. He also highlighted the fact that Washington was virtually unaware that the delegations in Geneva had much different understandings of the agreements on solid-fueled missile and mobile ICBM launcher elimination reached during the Mullen-Makarov meetings in Moscow in January (Ref A),but that the U.S. delegation was actively seeking guidance on these issues. Warner recommended the working group explore each others' proposals for common ground and potential compromises. ¶7. (S) After giving the Russian side a copy of an unofficial U.S.-proposed Section VII, Warner again outlined the broader U.S. view of Type-2 inspections for all conversion or elimination activities discussed in the IPWG meeting on February 10, (Ref B), as well as the basic structure for a revised batching and inspection concept for the inspection of eliminated solid-fueled rocket motor cases at Votkinsk and mobile ICBM launchers at Piban'shur. ¶8. (S) Warner noted that U.S. proposals sought to address all conversion or elimination activity within the Type-2 inspection regime. While the primary focus of discussions had been on elimination of solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs and mobile ICBM launchers, both sides also needed to look at procedures for Type-2 inspections of eliminated silo launchers, as well as conversions of SLBM launchers, and conversion of heavy bombers (HB) from nuclear to non-nuclear armaments. Warner recommended withholding discussion of the controversial issue of the conversion of individual SLBM launchers aboard SSBNs for another meeting. ¶9. (S) For inspections of eliminated solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs, Warner explained the new, unofficial U.S. proposal under which the United States would only inspect the Votkinsk CorE facility twice per year, but could choose either to inspect the semi-annual 25 percent batches of burned-out motor cases accumulated by the Russians, or inspect the facility, including the eliminated items on display, during periods not associated with the two accumulations. If the United States chose to inspect outside one of the accumulation windows, he emphasized that inspection teams must be able to inspect all items subject to inspection within the boundaries of the inspectable area and not just the eliminated missiles or mobile ICBM launchers. Ilin disagreed on the scope of the inspection, insisting that the eliminated items were the only inspectable items at these CorE facilities. (Begin comment: Col Petrov was overheard telling Ilin that everything within the boundaries of such facilities was inspectable under START, but this seemed to make no difference to Ilin. End comment.) -------------- DISCUSSION ON RUSSIAN-PROPOSED JDT -------------- ¶10. (S) Discussion moved to the Russian-proposed JDT, which added several sub-paragraphs to paragraph 2 of Section VII for specific facilities: sub-para (b) to allow Type-2 inspections of eliminated silo launchers at ICBM bases and inspections at submarine bases for SSBNs converted to SSGNs; sub-para (c) to state the purpose of inspections at CorE facilities for solid-fueled missiles or mobile ICBM launchers was only to confirm the elimination of these items; sub-para (d) for inspection of heavy bombers (HBs) converted to non-nuclear armaments at their basing locations; sub-para (e) to inspect silo launchers of ICBMs converted to launch missile defense interceptors at Vandenberg AFB (VAFB); and an additional clause that would exempt from inspection and prohibit access to any other facilities at ICBM bases, submarine bases, and CorE facilities when conducting Type-2 elimination inspections at these sites. ¶11. (S) In response to a question from Warner, Ilin clarified that sub-para (b) for inspections of SSGNs dealt strictly with the full conversion of an SSBN into an SSGN and would be conducted under two situations: to confirm completion of the conversion; and to confirm the cruise missile launchers had not been reconverted. Warner noted that Ilin had discussed this topic during the previous day's Expanded Ad Hoc Group meeting (Ref C),and requested that Ilin provide his talking points in writing. Ilin demurred, claiming he did not yet have authorization from the Russian Head of Delegation (HOD). ¶12. (S) Warner noted the Russian proposal was that inspection of converted HBs would only take place at air bases and asked if Russia would inspect HBs at CorE facilities where the conversion process actually occurred. Warner indicated that the United States planned to continue to carry out conversions of HBs at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base (DMAFB),probably through the life of the treaty. Ilin claimed Russia had based its language on HBs on U.S. language in a draft agreed statement discussed on February 11 (Ref D),but the lack of a definition for non-deployed HBs had created a problem. ¶13. (S) Warner said the individual HBs at DMAFB would remain deployed HBs equipped for nuclear armaments until the conversion process on each was completed. As all provisions for inspection of converted HBs were contained in paragraph 1 of Section VII, the