SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP,

S E C R E T GENEVA 000153 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/26 TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP, FEBRUARY 10, 2010 REF: 10 GENEVA 85 (SFO-GVA-VIII-025) CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-034. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: February 10, 2010 Time: 3:00 P.M. - 5:00 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) At the Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG) meeting chaired by Dr. Warner and Col Ilin, the sides discussed the proposed approaches for Type-2 inspections of converted or eliminated strategic offensive arms (SOA),located either at operational bases or at CorE facilities. The U.S.-proposed text contained uniform Type-2 inspection parameters for confirming converted heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, converted SLBM launchers, eliminated silo ICBM launchers, eliminated solid-fuel ICBMs and SLBMs, and eliminated mobile ICBM launchers. The Russian side disagreed with this approach, but said it would study the U.S. proposal. End Summary. ¶4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Parity for All; The Haymaker Right: SSBN Launcher Conversion; The Golden Middle: and Solid-Fueled ICBM Elimination Inspections. -------------- PARITY FOR ALL -------------- ¶5. (S) Warner requested the Russian response to the U.S. counter-proposals in Sections V and VII of Part Five of the Protocol, provided at the previous meeting (Reftel). Ilin, clearly pressed for time, given the Russian mission's pending "Day of the Diplomat" reception that evening, expressed hesitation with the U.S. approach of handling all conversion or elimination inspections as consistently as possible with other Type-2 inspections. Under the U.S. approach, inspection procedures, duration, and team composition provisions would be broadly applied to all Type-2 conversion or elimination inspections, save for a limited scope of verification of eliminated silo launchers of ICBMs or converted SLBM launchers located at operational bases. ¶6. (S) Ilin noted that separate language may be required for each specific kind of conversion or elimination inspection, vice the one-size-fits-all proposals the United States had tabled. Ilin even opened the possibility that silo eliminations and SLBM launcher conversions could be handled as a piggyback to a Type-1 inspection at these types of operational bases; Warner pointed out that this was the original U.S. proposal for confirming silo elimination and SLBM launcher conversion, which the Russian side had rejected. ¶7. (S) After a lengthy discussion on the conversion of a very small number of launchers on SSBNs, Ilin returned to the general theory of conversion or elimination inspections, stating that Russia was still holding to limits of only five inspectors, a 12-hour duration, and no time extensions for solid-fueled ICBM or SLBM missile or mobile ICBM launcher elimination inspections. Furthermore, he said sequential inspections should not be conducted in association with conversion or elimination inspections, refuting U.S. arguments that these limits would interfere with the conduct of sequential inspections, either before or after the conversion or elimination inspection. Warner offered several options that would employ subgroups of a 10-inspector team, providing flexibility to the inspecting party, but it was clear the Russian side had no desire to seek solutions that would facilitate sequential inspections associated with solid-fueled missile elimination inspections. -------------- THE HAYMAKER RIGHT: SLBM LAUNCHER CONVERSION -------------- ¶8. (S) During the discussion on conversion or elimination inspections, Warner reminded Ilin that all rights afforded to U.S. teams during solid-fueled ICBM or SLBM elimination inspections would be afforded to Russian teams during silo elimination and SLBM launcher conversion inspections at U.S. operational bases. Ilin and Petrov attempted to correct Warner, saying that SLBM launchers could not be converted unless all were converted and the submarine subsequently became an SSGN, for which there were already specific and agreed procedures in an agreed statement. Warner explained that the Treaty and Protocol language provided for the conversion of individual launchers onboard an SSBN to non-SLBM-capable status, a process the United States fully intended to utilize in order to meet both the 700 strategic deployed delivery vehicle and 800 aggregate deployed and non-deployed "launcher" limits. ¶9. (S) The entire Russian contingent was visibly stunned regarding the U.S. assertion that procedures for the conversion of individual SLBM launchers were already agreed. This included Mr. Smirnov, a regular participant in discussions on this issue which occurred between Mr. Elliott and Col Ryzhkov in the Conversion or Elimination Working Group. Warner reminded the Russian side of the extensive discussions which occurred on this matter between those two principals. He made clear that such launch tubes would be rendered incapable of launching an SLBM and therefore would no longer be accountable as SLBM launchers. The Russian side would be allowed to confirm this in a Type-2 inspection. Ilin argued that they should also be inspectable