United States had not considered it necessary to include a special provision in paragraph 2. Both sides agreed to consider whether a separate provision for inspection of HBs undergoing conversion at DMAFB was needed in paragraph 2. -------------- INSPECTING ICBM SILOS CONVERTED TO LAUNCH MISSILE DEFENSE INTERCEPTORS -------------- ¶14. (S) Ilin raised the issue of inspection of the former ICBM silo launchers located at VAFB, which had been converted to launch missile defense interceptors (MDI). Citing discussion on these(MDI)during the February 11 Expanded Ad Hoc Group meeting (Ref C),Ilin proposed that converted silo launchers be subject to inspection to ensure against reconversion in the same manner as HBs converted to carry non-nuclear armaments. ¶15. (S) Warner reminded Ilin that Article V of the draft treaty banned conversion of ICBM silo launchers to launch MDI, with the exception that the ban did not apply to former ICBM silo launchers located at VAFB that had been converted prior to signature of this treaty. Warner stated that this issue was being discussed at the HOD level, and might possibly develop into an agreed statement. Ilin claimed that the Russian HOD understood that "technical elements" for the development of such an agreed statement could be discussed in the IPWG. Warner reemphasized that the sensitivity of including missile defense issues in the SFO Treaty was so great that this matter required special handling. He recommended both sides note this issue and report to their respective HODs. ¶16. (S) When Ilin clarified that the Russian provision in sub-para (e) was intended to focus on silos at VAFB and not at ICBM bases; Warner reminded him that those launchers were located at the VAFB Space Launch Facility, which was not and would not be subject to inspection. Ilin asked why the United States was ready to resolve Russian concerns about reconversion of HBs and SLBM launchers, but was not willing to discuss the converted silos at VAFB. Ilin proposed to introduce such inspections of MDI at VAFB into Section VII as a Type-2 inspection. Warner replied that any discussion on this topic should be at the Expanded Ad Hoc Group level. -------------- CONDUCT OF TYPE-2 INSPECTIONS AT ICBM, SUBMARINE, and AIR BASES -------------- ¶17. (S) Ilin noted both the U.S. and Russian proposals included provisions that would exclude other items or portions of facilities from access during a Type-2 inspection to confirm an elimination or conversion. Warner stated the United States agreed with a portion of this understanding - if an inspection team were at an ICBM base to see an eliminated silo or at a submarine base to see a converted SLBM launcher, only those items would be inspected. However, the United States had a different view on CorE facilities. ¶18. (S) Warner noted both sides had agreed early on to include CorE facilities within the list of facilities subject to Type-2 inspections, and the general rules for these inspections in paragraph 1 of Section VII stated that their purpose was to confirm the accuracy of declared data specified for such facilities on the number and types of non-deployed items. If a team conducted a Type-2 inspection at a CorE facility, it had the right to inspect the facility for non-deployed items declared for that facility. ¶19. (S) Ilin claimed the purpose for inspection of a CorE facility should be to confirm the results of elimination, not to confirm the presence of non-deployed items of inspection. According to Ilin, Russia did not store any other non-deployed items at its CorE facilities, only eliminated items. He stated that the only purpose for coming to a CorE facility was to confirm the fact of elimination, which consisted of three elements: 1) confirm the number of items eliminated that was declared in the notification and pre-inspection brief; 2) view the eliminated items; and 3) record the UIDs for these eliminated items. ¶20. (S) Warner countered that there could be some other non-deployed items at such facilities which were still in the process of elimination, but their elimination was not yet completed. Even if the purpose of the inspection was to confirm the results of elimination, a side would still have the opportunity to inspect the area within the site diagram to confirm data on inspectable items - mobile launchers at Piban'shur or first stages of ICBMs and SLBMs at Votkinsk at whatever stage they might be within the elimination process. Warner noted the same would apply to HBs undergoing conversion at DMAFB, where such bombers could be seen in all stages of the process. ¶21. (S) Ilin recognized that views on inspections at CorE facilities differed, and claimed to be surprised at this U.S. "addition." He requested the United States provide in writing its reasons for wanting to verify the numbers of non-deployed missiles located at a CorE facility at the time of an inspection. ¶22. (S) Warner pointed out this was not an addition; it had been a component of jointly-agreed text on the conduct of Type-2 inspections from the beginning of the negotiations. Russia had proposed to include CorE inspections under Type-2 long before the United States agreed to include the inspection of eliminated items as part of a Type-2 inspection during the Mullen-Makarov talks in Moscow in January (Ref A). Warner asked Ilin what the Russian delegation had in mind regarding the conduct of Type-2 inspections at CorE facilities when it had initially agreed that Type-2 inspections would be carried out at CorE facilities. ¶23. (S) Ilin reiterated Russia's position that the basic purpose of inspections at CorE inspections was to confirm the results of elimination and claimed that the United States was now seeking to broaden access at such sites, which would increase inspection time. Warner commented that, at Votkinsk and Piban'shur, inspecting the entire site would not be a time-consuming activity and recommended the group explore the provisions for batching and inspection of eliminated items at these two facilities. -------------- CONCEPTS FOR BATCHING -------------- ¶24. (S) Ilin claimed he could not talk about inspection of non-deployed items at CorE facilities, but outlined the two situations Russia envisioned for elimination inspections at these facilities: Situation 1 under the general rules for a short notice Type-2 inspection; Situation 2 after notification by the inspected Party of the accumulation of the agreed-upon number of eliminated items for that batching period. Ilin explained that the concentration (accumulation or batching) of eliminated items would not apply to inspections conducted by the inspecting Party in Situation 1. ¶25. (S) Warner stated the United States may need a notification of the start of the accumulation period so that an inspection team did not arrive accidently during the period of accumulation activity. The timing for a second notification, opening the window for inspection or national technical means (NTM) observation would be provided in Part Four of the Protocol. ¶26. (S) Smirnov asked Warner to confirm his understanding of the U.S. proposal which was that if the United States inspected the first batch of 25 percent of eliminated items, then inspected the facility at some other time prior to the concentration of the second batch, the second concentration period would not be required. Warner replied that this was a correct understanding. ¶27. (S) Ilin noted that if that were the case, the United States would see less than 50 percent of the items planned for elimination in that year. Warner agreed that if the United States inspected during one concentration period and one non-concentration period, it would get less than 50 percent and if the United States chose to inspect twice, both times during non-concentration periods, the United States might see significantly less than 50 percent. It was important for the United States to have the chance to conduct a short notice inspection of those items that had not yet been concentrated or to see items that the Russians had not chosen to be part of a particular batch, but which may or may not be going through their NTM display period. -------------- UNIQUE IDENTIFIERS -------------- ¶28. (S) Ilin asked how the United States envisioned viewing and recording of UIDs during inspections at CorE facilities. Warner stated that the broad application of the use of UIDs on strategic offensive arms (SOA) was one of the agreements from the Mullen-Makarov talks (Ref A),and recording of UIDs was relevant to all Type-1 and Type-2 inspections. Through the use of UIDs in notifications and in pre-inspection briefings, the inspecting Party could confirm the numbers and UIDs for items at all facilities, to include those where non-deployed SOA were located. ¶29. (S) Ilin agreed that Admiral Mullen and General Makarov had talked about broadly applying UIDs, but, as Ilin recalled, Russian agreement to the broad application of UIDs was made in return for the United States dropping all remaining demands on mobile launchers of ICBMs and their missiles. Now that situation might not be as clear. ¶30. (S) Warner summarized the results of the day's discussion, noting that both sides had good drafts and similar approaches to elimination of solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs and mobile ICBM launchers, with one exception - that being the element of inspecting non-deployed missiles and mobile ICBM launchers at CorE facilities. When Ilin interjected that this was a new element that deviated from the agreements reached during the Mullen-Makarov talks, Warner corrected him stating that it may be a new issue to Ilin, but not to the two delegations. ¶31. (U) Documents provided: - United States: -- Unofficial Proposal for Section VII of Part Five of the Protocol, dated February 12, 2010 - Russia: -- Russian Proposal, Section VII of Part Five of the Protocol, dated February 12, 2010 ¶32. (U) Participants: UNITED STATES Dr. Warner Mr. Albertson Mr. Buttrick MAJ Johnson LTC Litterini Mr. McConnell (RO) Ms. Purcell Mr. Rust LT Sicks Mr. Smith Ms. Gesse (Int) RUSSIA Col Ilin Mr. Lyasovskiy Col Petrov Mr. G. Shevchenko Mr. Smirnov Mr. Venevtsev Ms. Vodopolova Col Zaitsev Ms. Komshilova (Int) ¶33. (U) Gottemoeller sends. KING