during Type-1 inspections as launchers not containing an SLBM as a means to ensure these launchers were not reconverted into launchers capable of launching an SLBM. Petrov argued that the launchers must be eliminated in order to remove them from accountability, but Warner corrected him that conversion was also a means of removal from accountability. Ilin concluded that this was a serious change, which the Russian side must consider carefully. -------------- -------------- THE GOLDEN MIDDLE: SOLID-FUELED ICBM ELIMINATION INSPECTIONS -------------- -------------- ¶10. (S) Ilin reiterated the Russian position that only 50 percent of the annual eliminated total would be batched and that no more than two inspections per year could be conducted at each CorE facility. Warner pointed out the inconsistencies in the Russian arguments requiring steady-state inflows and outflows of ICBMS for elimination, and also cited safety concerns, which limited the number of ICBMS simultaneously permitted within the Votkinsk Final Assembly Facility, as Mr. Smirnov had briefed previously. If the process flow was, in fact, the way Smirnov had briefed, Warner pointed out, then the U.S. batching proposal (100 percent) and frequency of inspections (four times annually) was not a difficult proposition, particularly given the requirement for a 60-day display of eliminated first stages for national technical means (NTM) viewing. ¶11. (S) Smirnov sought to refute Warner's argument by saying the Russian side had not agreed to a 60-day NTM display window for eliminated first stages of solid-fueled ICBMs, but was proposing 30 days. Warner countered with the fact that the 60-day NTM window had been agreed by the Russian side in December 2009 in Part Three of the Protocol, but the Russian side was now again bracketing that text in an effort to secure a smaller 30-day NTM window. The 60-day NTM window requirement lowered the amount of additional dwell time eliminated first stages would remain on display at Votkinsk as part of the batching process, and would still ensure the same sustained rate of outflows to downstream disposition of eliminated first stages of solid-fueled ICBMs or SLBMs. ¶12. (S) Warner suggested the sides consider a combined inspection alternative: that Russia would batch solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs and mobile ICBM launchers twice annually, with each batch equaling 25 percent of the annual elimination output. What would be new was that the United States would also have the right to conduct Type-2 inspections at the solid-fueled missile and mobile ICBM launcher CorE facilities during the time periods between the two batched accumulations. Furthermore, the U.S. inspection team could inspect all items of inspection within the CorE facility, not only those eliminated items that were displayed in the open. Under this arrangement, while the Russian side would only need to batch 50 percent of the annual eliminated items, 100 percent of the eliminated items would be potentially subject to inspection each year. The United States would have the right to inspect not only the 50 percent of items that were batched, but could inspect as well, portions of the remaining 50 percent of eliminated items not subject to batching. The Votkinsk and Piban'shur CorE facilities would each be subject to up to two Type-2 inspections each year. Warner underscored that this was not an official proposal, but rather a concept for discussion by the sides. ¶13. (S) Ilin appeared interested in the prospect of such a compromise solution. He reiterated that batching no more than 50 percent of the eliminated items was a red line for the Russian side, and that another major concern was maintaining an uninterrupted, steady-state downstream flow of eliminated ICBM motor casings. With Ilin, Zaitsev, S. Shevchenko, Smirnov, and Petrov all nodding in unison, the Russian contingent did not seem at all alarmed at the prospect of being subject to short-notice Type-2 inspections during the non-batching periods of the elimination year. Ilin promised that the Russian side would begin discussing this concept internally. He reiterated, however, that the Russian side did not see a "great future" for sequential inspections in conjunction with conversion or elimination inspections. ¶14. Ilin proposed removing several minor brackets in Section VIII of Part Five which deals with the conduct of exhibitions. The sides proved unable to clear the brackets on the exhibitions of new conversion or elimination processes that have been applied for the first time. Following the discussion on exhibitions, Warner proposed beginning work on the selected portions of the Annex to Part Five of the Protocol as soon as possible during upcoming IPWG sessions. Ilin cautioned that the Russian side was convinced that the sides needed to complete work on "more global" issues of the Protocol before turning to the Annex. ¶15. (U) Documents provided: None. ¶16. (U) Participants: UNITED STATES Dr. Warner Mr. Ahlm Mr. Buttrick Mr. Elliott Lt Col Goodman MAJ Johnson LTC Litterini (RO) Mr. McConnell Ms. Purcell Mr. Rust Mr. Smith Ms. Gesse (Int) RUSSIA Col Ilin Col Petrov Mr. S. Shevchenko Mr. Smirnov Ms. Vodopolova Col Zaitsev Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) ¶17. (U) Gottemoeller sends. KING